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Abstract
This thesis is about diasporic audiences and their experiences of news. The main concern 
throughout is the under-researched question of how members of a diasporic audience, 
such as the Palestinians in Britain, use news, what they do with it and what it means for 
their social action and interaction. Taking into account the diverse news media the 
Palestinians in Britain engage with, this thesis investigates what news means for 
diasporas like the Palestinians - what it means for identity, belonging and community and 
what it means for their participation in societal action — by exploring the meanings 
surrounding the act of engagement with news narratives, rather than by examining the 
moment of consumption per se. Using a synthesis of original empirical work and an inter­
disciplinary theoretical inquiry into political communication, nationalism, identity, news 
and collective memory, this thesis shows that news, particularly television news, emerges 
as a significant resource in the informants’ lives, around whose consumption the 
informants’ discourses of identity, of belonging and community and of citizenship are 
fraught with tensions between the personal and the political and between the national and 
cosmopolitan. In paying attention to the processes die informants use to make sense of 
news, it shows how the informants discourses about themselves and their community 
alternate between dogmatic and closed discourses of thinking and arguing, reflecting 
tension between the self and the other and between the cosmopolitan and the national. In 
exploring the social uses of news, the thesis addresses the contexts within which news 
can enable or disable participation and social action, therefore drawing attention to the 
need for a differentiated understanding of the relationship between news and its audience, 
and between news and possibilities of citizenship.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
As I started pulling this study together in November 2004, a critical event in the 
continuous narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict hit the news headlines — the death 
of Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat on November 11. Journalists and 
politicians vied to find different interpretations to explain what was going on; to discuss 
the burning question of succession and hypothesise about the impact of Arafat’s death on 
the intractable peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.
The political, national and international ramifications of this event are beyond the 
remit of this study, but the implications of this latest ‘news event’ for the Palestinians in 
Britain (the subjects of this study) and elsewhere are central to this inquiry, an 
exploration of the relationship between news narratives and discourses of identity. Just 
like the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) of September 2000 and the ensuing 
violence between Israel and the Palestinians; the September 11,2001, attacks in the US; 
the ‘war against terror’ and the war in Iraq; the death of Arafat and the uncertainty it 
created served to bring the Palestinians in Britain and elsewhere into the public gaze 
while raising fresh questions about Palestinian-ness, what it means to be Palestinian.
Up until the second intifada, talk among the Palestinians in Britain about Palestinian- 
ness and its twin narrative Palestinian-ism (Palestinian national consciousness or 
nationalism) had been confined to their private, subjective sphere. This is a space where 
the Palestinians, much like other diasporic and migrant groups, talk and argue among
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themselves about questions related to themselves, to their homeland and to the host 
country. However, this news event and others related to the ongoing conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinians opened questions about the relationship between this private 
space and the wider British space, where Palestinians in Britain have been expected to 
give considered arguments about issues of global concerns, about their affiliations and 
about their points o f reference amid concerns about their loyalties and their political 
affiliations. What was significant in this context was how mainstream (mainly Western) 
news discourses and the meanings and representations generated and circulated by the 
local (British) media were perceived among the members of this diaspora to sustain 
relationships of domination and questions of othering.
Amid heightened tension and worries about the repercussions of terrorism, discourses 
about Israel’s and the US’s wars against ‘terror’ and the relationship between the Middle 
East, Islam and the West, the questions in the public domain were concerned with 
whether the pluralisation of ‘publics’, the public ‘sphericules’ that embody the particular 
interests of different social and cultural groups, may challenge the overall collective 
interests (cf. Gitlin 1998) of the nation-state. Such questions relating to Habermas’ 
normative ideal of the public sphere have been central to contemporary debates on 
globalising and globalised media industries and on their real and perceived challenges to 
the old, taken-for-granted ways in which people thought of cultural and political spaces.
The narrative that unfolds in the following chapters does not specifically address the 
possibility of the existence of different ‘publics’, nor does it analyse the representations 
in news texts, concerns that have engaged media and cultural critics for the past few 
decades. Rather, it is concerned with an exploration of the social role of news and the
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relationship between news and identity work. Yet, it was within contexts such as those 
mentioned above that I found myself addressing the central questions of this study: How 
do the Palestinians in Britain make sense of news? How do they appropriate the meanings 
of news in their daily lives? And, what are the implications of this appropriation to 
questions of inclusion and exclusion, recognition and invisibility in the wider social space 
they inhabit as well as to the understanding of power processes in societies?
1.1 Why News
The focus on news, rather than on media in general, is intentional. At the simplest level, 
news presents us with an ongoing narrative about the world beyond our immediate 
experience and from which we could draw our own cognitive maps of reality. Beyond 
this basic function, it is argued, one of the key tasks of journalism is to make information 
publicly available as this is one ‘basic ingredient of the public sphere [...] required for 
public participation in discussion and decisions’ (Jensen 1986:31).
However, a comprehensive, though by no means exhaustive, survey of the range of 
interdisciplinary literature on news, particularly political news, suggests that 
understanding the task of journalism in contemporary societies remains a ‘grey’ area, not 
the least because of the general confusion about the basic epistemological questions 
concerning how best to open up the debate over the meaning of news in societies. In 
political science scholarship, where inquiry into journalism is considered relevant to 
understanding the workings of the state and the functioning of political systems, inquiry 
has tended to address news as providing information and as serving a democratic function
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(cf. Schudson 1995), and by implication, as a precondition for the political, economic and 
cultural participation of individuals at the local, national and global levels.
Given these normative assumptions, much of the literature discusses news in terms of 
its relationship to public opinion; to how and whether it makes people interested in 
politics and/or helps them make decisions as ‘rational’ (cf Habermas 1989) citizens; 
what or who governs news values; the nature of news work and the dynamics of political 
information inherent in the texts, among other issues related to elections and voter 
interest. Most of these discussions are, to a certain extent, concerned with the question of 
effect, which remains one of the most outstanding conundrums in contemporary societies.
Of the main theoretical paradigms suggesting that media’s and news’ role in societies 
is essentially benevolent, i.e. having little social impact, is the ‘uses and gratifications’ 
approach, which, in simple terms, asserts that people use media to gratify their needs. 
Adopting a functional approach to how people use media, it shifted the question of media 
power from the media to the audience, overturning thinking of the much maligned 
effects model of media power, while raising a number of questions regarding human 
agency, and, more precisely, how people make sense of meaning in different ways. This 
functionalist approach contrasts with the ‘agenda-setting’ perspective of the relationship 
between media and the audience, which sees a ‘... causal relationship between the 
[journalistic] content of the media agenda and subsequent public perception of what 
important issues...are’ (McCombs 1981: 211).
Critical theorists, building on Marxist and analytical frameworks of political economy 
have also challenged ‘benign’ views of news’ influence, pointing out that journalism’s 
function is essentially one of social reproduction that mostly caters for the dominant
10
groups and classes, while structuralists, such as van Dijk (1988), have argued that the 
linguistic structure of news puts the audience in a subordinate position vis-a-vis the 
dominant class of capitalist — these arguments regard ideology as produced in language. 
Critics of these latter positions (e.g. Scannell 1989), however, counter that such a 
framework is not only simplistic, but also repeats the early assumptions of the media 
effects tradition, which assumed a ‘hypodermic needle’ effect. Others, like Stuart Hall 
aid Umberto Eco, point out that though dominant ideological messages are possible, 
there can be oppositional decodings by the audience members of the text.
12 Exploring the Audience for News
Diawing on these latter perspectives, audience and reception studies have provided crucial 
insights into how people, in their making sense of news, are involved in processes and 
pa.'tems that have a bearing on their behaviour. However, the outcome has often been 
coitradictory, confirming that trying to find a direct causal relationship between news and 
its audience remains a difficult, if not a contentious project. For example, while 
Cunberbatch et al.’s (1986) study of audience perceptions of the UK 1984-5 miners’ strike 
showed that viewers were resistant to the dominant messages of the news, Philo’s (1990) 
wcrk claimed the opposite, seeing media as providing information that relates to people’s 
beliefs, and Hall et al.’s Policing the Crisis (1978) showed that news organisations do not 
only report events, but are active agents in constructing the socio-political environment 
which frames these events in the public imagination. Furthermore, it has been difficult to
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reach conclusive evidence over media’s effect on people, particularly because, as several 
studies have shown, it is difficult to isolate media use from other social actions.
Broadly speaking, within cultural studies, a discipline that broadly informs this work, 
inquiry into news has moved in tandem with, but also in opposition to the pronounced and 
conventional understanding of how journalism works. Research has often focused on the 
meanings, symbols and symbolic systems, rituals and conventions by which journalists 
maintain their authority, moving beyond presumptions that journalism plays a “role 
everyone knows” of “afflicting the powerful.. .while comforting the afflicted” because it 
“severely limits .. .what sorts of questions can be asked about the news media in our society” 
(Allan 1999: 2-3).
While early work within British cultural studies, such as the scholarship at the Centre 
for Contemporary and Cultural Studies in Birmingham, broadly based its groundwork on 
political news, producing a rich corpus of work, there has been a shift in recent inquiry to 
different dimensions of contemporary journalism, such as the tabloids, infotainment, the 
alternative media and the online format (e.g. Langer 1998; Sparks and Tulloch 2000), 
therefore providing a vision of journalism that is more focused on entertainment and 
personalisation of news, the human interest and the pleasurable, than on political news, 
while emphasising alternative lines of explanation that tend to eschew the mainstream 
dimensions of news that remain paramount in political and social life.
Indeed, the general bias in research that begins with the assumption that entertainment 
does not equate with information, though broadening the understanding of journalism 
beyond the particular loci in which it has traditionally been examined, has not helped offer 
answers about the potential social role of news, rather keeping the inquiry within what
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Dahlgren (1992) has called a narrow ‘metonymic’ conception of journalism and of politics. 
What has added to the problem is the tendency within much of the literature to incorporate 
news in a taken-for-granted way in discussions of media in the broad sense, which Carey 
(cited in Zelizer 2004: 186) has taken issue with because “to confuse journalism with media 
or communication is to confuse the fish story with the fish.”
Divisions over how to address journalism are not confined to the academy, but stretch 
across to debates within the profession itself. Here, however, the debates are of a different 
and more simplistic nature — many journalists and practitioners continue to resist 
introspection and reflexivity about their profession, remaining staunchly wedded to idealist 
notions that what they report on is the reality out there; to notions of objectivity and balance 
while opposing suggestions that they can serve the interests of the elite or powerful. These 
divisions have raised fresh questions over how to engage the epistemological uneasiness at 
the core of journalism and cultural studies in a way that maintains the integrity of both.
Though inquiries into this epistemological quandary, drawing on the methodological 
techniques of content and textual analysis and the parameters of production and constraints, 
have been made and used to good effect, I argue that a bottom-up approach, i.e. an audience 
study, can, too, provide a fresh understanding of the social meanings of news; why it 
remains central to some people’s everyday lives and how they use it as a resource in their 
everyday social and cultural experiences and as a resource for identity and memory work.
Meaning-making takes on additional urgency because the proliferation of, and easy 
access, to transnational media, particularly news-focused satellite television targeting 
diasporic as well as national audiences, has not only challenged the dominance of the 
mainstream news media (such as the public service model in Europe), but also conventional
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models about the power of news, such as the transmission model of communication. Indeed, 
it is the availability of different and often competing news narratives that call into question 
the prevalent understanding of news as providing and reproducing information, a function 
that has been seen as vital for the smooth running of democratic societies. And, it is both 
individual agency and cultural constraints that make it relevant to understand news, this 
thesis argues, as cultural discourse (cf. Dahlgren 1992/
Understanding news as cultural discourse allows us to see - to borrow from Schudson 
(1995) -  how news is related to, but is not the same as, ideology; is related to, but not the 
same as, information; and it is potentially, though only indirectly, a social force. Crucially, it 
draws attention to the ways in which the daily recurrence and the culturally recognisable 
features in news programmes can “link the viewer and his/her everyday life to the larger 
world in a manner which is ritualistic, symbolic and ultimately mythic” (Dahlgren 1992: 
205). Significantly, such an understanding addresses how news is legitimised in people’s 
lives through its use as ritual while allowing for an examination of its potential as a catalyst 
that may help shift people’s thinking and talk about themselves and their communities.
These arguments necessitate an empirical investigation into how people talk of news and 
what this telling tells us about belonging and boundary-drawing and about the contemporary 
diasporic condition at a time of heightened physical and symbolic interaction. It is through 
such an exploration that we can address the implications for identity and citizenship of the 
complex processes of negotiating positions in the private and public spheres that 
‘transnational’ communities, such as the Palestinians concerned in this study, are 
continuously engaging in.
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1.3 Identity; why it matters
Academic concern with the concept of identity has a long history, which I will not detail 
here. Briefly, this concern derives from the exceptional plurality of the meanings of 
identity, meanings that are condensed and interwoven as the term circulates in everyday 
speech (Woodward 1997), and from its centrality in contemporary debates in cultural 
studies and social theory. Interest in de-constructing the term itself grew as scholarship 
began to associate the ways in which identities are constructed in response to, along with 
social, cultural and socio-economic factors, systems of representation. As defined by Hall 
(1997), representation refers to the signifying practices and symbolic systems through 
which meanings are produced and which position people as subjects. Thus, it seems 
logical to suggest that representation can have an impact on how people construct their 
identities and that symbolic products, including news, can help people find answers to the 
questions: ‘Who am I? What could I be? And who do I want to be’ (Woodward 1997:14).
As recent scholarship has attested, these questions are particularly poignant for 
diasporas, which, this thesis argues, are cultural, economic, political and social 
formations in the process o f becoming, not being, which means they are responsive to 
‘media’ representations and to local, global and international crises. By definition (see, 
e.g., Cohen 1997), diasporas are the product of economic, historical and political 
globalising conditions in the contemporary world, the result of power contestations and 
organisations of spatial and economic configurations. Because these conditions are 
mostly irreversible1, diasporas are often taken to suggest a condition of permanence.
1 This, however, does not mean that diasporas cannot reverse the process, as has been the case, to some 
degree, with the Jewish and Armenian diasporas.
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However, this does not mean they are stable, arrived at, cultures.Indeed, the opening 
paragraphs in this chapter show how diasporic groups, such as the Palestinians’, can be 
subjected to ruptures caused by real political and social events that are mediated by a 
wide array of news media and how these mediated events can serve to jolt memories.
Writing in the journal Diaspora on the historical rise and fall of Armenian diaspora 
centres, Tolyalan (2000), points to these very ruptures in noting how this particular 
history has been marked by expulsions, on the one hand, and by periodic consolidations 
of new diasporic centres, on the other, therefore contributing to what he calls a transition 
in the understanding of this culture from an exilic to diasporic transnationalism. Seen 
differently, one can view this history as one marked by movements or alternations 
between alienation and consolidation, exile and peaceful sojourning (Werbner 2002). She 
writes:
During periods of consolidation, diasporas not only prosper, but establish powerful 
transnational organisations and community institutions. This long and complex 
history means that at any one time, dominant, emergent and dying diaspora 
communities co-exist simultaneously in different parts of the world, some in a state 
of ascendancy and some in decline. (Werbner 2002: 9-10)
In fact, as she points out, members of a ‘self-defined’ diasporic community may be so 
assimilated into the host country that they retain mere vestiges of difference, in the form 
of a totem identity — like a flag or a picture of the homeland — put in a special place to 
maintain the ‘national imagery’ or to flag it when support of the country of origin or the 
collective cause is mobilised. Yet, at the same time, they are materially embodied social
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formations, requiring an enormous investment of time, money and labour if they are to be 
effective as political and cultural actors in societies.
Exploring the relationship between media, in their broad sense, and identity is not a 
new question. Indeed, an examination of the relevant literature shows that such inquiries 
had been at the centre of debates within the media effects tradition, in feminist literature 
and in critical cultural studies, since before Benedict Anderson’s (1983) widely 
acclaimed seminal work Imagined Communities drew attention to the role of print 
capitalism in the emergence of the modem nation state, and on which much subsequent 
work on the nature of the relationship between media and the ways in which people may 
imagine themselves as members of a national community has been modelled. In his 
alluring intellectualisation of the meaning of nations and national identities, Anderson 
writes:
[A nation is] an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of the fellow members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communication (Anderson 
1983:6).
Though Anderson’s theorisation has been the subject of much critique, it remains central 
to debates on media and identity if only because it serves to highlight the relevance of 
symbolic products, including media’s, in a world in which communities are increasingly 
becoming, if not wholly de-territorialised, at least differently territorialised, and where 
both communities and communications are no longer bounded in singular places or 
spaces and distinct cultures. In fact, although the movement of people and dispersal of
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populations are not new phenomena — people have been on the go for centuries — the 
increasing fluidity of borders and the widespread production and consumption of 
different symbolic products, including media products, have allowed the local/the 
national and transnational/global to actively interweave in emerging multi- and de­
centred cultural spaces (cf. Morley and Robins 1995), processes that have preoccupied 
recent scholarship concerned with belonging, identity and community.
Nowhere have these concerns been more pressing to address than in scholarship on 
migrant and diasporic groups, where the flurry of academic work reflects, on the one 
hand, the growing significance of global and transnational processes in the post-modem 
world and, on the other hand, the profound sense in which the acceleration of 
globalisation processes, and improvements in communication technologies, have 
challenged fundamental assumptions about space, culture and identity.
Broadly speaking, scholarship has looked into the ways in which the production, use 
and readings of ‘media’ representations can play a role in constructing and defining, 
contesting and reconstituting national, ‘ethnic’ and other cultural identities (Gillespie 
1995) as well as into how media2 can affirm social and cultural diversity while providing 
cultural spaces in and through which ‘imposed’ identities or interests of others can be 
contested and challenged (Cottle 2000). Such challenges and contestations have been 
addressed in recent, mostly ethnographic reception studies on diasporic communities, 
where the focus has centred on diasporic (ethnic) or transnational media because, as 
Riggins (1992) and Husband (1994) propose, these can become powerful mouthpieces of 
the communities they represent, create powerful images of self-representation for the 
group and in their communal consumption can sustain a sense of ‘ethnic’ commonality
21 use the word media in their broader sense, i.e. one that encompasses different forms of communications.
(Georgiou 2001). There has also been a growing body of work on transnational 
communications within diasporic and cultural studies where arguments abound on how 
new technologies can make possible connections that transcend distance and space as 
developments in media minimise the relevance of geo-political borders and of spatial and 
temporal boundaries.
The consensus within academia about the significance of these new connections has 
spurred fresh inquiry into movements across space and time, Appadurai’s ethnoscapes 
(1991), as well as into novel hybrid, complex ‘third spaces’ of cultural practice and 
identifications, or what Annabelle Srebreny (2000) calls a significant third space of 
globalised diasporic connections and global diasporic consciousness, or transnationalism. 
Much like the concept of globalisation, the term transnationalism has become a buzzword 
in public and academic discourses. Like globalisation, it remains poorly defined, 
variously evaluated and debated, which partly reflects a lack of consensus on what it 
actually means. However, some of its core characteristics, which are of interest to this 
study, can be identified; these are the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and their places 
of settlement.
Since the 1980s, much of the inter-disciplinary literature on the relationship between 
globalisation processes and, in particular, national identities, has drawn on two 
diametrically situated theoretical perspectives, at the heart of which has been the debate 
about the integrity of the nation-state and the continued relevance of nationalism. The 
first is the ‘hegemony approach’ which sees globalisation as predominant and 
homogenising in its effect, therefore reducing national influences (e.g. Hall 1991;
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Herman and McChessney 1997); and the second is the ‘heterogeneity approach’ which 
maintains that national dimensions remain paramount and that nations remain central to 
media cultures and policies (e.g. Curran and Park 2000).
Though there has been a tendency in scholarship on different media cultures and 
diasporas, whom Dayan (1998) has called the ‘imagined communities par excellence’, to 
focus on nation-centric explanations, there is a growing recognition that new forms of 
affiliations that transcend the nation and yet do not threaten the nation are contributing to 
the emergence of intersecting affiliations and loyalties, local, global, regional and 
religious. What this means -  and this is the approach followed in this study — is that we 
need to integrate the above-mentioned two paradigms and discuss them as overlapping, 
particularly because the contemporary media ecology means that people are subjected to 
a two-way process, from within the nation and from without the nation.
Generally speaking, within the cultural studies agenda, inquiry into the relationship 
between the nation and media has been concerned with the text and image, focusing on 
how the nation is narrated in texts, particularly television texts, because they are seen as 
containers of meanings, symbols, images, landscapes and rituals which give meaning to 
the nation (Hall 1992). Reception studies, often drawing on Hall’s encoding/decoding 
model of communication (1980), have complemented these approaches, contributing to a 
differentiated understanding of the audience as active and critical (e.g. Morley 1980; Ang 
1996; Livingstone 1998).
Various empirical and theoretical studies have evolved over the past three decades in 
which the audience has been addressed in different, and more positive, terms, not only as 
active, but also as creative and oppositional. Some of these studies have examined the
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reception of media texts within national contexts and across borders (e.g. Miller 1992), 
arguing that the impact of media messages on audiences depends on reception contexts 
and the different resources of the receivers, while others have examined media 
production processes, drawing on the theoretical assumptions of the political economy 
tradition (e.g. Herman and McChessney 1997; Thussu 2000) as well as social 
organisational approaches to media production. The ever growing debate over approaches 
to the audience underscores that the audience is, explicitly or latently, the linchpin for 
research on media influence.
1.4 The proposal
It was within these broad intellectual frameworks that this research was bom and grew — 
an exploration into the ways in which members of the Palestinian diasporic community in 
Britain make sense of the different representations and meanings of varied news 
narrations in their everyday lives and what this means for their negotiation of identity, 
belonging and participation in public life. What intrigued me from the start were 
questions related to social processes in societies in the broad sense and the power of news 
in the narrow sense — I was chiefly interested in how and whether news media can 
empower communities by creating powerful representations of the group (Riggins 1992; 
Husband 1994; Dayan 1998), therefore playing a role in maintaining cultural and political 
particularity, and whether it could be a catalyst for participation in or withdrawal from 
public life.
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My original intention was to address these concerns by exploring the relationship 
between ‘transnational’ news media and people’s talk and perceptions of identity, 
expanding on the work of, among others, Marie Gillespie (1995), Hamid Naficy (1999) 
and Myria Georgiou (2001) within the strand of ethno-cultural studies. However, the 
more I probed these questions, the more aware I became that focusing on one aspect of 
the globalisation process, such as transnational news media, was not enough to address 
the main concern of this research, particularly as the informants, members of the 
Palestinian diasporic community in Britain, had access to and engaged with different and 
diverse news media, including mainstream media, such as the BBC and CNN, and 
transntional news media, such as al-Jazeera. Indeed, it is precisely in discussing the 
tensions that arise around the informants’ engagement with diverse news narratives, both 
local and transnational, that my own concerns are situated: What are the implications of 
these negotiations for questions of community and belonging? And what are their 
implications for notions of Palestinian-ness (Palestinian identity) and Palestinian-ism 
(national consciousness)? How do Palestinians in Britain use these different and polarised 
cultural references and positionings in their daily lives and social encounters? In other 
words, how does this ‘transnational’ news audience take positions through its 
engagement with national, transnational/global and host country news narratives and 
what are the consequences of this negotiation for social action and interaction and for 
understanding the power of news in societies? My inquiry hence shifted from a focus on 
ethnic and/or diasporic news-producing media and its potential role in the emergence of a
3 Apart from al-Quds newspaper, a London-based Arabic-language daily, the Palestinians in Britain do not 
have their own diasporic media, i.e. media produced in the diasporic space.
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‘diasporic consciousness’ to an inquiry into the informants’ social uses of news, 
irrespective of which news media they consume.
The case study (the Palestinians in Britain) was selected out of a set of personal and 
theoretical perspectives. As an ‘exemplary community of the transnational moment’ (cf. 
Toloyan 1996:4), the Palestinians in Britain are an ideal subject of a research study of this 
kind; first, the (at the time of writing) unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to 
attract worldwide political attention as well as media coverage; second, the Palestinians 
in Britain have remained largely excluded from this drama4; and third, because the reach 
and immediacy of the global and transnational news media means that the Palestinians in 
Britain are largely focused around this drama, whether out of choice or not.. It is 
precisely the informants’ intense focus on the continuous news drama and their constant 
contrasting between diverse news narrations framed according to different cultural 
perspectives that bring to the open tensions of belonging and community.
In the interviews carried out as part of the fieldwork for this study, hardly a 
conversation with the informants was started without some reference to the unfolding 
events from the ‘homeland’ and their repercussions at home and elsewhere. The 
implications of this intense focus on news to questions of belonging, identity and nation 
are not difficult to assess, but, as this thesis will argue, these implications go further than 
notions suggesting the emergence of ‘an imagined community’, and its implied arrived-at 
ending point and its implied homogeneity. Indeed, as this thesis will show, the 
informants’ discourses suggest they are involved in continuous negotiations of
4 There is very little mention of the Palestinians in Britain in the host country media. Furthermore, they 
remain neglected in the Palestinian national discourse about dispossession and exile.
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positionings between what it means to be Palestinian and what it means to be 
cosmopolitan in the diasporic space.
In designing the parameters for this study, I was conscious that the theoretical and 
methodological arguments used in framing of this research had to be reflexive enough to 
assess what is interesting and unique about the Palestinians, about their engagement with 
news and about their experiences as members of a ‘complex’5 diaspora in the era of 
expanded communication networks and possibilities. It was with these considerations in 
mind that I set forth to explore these notions by investigating, through an audience study 
as well as a critical engagement with the relevant literature (on news, identity, diaspora, 
collective memory and nationalism within and across disciplines) the implications for 
identity, for belonging and for community of the Palestinians’ interaction with the 
continuous news events, the news events that have engaged most6 Palestinians since the 
second intifada in September 2000.
The fieldwork comprised semi-structured interviews with a diverse sample of 
Palestinian individuals, households and groups in greater London and Manchester. The 
arguments presented in this thesis are a result of a synthesis of the empirical work and 
existing theorisation around the key concepts proposed, an approach that is essential in a 
thesis of this kind, where the aim is not to supplant old or ‘inadequate’ concepts with new 
ones, but rather at thinking with and through them.
5 Chapter Four will explain show that the Palestinians are not only a victim diaspora (see Cohen 1997) as 
the reasons for migration include trade and education.
6 It would be presumptuous to assume that all Palestinians are engaged with the news story. Working from 
a perspective that all do implies a homogeneity and a uniform identity that runs counter to the fundamental 
questions related to the negotiation of identity in diaspora.
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The rationale behind the methodological impetus relates to the investigation of the 
social uses of news, particularly in the contemporary media environment characterised by 
24-hour live coverage of events and by competing narratives and representations of the 
same event. By addressing these concerns, I will show how we can understand news, not 
only as information or as a forum for discussions about the public good, but also as 
cultural discourse that serves to confirm people’s beliefs about themselves through its 
appropriation as ritual, through its narrative structures and through its mediation of the 
past in the present, all of which are important for identity work.
The analysis of the interview material will show that the discursive taking up of 
different positionings relates to how the informants’ uses of news draws on their 
‘worldview’, which, according to Wallace (as cited in M. Ayish 2003), refers to the 
fundamental and subjective assumptions of a people about the nature of the world, as 
expressed in their philosophy, ethics, ritual and scientific belief. In similar vein, Peter 
Dahlgren (2003) uses the notion of ‘civic culture’ to refer to the “dispositions, practices 
and processes that constitute pre-conditions for people’s actual participation in the civil 
and political society” (2003: 154), while noting that such dimensions as meaning, identity 
and subjectivity are important elements that remain relevant to explaining how people 
participate in public life. These two concepts - worldview and civic culture - serve to 
define peoples’ dispositions and practices from inside rather than outside culture.
The analysis of the fieldwork explores how and whether the informants’ engagement 
with the news narrative related to the conflict with Israel enables them to be reflexive about 
their worldviews and ideologies and about their identity beyond the constraints of 
Palestinian-ness (what it means to be Palestinian) and Palestinian-ism (Palestinian national
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consciousness). Most of the informants describe themselves as British, Moslem 
Palestinians/Palestinian Moslems, Arab Palestinians/Palestinian Arabs, British Palestinians, 
or just Palestinians, but almost all say they feel Palestinian. Furthermore, theirs is by no 
means a homogeneous community.7 Cross-cutting differences reflected in the gender, 
generational and religious diversity of the sample, variations in the patterns of migration and 
socio-economic status (some are economic migrants while others are recent political asylum 
seekers), differences in their place of residence in the UK, their status in the host country, 
their level of integration and their mastery of the English language, mean we cannot assume 
that there is a neat equation between identity and community.
The analysis will also show how the informants’ uses of news provides them with the 
possibilities of acting and/or imagining situations where they can act mostly because of a 
sense of co-responsibility to similar others, but also as citizens of the wider social space 
they inhabit, bringing into attention conflicts of identification in an increasingly mediated 
world and the continued interplay between the personal and the political, between individual 
and collective memory and between Palestinian-ism and cosmopolitanism. I will show how 
the informants’ discourses alternate between particularistic imaginings of what it means to
o
be Palestinian and what it means to be cosmopolitan as they negotiate diverse foci of 
identifications, negotiations that reflect the co-existence in tension of open and closed 
discourses about themselves and others. I will also show that their discourses about what it 
means to be Palestinian and what it means to feel Palestinian do not suggest a homogeneous
71 will validate these points in the analysis of the fieldwork.
8 Hannerz (1990) defines a cosmopolitan as someone open to divergent cultures and tolerant of diversity, 
making a useful distinction between cosmopolitan and transnational, where the latter refers to people who 
sustain their home culture away from home.
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‘we’ -  this comes across in the different ways in which the informants talk about and 
imagine themselves to be Palestinian.
In exploring their social uses of news, I will reflect on the need for a differentiated 
understanding of the news audience and of the understanding of news as a resource for the 
‘rational’ citizen. Crucially for this investigation, I will show that access to diverse mediated 
information can enable participation in social life, though this may fall short of an active 
polity necessary for full citizenship and political engagement.
At this point, it is necessary to re-focus attention on the central question of this research 
study: the relationship between news narrations and identity construction. In doing so, I set 
out several starting points that frame and come out of this research. First; that identity is not 
a thing, but a short-hand description for ways of talking about the self and community, 
which means it is socially constructed. The second starting point draws on the theoretical 
framework of mediation to contextualise the relevance of news in people’s lives, both as 
ritual that orders their activities and connects their world and as narrative that mediates the 
past in the present. Situating news as part of the overall processes of mediation9 moves 
attention from the transmission to the ritual model of communication and, as I will argue, 
provides the context towards understanding news as cultural discourse.
These notions provide the theoretical framework for the analysis of the Palestinians’ 
daily reality in Britain, a framework that emphasises that social terms we use and take for 
granted — identity, diaspora, community, memory and tradition — are the products of 
ongoing debates or political struggles or alliances. Such social terms have been difficult 
for the Palestinians under study to come to terms with not only because of the lack of a
9 This is extensively discussed and examined in Chapter Three where various frames traditionally used to 
explain news are examined and contested.
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homeland political structure and its mediating frameworks that normally allow people to 
reinforce, inspire and build on their individual and collective memories, but also because 
these memories have for long been overshadowed by a powerful counter-narrative10 that 
had, until recently, a wide and receptive international audience. These arguments are 
developed in several subsequent chapters, but particularly in Chapters Seven and Eight, 
in which I present the analysis of the informants’ attitudes to news, to identity and 
community that unravels broader processes of contestation and power struggles in their 
discourses about themselves and their community. The analysis shows how the personal 
becomes political and how the divide between the intimate and public spaces can become 
blurred.
The narrative that unfolds in subsequent chapters is a compilation of two narratives; 
the first is the story of the Palestinian diaspora in Britain as represented in their own talk 
about themselves, their community and their lives; and the second is my own 
interrogation of the literature on news, nationalism, diaspora, identity, globalisation and 
collective memory. Chapter Two argues for a differentiated understanding of the 
relationship between media and identity that draws on the conceptual framework of 
‘identification as discourse’; Chapter Three situates the proposed understanding of news 
as cultural discourse within the theoretical framework of mediation that emphasises 
news’ centrality in people’s lives; Chapter Four tells the story of the Palestinian diaspora 
and the significance of ‘news’ events to Palestinian collective memory, identity and 
national consciousness; Chapter Five presents the methodological impetus for this 
research while critically engaging with audience reception research and its developments.
10 Until recently, the Israeli government, with the support of some scholars, claimed that Palestinian 
refugees left their homes as a result of orders given by Arab and Palestinian leaders.
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Chapter Six provides a demographic breakdown of the informants and a description of 
the groups, households and individuals that took part in the research. Chapters Seven and 
Eight present the analysis of the interview material and Chapter Nine details this research 
study’s arguments, summing up the debates and ideas forwarded in this thesis and 
emphasising its contribution to the field of cultural studies.
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Chapter Two 
Identification: Between the Personal and Political
This chapter draws on relevant scholarship in arguing for a differentiated understanding 
of the theorisation of the relationship between media and identity that can help account 
for the role of news in the negotiation of identities. The proposed understanding draws on 
Hall’s (1996) theoretical framework of ‘identification as discourse’, which sees identity 
construction as a process and identity as ‘becoming’, not ‘being’ and as constructed 
across different intersection and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions.
In this sense, what matters is not who we are or where we came from but what we 
might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might 
represent ourselves, therefore drawing attention to the continuous negotiations of tensions 
between the self and the other and between personal and collective identity. These 
tensions are crucially related to notions of recognition/non-recognition and 
belonging/non-belonging, which have been rendered problematic by the social changes of 
globalisation processes and the increasing mediation of everyday life. Central to such an 
understanding is the conceptualisation of identity as a discursive social construction, 
therefore acknowledging the multiple meanings and continuous contestation in its 
negotiation. What this means is that people’s reflections on and talk about their identities 
can oscillate between open discourses about oneself or the group to ones that are more 
closed and essentialising.
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Talking of identities as constructed is not original; neither is the notion of identity 
construction and negotiation as a process, of becoming, not being. However, the 
significance of this conceptual framework for this study and similar others, is that it 
pushes onto the agenda the tense and dialectical relationship between the personal and the 
collective. Though it has not been fashionable to talk of the ‘politics of the collective’ or 
‘identity politics’ in post-modem scholarship — this is often associated with ideas of 
particularistic (ethno) nationalisms and with essentialist views of identity or because it 
denies personal or individual agency — this study argues that it merits attention.
Attention is merited because identities are not only constructed by individuals’ 
agency, as understood in the Western perspective, but are also formed through interactive 
relations among actors within historically and symbolically constituted contexts and 
social structures, including global media. The idea here is not to deny individual agency 
and reflexivity, nor is it to argue for rigid and static identities. Rather, the intention is to 
take into consideration the specific historical and cultural contexts that may impinge on 
or constrain the ways in which individuals and groups construct their identities. This 
understanding is particularly relevant in theorising diasporas, such as the Palestinians, for 
whom the global and the national are constantly interacting and interweaving through 
movement and through the consumption of various symbolic material, including news 
(which itself is both a product and agent of globalisation) and for whom the diasporic 
condition means a continuous negotiation of parameters of belonging and citizenship.
The proposed direction is a result of a synthesis of existing theorisation on identity 
and the relationship between media and identity and, importantly, the empirical work 
undertaken for this project. The chapter begins by placing the overall thesis in the context
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of similar academic inquiry, then goes on to discuss the key theories concerned with the 
relationship between media and identity.
2.1 The Context
Much of the scholarship on the relationship between media and identity stems from the 
widely held, but contested, beliefs that media systems perform a crucial role in the public 
representation of unequal social relations and the play of cultural power. And much of the 
debate concerning these questions has focused on the ways in which media could 
influence the ways in which identities are constructed and contested, with empirical 
inquiry taking a top-down or bottom-up approach, or a combination of the two.
Indeed, it has been argued that media’s role in the negotiation of identity is related to 
the ways in which the production, reading and use of media representations plays a key 
role in constructing and defining, contesting and reconstituting national, ‘ethnic’ and 
other cultural identities (Gillespie 1995) as well as to the ways in which media can serve 
to affirm social and cultural diversity and provide cultural spaces in and through which 
imposed identities or interests of others can be resisted and challenged (Cottle 2000).
Representation, as defined most clearly by Hall (1997), refers to the signifying 
practices and symbolic systems through which meanings are produced and which provide 
people with a sense of who they and some significance to their experiences. In other 
words, representations refer to the signs and symbols that are claimed to represent some 
aspect of reality, such as objects, people, groups, places, events, social norms, cultural 
identities and so on. For Hall, “representation is an essential part of the process by which
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meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture” (1997: 15). 
Therefore, representations are significant in understanding the ways in which discourse, 
which refers to a “set of statements or beliefs which produce knowledge...” (Hall 
1992:292) and through which a society makes sense of its own structures and processes, 
can operate through them, thus linking issues of the social and the material with the 
different forms of representation: the narratives, images and forms which render the 
world meaningful.
This conceptualisation of the relationship between discourse and representation makes 
it easy to see why representation has assumed such importance in the field of media and 
cultural studies, where, broadly speaking, two main contrasting approaches to its role in 
people’s lives and cultures have taken central stage. The first approach argues that 
meaning is always inherent in objects themselves, as naturally given, and that “language 
functions like a mirror, to reflect the true meaning as it already exists in the world” (Hall 
1997: 24), and the second constructivist approach stresses that meaning is always socially 
constructed, thereby enabling communication, as it works according to a common 
socially constructed meaning. Hence, “meaning is the result, not of something fixed out 
there, in nature, but of our social, cultural and linguistic conventions, [...] meaning can 
never be finally fixed, (ibid: 23) What this latter approach suggests is that the processes 
through which meanings are created and appropriated are changeable, continuous, and 
contested (my emphasis).
Nowhere are these contestations more urgent to deal with than in discussions of 
migrant and diasporic groups, whose everyday experiences are becoming more complex 
as developments in new communication technologies, from and of their putative
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homelands, are blurring once familiar lines between ‘here’ and ‘there’, creating what 
Robin Cohen (1994) describes as ‘diasporic allegiances’ — a proliferation of 
transnational identities which cannot be easily contained in the nation-state system. At 
the same time, these developments are accelerating processes of cultural change, 
allowing for the construction of boundaries that may exclude others.
Although people, including diasporic and migrant communities, have always relied on 
some form of cross-border networking to maintain systems of ties among their various 
members and with the homeland, the speeding up of time-space compressions (Harvey 
1989) has had profound effects on how these connections are maintained. Indeed, there is 
a sense that migrants are developing ‘transcultural’ characteristics that confound the old 
models of belonging and loyalty (which are built around ideas of homeland and space), 
opening the door for contested loyalties and interpretations and posing questions about 
the homogenising role of globalisation processes. While the lamentation about the loss of 
cultural distinctiveness and the possibility that people may have contested loyalties, 
where media have been largely put to task, is pervasive in the literature, there are some 
within the academy who credit new ‘media’ technologies with the creation of infinite 
possibilities for people’s identities (see, for example, Turkle 1996) or with enhancing 
‘national unity’ at a symbolic level (Morley and Robins 1995).
The examination of the role of media and new technologies in enhancing this 
‘symbolic’ unity within national and global contexts has been a popular field of study, 
often building on Anderson’s (1983) notion of the nation as an ‘imagined community’. 
Rath (1988), for instance, has argued that audience engagement with radio or television 
offers the sense of participation in a (domesticated) national community, while Scanned
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has proposed that the British public service broadcasting model has created the space for 
a contemporary public sphere, contributing to the democratisation of everyday life 
(1989). Ang (1990), too, has noted that the “transnational communication system...offers 
opportunities of new forms of bonding and solidarity, new ways of forging cultural 
communities” (1990:252) and Martin-Barbero (1993) has stressed the role of media in the 
emergence of collective identities and a sense of the nation in Latin America.
Recent scholarship on diasporic and ethnic media1 draws on these arguments to 
advance views that transnational communications and diasporic media could help create 
new communities, or reconstruct and maintain already established but somehow fragile or 
imperiled communities — such as minority groups, exilic groups and diasporas (see 
Dayan 1998). In fact, a growing body of work on transnational communications has 
shown how new media technologies make possible new connections among dispersed 
communities as such developments (Clifford 1997) reduce the importance of geo­
political borders and spatial and temporal boundaries, sometimes threatening the vitality 
and significance of national cultures, while at the same time highlighting the complexity 
of diaspora cultures.2
This understanding has spurred a growing interest in diasporic media which have 
been seen as enabling new means of bonding among dispersed people, therefore 
contributing to notions suggesting the emergence of a consciousness of community, 
which typically refers to the belief or feeling that members of the same communities
1 The exploration of the relationship between media and identity is not exclusive to diasporic and migrant 
studies. In fact, feminist scholarship — along with cultural studies particularly concerning race — has been 
central to the highlighting of the importance of examining the interaction between a text and its 
consumption (for example, see Radway’s 1984 seminal work on the reading practices of women consumers 
of romantic fiction)
2 Some other arguments have highlighted the challenges the Internet has posed to traditional constructs 
such as voice, community and identity (Mitra 2001).
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living across nations belong to one community and to the real or ‘imagined’ homeland. 
These media (Riggins 1992; Husband 1994) can become powerful mouthpieces of the 
communities they represent and can create powerful images of self-representation for the 
group and in their communal consumption can sustain a sense of ethnic commonality 
(Georgiou 2001).
Dayan (1998), in particular, has emphasised the importance of analysing the role of 
these media as instruments of survival for endangered cultures and for ensuring the 
maintenance of links within geographically dispersed groups. It is in such contexts, he 
argues, that minority media can become symbols of empowerment because they 
communicate symbols of community and mediate a group’s participation in the host 
country’s public sphere, in the public sphere of the country of origin as well as in 
‘transnational’ public spheres.
Though studies of diasporic and minority media are relatively new, interrogation of 
media’s impact on societies and people’s behaviour began in earnest in the second half of 
the 20th century at a time when the ‘effects’ tradition and its sweeping assumptions about 
media’s powerful and direct effects on societies and audiences dominated the research 
agenda. Though largely discredited because of its neglect of audiences and its support for 
the hypodermic ‘transmission’ model of media, this tradition continues to provide a 
compelling framework for much work in the field, and largely informs one of the two 
major competing paradigms that have dominated the literature on the relationship 
between media and identity, and in particular, national identity.
This paradigm sees national media as forging national culture and contributing to the 
formation of national identities, thus posing itself as diametrically opposed to the second
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paradigm, which suggests that the diversity of media and the increased access to foreign 
sources of information weaken or threaten national identity3. It would be simplistic to 
suggest that work within these traditions is uniform. Research is varied4 and results are 
not homogeneous. What inform both paradigms, however, are the ‘powerful’ discourses 
of globalisation (cf. Tomlinson 1999), and the ways in which globalisation processes 
have challenged and contested the ways in which nations are imagined and constructed. 
Before I turn to the key debates on globalisation, I first examine the relevant scholarship 
on the relationship between media and mostly national identity.
2.2 Media and National Identity
Although German scholar Karl W. Deutsch^dvanced a theoretical link between media 
and (national) identity as early as 1966, the literature on this relationship is relatively 
new. In his theoretical work Nationalism and Social Communication (1966), Deutsch 
made a critical observation about the interplay between national identity and mass 
communication systems, arguing that communication should be understood as an 
increasingly sustained mode of being that integrates a given people and provides it with 
singularity. His argument suggests that national communities are strongly bounded by 
their socially communicative structures of information and that members of a nation are 
united by more intensive social communications and are linked to centres by an unbroken 
chain of connections in communications.
3 These paradigms have also been explained as strong media/weak audiences and weak media/strong 
audiences, but these explanations are too simplistic.
4 Some theorists (for example McLuhan 1964) have focused on media as technologies to explore their role 
in nation building, while others have stressed the relevance of media for the maintenance and reproduction 
of the nation (Billig 1995; Morley and Brundson 1999).
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In most of the nationalism literatures, culture has been, until recently, seen as the 
most relevant ‘variable’ that may influence the emergence of nationalistic feelings within 
the nation-state context. Ernest Gellner, for example, saw state and culture as linked 
(1983) and understood culture, used in an anthropological rather than a normative sense, 
to mean ‘the distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community’ 
(1983:92). This notion is clear in his work on nationalism, where he proposes that culture 
is a distinctive style of conduct and communication (my emphasis) of a given community. 
Culture, for those participating in modem nation-states, is ‘the necessary shared medium’ 
(Gellner 1983:37-8). However, in his account of the rise of nations and nationalism, 
Gellner also credits the mass media for the spread of nationalist ideas:
The media do not transmit an idea that happens to have been fed into them. It matters 
precious little what has been fed into them; it is the media themselves, the 
pervasiveness and the importance of abstract, centralized one-to-many 
communication, which itself automatically engenders the core idea of nationalism 
quite irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages 
transmitted. The most important and persistent message is generated by the medium 
itself, by the role which such media have acquired in modem life. The core 
message is that the language and the style of the transmissions is important [...] what 
is actually said matters little (Gellner 1983:127).
This account of the role of the media in the rise of nations and nationalism seems to echo 
McLuhan’s notion of the media as the message, and has been attacked for being too 
deterministic because as Schlesinger (1991) argues, Gellner’s theorisation of national 
identity and the media does not contain an account of the active construction of collective 
identity or the processes involved in that construction.
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In recent years, the conceptualisation of the nation as a social construction of 
meanings has become more common as scholars of ethnicity and nationalism began to 
deconstruct the concepts of nation and national identity through the study of shared 
symbols, values, discourses and memories that appear to link people within a ‘national’ 
community together (see for e.g. Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Billig 
1995). However, it was not until Anderson’s influential work ‘Imagined Communities ’ 
(1983) that academic interest in the role of media in the formation of national identities 
took off in a serious way, though he also focused on the medium itself rather than the 
message.
Using a historical perspective, Anderson argued that print capitalism was instrumental 
in forging the ‘imagined community’ of the nation while noting that the changed relations 
of time and space brought about by the Industrial Revolution, especially by print media, 
contributed to a heightened awareness of ‘the steady, anonymous, simultaneous’ 
experience of communities of readers. He wrote:
The convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human 
language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its 
basic morphology set the stage for the modem nation .. .(Anderson 1991:46)
However, his crucial contribution to contemporary thinking about the rise of nationalism 
was his notion of ‘community’ as a state of mind, or an imagination. “All communities 
larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are 
imagined. Communities are not to be distinguished by their falsity/genuineness, but by
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the style in which they are imagined.” (Anderson 1983: 5-7) Though notions of a 
community as being not a ‘thing’ in itself, but a way of speaking, and thinking about 
others who are the same, has been a characteristic of oral and literate societies, 
Anderson’s work shifted the focus to how particular systems of communication that 
characterise societies with popular literacy enable the ‘imagined’ population of the 
‘imagined’ community to be extended far beyond the boundaries of the knowable or face- 
to-face community of societies where oral communication is the norm.
Anderson’s work has inspired much research on the ways in which nations and 
communities are imagined. For example, Scannel and Cardiff (1987) extended this 
argument to address the ways in which broadcast news can bring about simultaneous 
national experiences, while Morley and Brundson in their Nationwide television study 
(1978; 1999) argued that such programmes can contribute to the daily construction and 
reconstitution of nationalism and national identities5. Dayan and Katz (1992), in their 
seminal work on ‘media events’ examined how such mediated events can enhance the 
sense of belonging to a wider community. In “Media Events: the Live Broadcasting o f 
History”, they emphasise the ways in which these events integrate society, affirm its 
common values, legitimate its institutions and reconcile different sectional elements. 
Many of the special media events6 they mention evoke a liminal sense of togetherness as 
well as the celebration of a shared sense of purpose and value, thus serving as episodes in 
the history of the nation state and in the relations between states, nations and people. 
Media events, therefore, can provide the cultural grounds for attachment to the ‘imagined
5 Chapter Four details various academic discourses on national identity.
6 These include the Olympic Games, Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation and the assassination of Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat.
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communities’ and update the ‘invented traditions’ proposed by British nationalism and 
history scholar Eric Hobsbawn (1983).
Despite its popularity, Anderson’s theory has been criticised for being materially and 
technologically deterministic, particularly for his assumption that the text as a technological 
commodity helps the construction of the nation and for his assuming a common end product, 
a common national identity for the people under investigation. Other criticisms were voiced 
against his giving too much weight to the power of nationally structured communications 
systems. Schlesinger, for example, says one shortcoming that Anderson’s theory shares with 
Gellner’s model “is conflated with the analytically separate question of how a national 
culture is continually redeveloped and how the contours of national identity are ... drawn” 
(1991:165).
That said, Anderson’s theorisation is more than trivial as it draws attention to the ways in 
which people can constitute their own subjectivities through identification with different 
scenarios set out in the text. By projecting that constituted subjectivity onto others also 
believed to be engaging with the text, the reader can imagine a collectivity of persons with 
positions like himself/herself in relation to the concerns set out in the text. In other words, 
the reader does not ‘find’ a national or collective identity through imagining thousands or 
millions of others doing the same thing; rather, this identity is constituted by discovering a 
set of concerns he or she recognises as his or her own within a text or texts.7
Scholarship within the globalisation literature, too, has built on the Andersonian 
approach. Using the same theoretical premises, some scholars have argued that global or 
transnational means of communication, such as satellite television and the Internet, are
7 This understanding is relevant for understanding the cognitive processes through which people make 
sense of media.
41
helping migrant and diasporic communities feel a sense of belonging to one or more than 
one imagined community at the same time. For example, in tracing ‘new patterns’ in global 
media, John Sinclair and his co-authors note the emergence of what they call imagined 
diasporic communities which point to the re-stratification of audiences into imagined 
communities beyond national boundaries (Sinclair et al. 1996), while Portes et al. (1999) 
argue that migrants and diasporic groups, through a thick web of regular instantaneous 
communication and easy personal travel, are now routinely able to establish transnational 
communities that exist across two, or more, cultural spaces.
These studies, too, have come under fire for not grounding their assumptions in 
empirical evidence, for being too speculative and for implying that media are all-powerful, 
therefore re-affirming arguments espoused by the much-maligned tradition of the 
hypodermic model of media effects. The main criticism, however, was reserved for their 
assumptions that cultures and identities are complete and homogeneous and for ignoring 
the tensions between identity as singular, unitary and integral and identities as plural, 
cross-cutting and divided, which as Calhoun (1994) points out, is inescapable at both 
personal and collective levels. To better understand the relationship between globalisation 
processes, in which media are key institutions, and identity, I turn to the relevant literature 
on globalisation.
2.3 Globalisation and Identity
The term globalisation has been extensively employed in social sciences, economics and 
humanities to convey a growing sense of interconnectedness between different parts of
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the world or a condition that describes the rapidly changing world. While processes of 
globalisation are diverse, there is a consensus that they have radically changed social 
interaction and relations, contributing to the distantiation of ‘our experiences of time and 
space’, as Giddens (1990) puts it, or the compression of spatial and temporal differences 
(Harvey 1989). In broad terms, globalisation concerns every aspect of life (Robertson 
1992): at the level of ‘national societies’, individuals or selves, relations between national 
societies or the world system of societies and humankind.
However, the concept remains differently understood and hotly debated. While there is 
agreement that such a process is taking place, there is less agreement about what it 
actually is. This is largely because though one can see the changes the globalisation 
processes have brought to the operations of industry, finance, economy, policy, culture 
and media, globalisation processes are clearly are not only a material or tangible reality, 
but, as Silverstone (1999:144) argues, a ‘state of mind*. In other words, we know we live 
in a global age and we know we have our own ideas of the world and our place in it. This 
psychological awareness of the world is enhanced by the dynamic flows of images, texts, 
sounds and graphics, via film and news, among other things, means that globalisation 
entails both an increased psychological awareness of other cultures as well as a much 
more immediate experience of the world.
Roughly speaking, two different historical perspectives are posed squarely against each 
other in the globalisation literature. The first perspective sees globalisation as 
representing a qualitatively new phase, while the second sticks to notions that the 
globalised world essentially reproduces the conditions that have been with us for 
centuries, though in a modernised form. Held (1998) has conveniently identified these
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perspectives as two schools; the first is the hyper-globalisation school which sees 
globalisation as fundamentally new; and the second is the sceptical school which sees 
that there is nothing unprecedented about contemporary levels of international economic 
and social interactions. These two schools are rooted in different definitions of modernity 
and globalisation, both of which are seen as complex, multi-dimensional phenomena that 
are inter-related in some ways, therefore making it reasonable to see globalisation as an 
outcome of the universal logic of modernity (Featherstone 1995), a view more or less 
shared by eminent sociologists such as Anthony Giddens. This view of globalisation as 
an outcome of modernity, though implying historicity, plays down historical 
communication and cultural exchanges before the technological revolutions of the 20th 
century.8
The above discussion, though by no means inclusive or exhaustive, serves to highlight 
the broad range of perspectives on globalisation processes. While it is difficult to agree 
on a concrete meaning for globalisation, some of its aspects, particularly the ‘dialectical’ 
processes’ that characterise it, can be explored, therefore providing some direction about 
the consequences of this phenomenon. Giddens (1990) sees these dialectical processes as 
the “intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a 
way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring miles away and vice versa [...] 
this is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse 
direction from the very distantiated relations that shape them. Local transformation is as 
much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across space 
and time”(Giddens 1990:64). ‘Time-space distantiation’ thus involves the disengagement
8 However, seen differently, history can offer us an insight of the relationship between modernity and 
globalisation. For instance, we can argue that colonialism and imperialism existed long before modem 
media of communication through the interaction with the early forms of media such as the telegraph.
of certain dimensions of experience from presence and place. “The sense of the familiar 
is often mediated by time-space distantiation. This is less a phenomenon of estrangement 
from the local than one of integration within globalised communities of shared 
experience.. .The newspaper and the sequence of TV programmes over the day are the 
most obvious concrete examples of this phenomenon” (ibid: 140).
Most modernisation and cultural globalisation theorists suggest that the ‘globalisation 
of media’ is a key dimension and factor in the globalisation process (e.g. Robertson 1992; 
Lash and Urry 1994). Since new and “intricate relations between global or multi-national 
space and local (national) space” (Morley and Robins 1995) seem to constantly grow, 
new information and communication technologies are said to play a powerful role in the 
emergence of new spatial structures, relations and orientations and the diminishing power 
of nation-states and consequently national identities.
While the communication of symbolic material in general, and news in particular, may 
include homogenising elements, such as for example the organisational aspects of news 
gathering and news values (see Chapter Three for details), this thesis argues that news 
events are framed according to different national, cultural and organisational strategies as 
news, though a global product, is produced within culture and nations, rather than beyond 
them9. What this suggests is that audiences, though receiving the same information, do 
not necessarily build up an identical stock of knowledge, confirming Thompson’s (1995) 
view that although images of certain events may be presented worldwide, there is 
similarly a process in which “international images are interpreted differently in different 
social and cultural contexts” (1995:11) by the audiences as well as by media producers.
9 There are many studies that have examined the cultural differences that influence, in particular, 
production strategies. Among these is a recent study by Lisbeth Clausen (2003) on the domestication which 
builds on the notion of frame to describe how various news media frame their narrations of events.
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Thompson’s argument means there are different ways in which we (as people) can 
understand and see ourselves and the world, a view taken to the extreme by many post­
modernist commentators (e.g. Hebdige 1989), who emphasise the pluralisation of sources 
of identity and imagined communities.
Arguments about how globalising and globalised media technologies are influencing 
the ways in which identities are constructed and contested in the post-modem world 
command the debates on the relationship between globalisation processes and societies, 
taking as a starting point the perceived shift and fragmentation of identities in modernity. 
As Stuart Hall notes:
The old identities which established the social world for so long are in decline, giving 
rise to new identities and fragmenting the modem individual as a unified subject. This 
so-called crisis is seen as part of a wider process of change which is dislocating the 
central structures and processes of modem societies and undermining the frameworks 
which gave individuals stable anchorage in the social world. (Hall 1992:274)
For Hall, the changes in ‘time-space’ relationships within different systems of 
representations are having profound effects on how identities are located and represented 
(1992), resulting in the erosion, strengthening and the emergence of new identities or 
what he terms new ethnicities. Hall uses the term ‘global-post-modern’ to refer to a 
perceived breakdown of all established cultural identities, the fragmentation of styles, and 
to emphasise the fleeting aspects of contemporary culture, thus arguing: “The more social 
life becomes mediated by the global marketing of styles, images and places by globally 
networked media, the more identities become detached.. .from specific times, places, 
histories, traditions...” (Hall 1992:303)
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This intellectualisation is replicated by others, though in different ways. Harvey (1989), 
for instance, notes that the time-space compression provoked by new media technologies has 
influenced the transmission of social values, meanings and identities, while Thompson 
(1992) argues that one of the characteristics of the post-modern era is the fragmentation, 
multiplicity, plurality and indeterminacy of social identities, processes that de Mercer (1990) 
explains as characteristic of what he calls the post-modern predicament of contemporary 
politics, whose key characteristics are “displacement, de-centring and disenchantment.. .the 
fragmentation of traditional sources of authority and identity, the displacement of collective 
sources of membership and belonging ...” (1990: 43). Somewhat echoing the Giddensian 
approach, he argues that one of the consequences of modernity is the separation of time and 
space from place that creates what he calls ‘disembedded’ social systems and the ‘lifting 
out’ of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across 
indefinite spans of time-space (ibid: 21).
Robins (1991), too, sees globalisation as involving what he calls an extraordinary 
transformation, where the old structures of national states and communities are breaking 
up and where there is an increasing “transnationalisation of economic and cultural life”, 
therefore suggesting that globalisation involves the interaction between economic and 
cultural factors whereby changes in production and consumption patterns can produce 
shared identities. However, at the same time, the “... continuity and historicity of identity 
are challenged by the immediacy and intensity of global cultural confrontations. The 
comforts of tradition are fundamentally challenged by the imperatives to form a new self- 
interpretation based upon the responsibilities of cultural translation.” (Robins 1991:41)
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These challenges are felt most powerfully by diasporic groups, who, as Hall 
(1992:308) argues, may make a strategic retreat to more defensive identities “[...] in 
response to the experience of cultural racism”. What this means is that identities can be 
constructed in relation or reaction to various and different appropriations of meanings 
within the local, global and transnational contexts, a process that Ronald Robertson 
(1992) has called ‘glocalisation’. This proposal transcends the rigid binary analyses of 
globalisation which has obscured the actual interdependent of the majority and the 
minority and of the local and the global for the construction of their meanings.
The proliferation of transnational symbolic material through a variety of communication 
systems has provoked fresh inquiry into the perceived real and/or ‘imagined’ attachments by 
migrants and diasporic groups to their homeland cultures, attachments that are seen as 
denting their loyalty to host nations10 while raising questions about normative assumptions 
about multi-cultural citizenship in countries such as Britain. These concerns have been of 
concern in the burgeoning diaspora scholarship, where such attachments have been 
sometimes described as forms of transnationalism (Basch et al. 1992), a concept that broadly 
referring to processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations 
that link together their societies of origin and their place of settlement.
That said, reception studies have produced empirically-grounded evidence showing that 
the general impact of globalisation processes, manifest in the increasing availability of 
transnational media, and in particular satellite television, is highly contradictory, as different 
groups respond in different ways to the opening up of new possibilities and positions of
10 This type of discourse was particularly prominent after the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United 
Stites, which were seen as a good example of the dominant discourses of transnationalism. Here, the term 
transnationalism (referring to the global reach of militant Islam) was seen to have extended nationalism in 
new ways, producing exclusionist discourses.
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identification. It is with these notions in mind that I turn to the key theoretical paradigms on 
the relationship between media and identity in the globalisation literature.
2.4 The Local and the Global
Scholarship about the relationship between the globalisation of media, and particularly 
television, on societies and identities can be divided into two broad camps. Proponents of 
the first camp, the media imperialism theory (e.g. Herman and McChesney 1997), argue 
that the global flow of electronic media outputs leads to increased uniformity and the 
demise of cultural diversity. Put differently, this view sees television as destroying 
people’s sense of locality, contributing to a cultural detachment from community and 
place and the homegenisation11 of cultures (see Meyrowitz 1985).
Countering this view is the cultural globalisation position that sees television as a 
device to resist globalisation, paying particular attention to the manner in which this 
medium may uphold national cultures (e.g. Curran and Park 2000). Both approaches 
provide reasonable evidence to support their claims about the effects of the processes of 
globalisation on societies and on identities. However, the technological advances 
achieved in the latter part of the 20 century, and in particular, the emergence of satellite 
television, have raised a host of questions about both these assumptions and opened fresh 
lines of inquiry into the continuities and interdependencies between national, global and 
transnational media cultures.
11 Meyrowitz (1985) has argued that electronic media, particularly television, have led to a radical 
restructuring of social life by disrupting the traditional link between culture and geography. In this sense, 
he assumes media have uniform effects.
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The starting point to answer these fresh questions Appadurai (1990) argues is to 
acknowledge the tension between homogenisation and heterogenisation, or the processes 
of ‘disjunctures and conjunctures between ethnoscapes (the landscapes of living people) 
and ‘mediascapes’ (image-centred, narrative-based accounts of strips of reality) which:
..offer to those who experience and transform them [...] a series of 
elements (such as characters, plots and textual forms) out of which scripts 
can be formed of imagined lives, their own as well as those of others in living 
in other places. These scripts can and do get disaggregated into complex sets 
of metaphors by which people live [...] as they help to constitute narratives of 
the ‘other’ and proto-narratives of possible lives, fantasies which could become 
prologemena to the desire for acquisition and movement (Appadurai 1990: 299)
What this means is that we need to examine which sets of communicative genres can be 
valued in which ways and what sorts of “pragmatic genre conventions govern the 
collective readings of different kinds of text” (ibid: 300). This is an inquiry that is all the 
more urgent to address because the social and political implications of such processes, 
what Appadurai (1990) has termed ‘de-territorialisation’, are crucial for understanding 
the daily experiences and interactions of diasporic members.
Indeed, I argue that in examining how diasporic groups use media, we need to 
integrate the media imperialism and the cultural globalisation approaches in such a way 
as to address the dialectical relationship between the global and the local without 
privileging either one. This is a major concern for this present study as its central 
question is concerned with the ways in which news, which is affected by the globalisation 
trends and is in itself an agent of these trends, may uphold or change the ways in which
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people think and talk about their identities. As news is both global and local, in terms of 
production, reach and content, it is not possible to address this central question while 
continuing to privilege a binary analysis.
This is by no means a new direction. Roberston (1992), for example, has argued for the 
continued dialectic interconnection between what he terms universalism and 
particularism, while Ulrich Beck, in the Cosmopolitan and its Enemies (2002), has 
underlined the need to employ a ‘logic of opposition’ rather than determinism in 
understanding globalisation processes and their impact. For Robertson, globalisation 
involves the ‘attempt to preserve direct attention both to particularity and difference and 
to universality and homogeneity. It rests largely on the thesis that we are, in the late 
twentieth century, witnesses to- and participants in- a massive twofold process involving 
the interpenetration o f the universalization ofparticularism and the particularization o f 
universalism. . . ’ (1992:100). Beck, too, sees globalisation as a non-linear, dialectical 
process in which the local and the global do not exist as cultural polarities but as 
combined and mutually implicating principles (2002: 17).
These arguments are critical for my investigation of the relationship between news and 
identity among the Palestinians in Britain as they shift attention from spatial 
considerations which have occupied much scholarship to date (e.g. Meyrowitz 1985) to 
addressing the instances when the divide between the subjective and intimate (private) 
spheres of ordinary people and the public sphere becomes blurred. As recent studies on 
media and diasporic groups have shown, (see for example, Naficy 1992; Gillespie 1995; 
Srebreny 2000; Georgiou 2001, Aksoy and Robins 2000), it is the increasing porousness 
of the private and the public that makes it necessary to address the complex and dynamic
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processes that people use to make sense of media representations and what this means for 
their perceptions of identity. To understand this dynamism, the next section addresses 
relevant scholarship on identity and my own arguments regarding its construction.
2.5 Discourses of Identity
The concept of identity remains a contradictory term of contested meanings and relations 
relative to other discursive formations, such as culture, community and ethnicity. As a 
concept, identity remains relevant to our understanding of modem societies and cultural 
trends because of its perceived and real power to mobilise people. As Woodward (1997) 
writes in the introduction to the book Identity and Difference, identity matters (my 
emphasis)
.... both in terms of social and political concerns within the contemporary world and 
within academic discourses where identity has been seen as conceptually important in 
offering explanations of social and cultural changes.. ..Identity can be seen as the 
interface between subjective positions and social and cultural situations.. .Identity 
gives us an idea of who we are and of how we relate to others and to the world in 
which we live. Identity marks the ways in which we are the same as others who share 
that position, and the ways in which we are different from those who do not 
(Woodward 1997:1-2).
In some scholarship, the term identity has often been used interchangeably with other 
concepts such as ‘culture,’ ‘community’, ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’, thus adding to the 
confusion surrounding the term and which aspect of identity is being referred to, whether 
this is cultural, national, ethnic, religious, diasporic, individual or collective. This
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confusion has to a certain extent been informed by the discipline from within which the 
term has been conceptualised. Political scientist and nationalism scholar Ernest Gellner 
(1995), for example, sees culture as a genetic mode of transmission, located in an on­
going community and a community as a population that shares a culture. Thus, for him 
“culture and community are defined in terms of each other.. .the circularity of these 
definitions, their interdependence, does not matter” (Gellner 1995:45-46).
Anthropologist Anthony Cohen (1985) argues that culture implies a feeling among its 
members that they have something in common which distinguishes (members of a 
community) in a significant way from the members of other putative groups, which 
means that consciousness of community is related to the boundaries it draws between 
itself and others. And American political scientist Susan Herbst (1994) notes that one of 
the most meaningful functions of community is the way it strengthens one’s sense of 
identity. “We know who we are, in part, because of the groups to which we ‘belong’.” 
(1994: 23) In nationalism scholarship, the protagonists are divided between two main 
camps — the primordialist and modernist camps, the former focusing on assumed givens 
of culture, identity and ethnicity, and the latter emphasising the fact that nations are 
modem, political entities. Anthony Smith, one of the most prominent scholars who 
subscribes to the first view, stresses in the Ethnic Origins o f Nations (1986) the 
primordial links and symbols that define ethnic groups, and which he uses to explain the 
willingness of people to sacrifice their lives in the name of the nation (1986: 11), while 
Gellner, who belongs to the latter camp, places more emphasis on the modernity of
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nations, linking this evolution to other factors, including economic ones, or most 
famously to political factors (Gellner 1983).12
In the literature on cultural identity, ‘ethnicity’ has often been seen as a crucial marker 
of difference, though there is a general consensus that it does not constitute the whole of 
cultural identity because other markers, such as gender, sex, class, religion and socio­
economics, are equally relevant. As Hall (1996) argues, it therefore makes sense to talk 
of identity as a ‘field of antagonisms’ where the pluralisation of difference undermines 
suggestions of cultural and ethnic determinism and essentialism. Within psychoanalysis, 
the definitions of identity13 have often been derived from the analyses of personal 
development among small children — referred to as processes of individuation and 
integration — as well as personality disturbances. And in social interactionism 
scholarship, Herbert Mead (1934), for example, has put forward the notion of identity as 
derived from the relation between the self and society, or the self and the other. Mead’s 
work is important in understanding identity as experienced because though his notion 
sees identity as an unfinished project, the individual can maintain a sense of identity, 
based on self-reflection (interpretation), a process most people are involved with 
continuously as they try to adapt to the various social situations they encounter.
The cultural turn within social science, in general, and audience studies, in particular, 
has broadly adopted a revised ontological perspective on the notion of identity that 
stresses the incompleteness, fragmentation and contradictions of both collective and 
individual identities, challenging essentialist categories and rhetoric surrounding the
12 This is a simplistic account of a very complex and valuable literature, which I will revisit, albeit briefly, 
in Chapter Four.
13 This is mostly related to self or personal identity, which is how a person regards him/her self and how 
he/she relate to others. The self therefore is a centre of awareness, emotional needs and desires, in terms of 
which an individual reflects and acts upon his or her social circumstances (Layder 2004).
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term. While the notion of social construction of identities has gained avid followers, a 
number of different, overlapping intersecting and sometimes competing concepts (of 
identity) continue to define the space within which cultural studies has theorised the 
problem of identity (Grossberg 1996: 90). These are difference, fragmentation, hybridity 
and diaspora14 — all of which are mutually interdependent as the discussions below will 
show.
The idea of identity as difference is prevalent in the literature, deriving from notions 
that relate difference to a particular constitutive relation of negativity in which the 
subordinate term (the marginalised other or subaltern) is necessary for and constitutive of 
the dominant term. Woodward, one of the key scholars engaged in this debate, 
emphasises the ways in which identities are forged through the marking of difference, a 
process that takes place both “through the symbolic systems of representations and 
through forms of social exclusion. Identity, then is not the opposite of, but depends on 
difference” (emphasis in original 1997: 29).
The second idea explains identity as fragmentation, underlining the multiplicity of 
identities and of multiple positions within any apparent identity. This view which sees 
identity as a ‘kind of diassembled and reassembled unity’ (for example, Haraway 1991) is 
popular in post-modern literature, where commentators, such as Hebdige (1989), 
underscore the plurality of sources of identity, emphasising their different fragments and 
their ‘cut-and-mix’ characteristics and their indeterminacy (Thompson 1992). The third 
notion sees identities as a form of hybridity, a popular term in public and academic 
discourse, and particularly in the literature on cultural globalisation, national and 
diasporic identities (Bhabha 1990: Hall 1992; Hannerz 1996) because processes of
141 will provide a detailed discussion around the concept of diaspora in Chapter Four.
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globalisation, including the increased mobility of peoples, capital and goods are believed 
to have contributed to the mixing of different cultures and the emergence of hybrid forms 
of culture and/or/identity.
Bhabha (1990), for example, describes hybridity as the “third space.. .which enables 
other positions to emerge [...] a space [that] displaces the histories that constitutes it, and 
sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately 
understood through received wisdom.. ..The process of cultural hybridity gives rise to 
something different, something new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of 
meaning and representation” (1990:211). The hybridisation thesis has gained momentum 
because of its empowering potential and its success in shifting attention from essentialist 
and homegenisation arguments that are concurrent with crude versions of media power. 
However, as many scholars have pointed out, the term is ambiguous and has the potential 
of domination as well as empowerment (see, for example Pieterse 1995 for a critique).
Diaspora, according to Grossberg’s categorisation, is the fourth term that has been used 
to convey different meanings of identity. For example, Clifford (1994) describes it as the 
signifier not simply of transnationality and movement, but of political struggles to define 
the local as a distinctive community in historical contexts of displacement. However, 
whatever their ideologies of purity, “diasporic cultural forms can never, in practice, be 
exclusively nationalist as they are deployed in transnational networks built from multiple 
attachments and they encode practices of accommodation with, as well as resistance to, 
host countries and their norms” (1994: 287).
The concept diaspora has become one of the most crucial metaphors for a globalised 
condition of identities in constant motion because as Srebreny (2000) argues, it offers
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approaches that can be historically and spatially more dynamic, that explore the senses of 
both fit and non-fit, belonging and longing that seem to reflect most diasporic 
experiences, while drawing attention to the multiple identifications and third-or-more- 
spaces in which diaspora is constructed. Chapter Four will provide a detailed 
interrogation of the term and its contestations. In the next section, however, I return to the 
notion of identity as a social construction.
2.6 Identity as Social Construction
These different concepts for thinking about identity are all grounded in a social 
constructionist approach popular in contemporary media sociology as it serves to 
challenge essentialist notions that see people as having singular, integral and altogether 
harmonious and unproblematic identities. By the same token, this approach also 
challenges accounts of collective identities as based on some “essence or set of core 
features shared by all members of the collectivity and no other” (Calhoun 1996:13).
Essentialist definitions of identity suggest clear, authentic sets of characteristics 
which people belonging to one community, collectivity or nation share and which do not 
change across time, while a non-essentialist definition focuses on differences and 
contestations, which has meant that many investigations of the constitution and politics of 
identity are often predicated on a distinction, articulated as between two forms of struggle 
over two models of the production of identities (Hall 1990). This view is replicated to a 
certain extent in Bauman’s ethnographic study (1996) of diverse ethnic communities in 
Southhall in London, in which he characterises essentialist discourses as the dominant
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discourses that reify culture and identity as opposed to demotic discourses that challenge 
existing reifications, and which entail a dual discursive competence, embracing the 
dominant as well as the demotic . .it is the dominant that emphasizes the conservation 
of existing communities and the demotic that allows Southallians to re-conceive 
community boundaries and contest the meaning of culture.. .These contestations, 
however, tend to stop short of taking one final step: the word culture remains restricted, 
in many contexts to its reified meaning [...]” (1996:195)
This thesis, as stated at the outset, adheres to the view that identities are socially 
constructed, not given, and to the understanding that identity is a short-hand description 
for ways of talking about the self and the community. However, rather than assuming a 
simple opposition or dichotomy between essentialism and social constructionism, I argue 
that under certain circumstances, self-critical claims to strong, basic and collective 
(national) identities are important to acknowledge. What this means is that where a 
particular category of identity has been repressed, de-legitimated or devalued in dominant 
or public discourse, it is possible that it may be invoked in an essentialist way, suggesting 
that people’s thinking of and talk about identity can oscillate between essentialist and 
essentialising versions of identities to ones that are more open to possibilities, though this 
oscillation may not be for instrumental purposes as Bauman above suggests.
As Craig Calhoun (1994) notes, essentialist invocations of race, nation, gender, class, 
and a host of other identities remain common in everyday discourses throughout the 
world. In other words, categorical identities can be invoked and given public definition 
by individuals or groups even where they are not embodied in concrete networks of 
interpersonal relationships. Calhoun’s suggestion does not suggest accepting a
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predominantly essentialist understanding of the notion of identity, but calls for examining 
the different processes through which this dualism comes into play in order to understand 
the ways in which identities are claimed, constructed and contested. This means that we 
have to take the politics of identity seriously. As he says:
The struggles occasioned by identity politics need to be understood not as simply 
between those who claim different identities, but within each subject, as the multiple 
and contending discourses of our era challenge any of our efforts to attain stable self­
recognition or coherent subjectivity (Calhoun 1994:19-20).
Philip Schlesinger (1991) also moves us towards combining a theoretical perspective 
with an empirical investigation in noting that to understand identity, we need to 
conceptualise the processes involved in the constitution and reproduction of cultures to be 
able to address the relationship between collective identities and cultural processes. In 
this respect, we need to reverse the argument by first posing the problem of collective 
identity itself before asking how it might be analysed and what importance 
communicative practices might play in its constitution. Chapter Four addresses this 
challenge by detailing the relevant literature on collective (national) identity while the 
empirical chapters Seven and Eight specifically address the processes through which the 
informants concerned produce and reproduce their identity. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I turn to the theoretical framework of ‘identification as discourse’ as it provides 
the conceptual and analytical framework for this work.
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2.7 Identification as discourse
To put across the proposed direction regarding identity, I draw on Hall’s (1996) 
theoretical framework of ‘identification as discourse’ and of identity as constructed 
across different intersection and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions of self 
and othering that people use in their daily encounters. This perspective allows for 
understanding identity construction as a continuing, dialogical production that allows us 
as researchers to examine the tension between the self and the other or multiple others, 
and between the self and the collective or the national in people’s talk of their identities.
Identification, in this sense, refers to the unstable, contingent reflection of a 
‘dialogical’ process where identity is constructed through a dialogical understanding of 
the conceptual horizon (cf. Bakhtin 1981) of the individual concerned. The information 
exchanged in this dialogue is constituted, on the one hand, on positive assertions of 
individual or group self-identity and, on the other, on statements about or labels affixed to 
the identities of others, constantly making and re-making divisions. What this means is 
that processes of identification are fluid or constant movements that capture the ongoing, 
changeable and authored ‘technique’ that people use to situate themselves within social 
and cultural contexts (cf. Rabinow 1984).
Put differently, processes of identification suggest that people engage in reflexive and 
continuous processes that are steps towards the end of the road, rather than the end itself, 
suggesting that the project of constructing identity is always ‘for’ or ‘towards’ something.
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Therefore, it follows that the social and political identifications of a person or a group 
‘for’ one thing may shift and change as it is constituted ‘for’ something else.15 This 
conceptualisation is particularly relevant once it becomes accepted that communities are 
rarely homogeneous in themselves as they involve both internal and external 
contradictions and once it becomes recognised that every individual within these 
communities is to some extent involved in more than one single interpretative 
community. Talking of identity construction as a process is relevant in discussing 
migrants and diasporic groups in general, to whom ascribing an identity, as Silverstone 
(2003) points out, is premature because processes of identification are continuous, 
contradictory and unstable both within and across gender and generation; and 
community-building, for the most part, remains at the level of the imagined, but without, 
for many, the uncomplicated constructive potential that Anderson assumed.
Crucially for this thesis, this understanding allows for an empirical inquiry of how 
people talk about belonging and how they map boundaries. Of these two dimensions, 
belonging is the more problematic as it necessarily constitutes a political and cultural 
field of global contestation that brings into focus a range of pertinent issues concerning 
relations between individuals, groups and communities (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002). As a 
contested term, ‘belonging’ has often been discussed in the literature by relating it to 
space, but such a relationship can be difficult to assess when discussing diasporic groups 
or migrants because space and place have different connotations. For example, we can 
say that where people feel they belong (the cultural or ethnic home) may not match 
objective ascriptions of membership (to the political or civic home) because belonging
15 This is symptomatic of most Palestinians’ discourses about themselves and their community, discourses 
that are often coded with implications for future action or for something waiting to happen.
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separates into its two constituent parts; ‘being’ in one place, and ‘longing’ for another 
(ibid: ix). Boundary-mapping, on the other hand, is the productive and often emotional 
activity of constantly making and re-making divisions, an activity that remains relevant to 
people and groups despite suggestions that the post-modern world is fluid (e.g. Castells 
1997) because of its potential in locating the strange and the friendly, the past and the 
present and the individual and the collective. Indeed, it is in the marking out of 
boundaries that we maintain a sense of who we are and who we are not.
The proposed understanding of identification as discourse I follow here draws on 
Bakhtin’s (1981) notion that people’s individual acts of expression, both written and oral, 
are the result of a difficult internal struggle in which the various voices of the past and 
present are linked to one another through language, therefore highlighting the relevance 
of memory16 in the process. What is relevant here is that the multiplicity of voices means 
that processes of identification emerge within the interplay of specific modalities of 
power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion than the 
signalling of identical, naturally-constituted identities — meaning ones that are all- 
inclusive sameness, seamless and without internal differentiation.
Importantly for this work, this notion allows us to understand precisely the ways in 
which identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, and therefore to address 
identities as ‘narrated’. Identities, as narrated, suggests they are constituted and 
reconstituted in time and over time, through narrative processes and discourse. It is a 
constructive starting point for an analysis of the relationship between news and the 
negotiation of identity, the central question in this thesis, because narrating means 
making sense of experience.
16 Chapter Four interrogates the meaning of memory.
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In the analysis of the empirical work for this study (Chapter Eight), the idea of identity as 
narrated comes across clearly when the informants’ talk of news reflects their attitudes to 
belonging and boundaries.
Having put across the theoretical underpinnings for addressing how identity is 
negotiated and constructed, it is important to add that neither subjective nor collective 
modes of identification are constructed independent of other factors17; rather they are 
constructed in relation to cultural, social and national referents, which means taking into 
account the macro context. This refers to broader social contexts such as family and 
social relationships as well as historical, social and political contexts within which people 
engage with symbolic products, including media products, pointing to how their 
representations are negotiated within and regulated by the wider social, cultural and 
political contexts within which they are consumed.
Broadly speaking, this means examining the discursive processes through which 
identities are negotiated in relation to different foci (reference points) and contexts, which 
allows us to address how identities are created within pluralised social contexts and in 
relation to different mediated cultural products. This conceptualisation uses the notion of 
‘relationality’ (Somers and Gibson 1994) as an important analytic variable, therefore 
addressing the various and fluctuating socio-cultural relations that an individual upholds. 
Hall, too, uses the notion of relationality in noting that identification “is constructed on 
the basis of recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another 
person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance 
established on this foundation” (Hall 1996: 2). Identification:
17 Gillespie (1995) has argued along similar lines in noting that there are limits to free-floating identities.
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.. .is not determined in the sense that it can be always ‘won’ or ‘lost’, sustained or 
abandoned. Though not without its determinate conditions of existence, including the 
material and symbolic resources required to sustain it, identification is in the end, 
conditional, lodged in contingency.[...] As a process, identification operates across 
difference and entails discursive work, the binding and marking of symbolic 
boundaries, the production of ‘frontier effects’ and requires what is left outside, its 
constitutive outside, to consolidate the process (Hall 1996:2-3).
To conclude, I would like to stress the arguments proposed here and which inform the 
remainder of this work. The first is that theorising the relationship between identity and 
media must take into consideration the dialectic nature of globalisation processes and the 
interplay between the global and the local. The second draws on the framework of 
identification as discourse which can help us understand how identities are always in the 
process of becoming, not being. The third is that identity can be best understood as 
narrated as it is through talking about oneself and one’s sense of self and other that 
people can take up different discursive and imagined positionings that can oscillate 
between essentialist ones to ones that are more open and ambivalent.
These arguments provide the groundwork for an analysis of the relationship between 
news and the ways in which Palestinians in Britain talk of identity and community. If at 
this stage the relationship between news and the construction of identity seems complex, 
it will become more apparent in the progression of this work. With these notions in mind, 
the next chapter turns to news to examine how it has been assessed in the literature and to 
provide a theoretical understanding that explains its centrality to some people’s everyday 
lives.
64
Chapter Three
News as Cultural Discourse: Towards a New Understanding
The news serves a vital democratic function whether in a given instance 
anyone out there is listening or not. The news constructs a symbolic world 
that has a kind ofpriority, a certification o f legitimate importance. And 
that symbolic world, putatively and practically, in its easy availability, in 
its cheap, quotidian, throw-away material form, becomes the property o f 
us all. (Michael Schudson 1995: 33)
Given the normative assumptions about the functions of news implied in the above 
comment, it is not surprising that journalism has attracted a lot of interest since studies on 
public opinion and propaganda began in the early 20th century. The literature on news 
within and across disciplines is vast, with inquiry examining how news influences public 
opinion, society and politics, what or who governs news values, the nature of news work 
and the dynamics of political and cultural information inherent in the texts. Debates on 
news processes have, on the other hand, focused on production strategies and constraints 
to explain the effect of the globalisation processes on news forms and content while work 
in political communication has largely focused on the role of news in politics and 
democracies, drawing on normative and explanatory models of democratic theory.
Within the last two decades, reception studies and other forms of qualitative audience 
research have served to emphasise the ‘critical’ sense-making processes of audience 
members, in terms of social interaction and media decoding, using the domains of social 
and cultural practices with the textual, via an emphasis on language, consciousness and
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subjectivity as constitutive elements of social reality (for some surveys of this literature, 
see Morley 1989; Moores 1990/1993; Silverstone 1990).
However, despite the abundance of work in these areas, little work has been carried out 
on how people employ news as a social and cultural resource in their day-to-day 
experiences (Jensen 1998), how they view news, how they define it and what they do 
with it. These are the very questions that, I argue, we need to answer to address the 
centrality of news in some people’s everyday lives and not in others’, or, putting it 
differently, to explore why some individuals invest in news stories, reflexively and 
emotionally, and what these investments mean for notions of belonging, community and 
social action. And these are the very questions that draw attention to the ways in which 
the ‘social bonds’ between audience members and their overall interaction with news 
may fall short of an active or reasoning polity (Habermas 1989), and yet do not mean that 
news media do not create shared cultural and ideological perspectives that people make 
sense of by taking varying subjective and affective discursive positionings.
In Chapter Two, I argued for understanding identity as a continuous discursive process 
of identification that captures how people negotiate meanings and experiences as they 
navigate different tensions and points of reference in their lives. Here, I draw on various 
theoretical paradigms, particularly related to the meaning and place of news, to argue for 
understanding news as a form of ‘cultural discourse ’ that allows us to examine through 
an audience study how news may have a potential, though indirect, social impact. The 
argument is two-fold; first, it suggests that news may enable members of its audience to 
make connections with the wider world they inhabit, what Lewis (1991) calls ideological 
resonance, and second, it takes into consideration the changing dynamics of news
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formats, the aesthetics of news and its narrative structure, as well as the connection 
between news and popular culture, which serve to link its audience to the wider world “in 
ritualistic, symbolic and mythical ways” (Dahlgren 1992: 205), thus institutionalising and 
legitimising its significance and potential in their lives.
The proposed understanding shifts attention from the normative functionalistic 
perspective of news as ‘public knowledge’ prevalent in the political communication 
literature1 to a focus on its socio-cultural meanings, therefore facilitating the examination 
of how news may shape societal interactions and the ways in which people relate to 
others in their sameness and in their differences. Methodologically speaking, these 
considerations help move analytical attention from the point of contact between 
audiences and text, or the point of consumption, to people’s talk o f news around these 
moments. The key starting point framing this argument sees that news cannot simply be 
defined as providing information2 only, but must also be explained and placed within the 
wider historical ‘field of mediations’ (Martin-Barbero 1993), the history of the various 
forms by which social action has been mediated through the public circulation of images 
and text (Couldry 2000), and which require the understanding of production and 
reception of symbolic material as dynamic and inter-related.
The theoretical framework of mediation is not new — it is implied in the early works 
of Raymond Williams (1973) in which he refers to the content of modem 
communications as a “form of unevenly shared consciousness of persistently external 
events.. .It is what appears to happen, in these powerfully transmitted and mediated ways,
1 Liberal and critical approaches to news production, with the latter emphasising news media’s role as 
public watchdog, as influencing public opinion and as facilitating democratic processes, share a 
rationalistic approach which sees news as producing information.
2 This is particularly relevant in today’s differentiated information environment, where information is 
accessed through different means and via diverse channels.
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in a world with which we have no perceptible connections but which we feel is at once 
central and marginal to our lives” (1973:295-6). Silverstone (1999) goes further, referring 
to mediation as the circulation of meanings, a notion that captures its dialectical nature 
and underscores the circulation of meanings between institutions and individuals that 
means it between the self and the collective and between the private and the public.
Significantly, the theoretical framework of mediation shifts attention from effect, or 
the transmission model of communication, to one that conceptualises media power “as far 
from automatic.. .but [...] that has to be continually reproduced through various practices 
and dispositions at every level of social life” (Couldry 2000: 4). In this way, media 
power, broadly speaking, cannot be simply explained as a binary relation of domination 
between ‘large’ and ‘small’ actors, with large actors (the media) having the automatic 
ability to dominate small actors (audience members), but as reproduced through the 
details of what social actors (including audience members) do and say (ibid: 4). What this 
means is that the connections news has to the political action of its audience or the 
political acts of government officials or other elites might be difficult to measure 
concretely and decisively (cf. Schudson 1995), but that its potential in shifting thinking 
and attitudes can potentially be by analysing people’s discourses.
Situating news within the theoretical framework of mediation informs both the 
theoretical and the methodological approaches adopted in this study. I will elaborate on 
the methodological impetus in this study in Chapter Five. First, however, I use the 
following sections to place this thesis within the context of relevant research on news 
within the field of media studies. Other fields of inquiry into journalism include history,
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language studies, political science and cultural studies, but the aim of this thesis does not 
require me to elaborate on any of these in much detail.
3.1 News Studies — Three Paradigms
News stories, particularly television news, penetrate living rooms and work spaces and 
are accessed in the domestic and the public spheres. Indeed, by virtue of its pervasiveness 
in societies, it has been suggested that news helps shape everyday consciousness as well 
as consciousness of the world that is beyond people’s immediate reach. However, how 
best to explain the function of news in societies remains contested, both within various 
academic disciplines as well as between scholars and practitioners themselves. As 
Berkowitz (1997) notes, understanding journalism resembles viewing a hologram — 
there is no single vantage point where the entire hologram can be seen and from which 
we can acquire an understanding of its social meaning.
The vast amount of literature on the meanings of news bears out this statement — 
indeed there is so much scholarship on the topic that it is difficult to know where to 
begin. In an insightful and much referenced essay, Michael Schudson (1997) offers a way 
out of the maze by identifying three key traditions that have dominated thinking in media 
and communication research, and are useful starting points for addressing the theorisation 
of news in the literature. These approaches can be grouped under three broad categories: 
the economic and political, the professional or social-organisational and the cultural.
The political economy tradition has formed the backbone of much research on news 
production and strategies. Starting with the path-breaking work of Dallas Smythe and
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Herber Schiller, this approach sees that the output of news media is principally 
determined by the economic structures of the organisations concerned. With its origins in 
the Marxian tradition, its arguments reflect a broadly class-based analysis, where news 
media are explained as institutions that legitimise the demands of capitalism. For 
example, Murdock and Golding (1974) have argued that the mass media are industrial 
and commercial organisations whose role is to produce and distribute commodities within 
a late capitalist order, suggesting that the production of ideology cannot be adequately 
understood without grasping the general dynamics of media production and the 
determinations they exert. Herman and Chomsky (1988) adopt similar views in their still 
influential ‘propaganda model’ of the mass media in which they see news as serving “to 
mobilise support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity” 
(1988: xi). For them, the propagandist nature of news is related to the fact that it is 
produced by a concentrated industry of several dozen profit-making corporations that is 
dependent on advertising for profits and government officials for its sources, and that 
remains influenced by right-wing pressure groups.
In privileging production over consumption processes and class rather than other 
social, racial, gender and generational divisions within societies, the political economy 
approach has been useful in explaining the global reach of news media. Cultural 
imperialism theorists (for example, Schiller 1991) have drawn on political economy 
perspectives to describe how the export of consumerist products and values has served 
largely capitalist considerations and undermined authentic cultures. These assumptions, 
however, have been qualified by the cultural globalisation approach, which offers a more
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complex theorisation of processes of globalisation (see Tomlinson 1999; Volkmer 1999; 
Thussu 2000).
Some studies on global news agencies, such as Reuters, Associated Press and Agence 
France-Presse, can also be located as falling within the political economy tradition and 
the media imperialism thesis . Paterson (1998), for instance, argues that global news 
agencies are largely responsible for the homogenisation of international news due to the 
similarity of factors that influence news production, the similarity of news production 
routines among agencies, competitive pressure to duplicate coverage by other agencies 
and the universal focus on standard ‘frames’ or themes in news coverage.4 But Boyd- 
Barrett and Rantanen (1998) provide a more culturally nuanced account, arguing that 
both political economy and cultural studies “provide information on the broad social, 
political and economic contexts of agency operations, their news production practices, 
their texts and the social contexts and practices associated with the reception and use of 
their services” (1998:3).
The second approach identified by Schudson is the social organisational approach, 
sometimes referred to as the professional organisational framework, which explains 
journalism in terms of practices and routines of work, bringing a sociological emphasis to 
understanding how working arrangements and occupational beliefs shape news making 
and production. Broadly speaking, the sociological organisational approach rejects an 
overly deterministic stress on the political and economic factors behind journalistic 
production, focusing instead on the professional culture and organisational structure
3 Volkmer (1999), in a study of CNN International, argues for a more differentiated understanding of 
globalisation processes, noting that the audio-visual communication strategies tend not to homogenise the 
globe, but work with strategies of diversification.
4 In later work, Paterson (2003) has found that news websites do little original reporting, relying on the 
input from the major news organisations.
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underpinning the process: the objectivity ethic, as well as limitations imposed by the 
news forms, deadline pressure and other elements of routine news work (McNair 1999).
This tradition also builds on symbolic interactionism, which explores how labels, 
symbols and meanings inform human interactions and understandings and which was 
popular in the dawn of cultural studies. The early works of the Glasgow University 
Media Group and the work of Stuart Hall and his colleagues (1978) draw on these latter 
ideas, though they move beyond ideas of ‘labelling’ to ideas of ideological ‘legitimation’. 
According to this view, journalists’ accounts are informed by dominant cultural 
assumptions, which in turn dictate systematic and preferential patterns of news access. In 
Policing the Crisis (1978J, Hall et al., for example, contend that the news media 
reproduce the voices of the powerful via routine access and news legitimation, thus 
commanding the discursive field and setting the terms of the debate. The media, 
according to them, do not simply ‘create’ the news, nor do they simply transmit the 
ideology of the ‘ruling class’ in a conspiratorial fashion:
Indeed we have suggested that, in a critical sense, the media are frequently not the 
‘primary definers’ of news events at all; but their structured relationship to power has the 
effect of making them play a crucial but secondary role in the media as ‘accredited 
sources’ . From this point of view, in the moment of news production, the media stand in 
a position of structured subordination to the primary definers. (Hall et al. 1978: 255 as 
cited in H. Tumber News: A Reader 1999)
The emphasis on the dominant rather than the deviant is abundant in the literature, 
spilling over into inquiries of news practices, news texts (van Dijk 1988), news-gathering 
procedures (Fishman 1980; Gans 1979; Gitlin 1980; Tuchman 1978) and news audiences,
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broadly generating linear models of media power explained as the dominance of the 
strong over the weak. Some studies have also stressed the ideological consequences of 
the organisational or ‘routine’ character of news production, which, as Schlesinger (1978) 
says, have “definite consequences in structuring news.. .The doings of the world are 
tamed to meet the needs of a production system.. .[which] in many respects [is] 
bureaucratically organised” (1978:47). Fishman (1980) follows a similar approach in his 
analysis of news-making, describing how journalists go through several phases where 
they detect occurrences, interpret them as meaningful events, investigate their factual 
nature, and assemble them into stories, while Ericson et al. (1987) point to the 
development of a ‘vocabulary of precedents’ that helps journalists recognise, produce, 
source and justify their output.
Also falling within this tradition are gate-keeping studies of news (White 1950), 
studies of the effects of journalistic expectations on reporting behaviour (for example, 
Lang and Lang 1953), work on ‘objectivity’ (Tuchman 1972), as well as the framing 
theory of news, where frames are seen as the “principles of selection, emphasis, and 
presentation composed of tacit theories about what exists, what happens and what 
matters” (Gitlin 1980:6). Tuchman (1972), too, uses the concept of framing in her study 
of newsroom practices and presentations, while Gofftnan (1986) uses it to describe the 
principles of organisation that govern events. The social and organisational routines of 
journalists are relevant to understanding news as discourse (van Dijk 1988) because they 
highlight specific factors such as the division of labour, hierarchical relations, deadlines, 
competition, journalists’ class membership and the economic conditions for news 
production, which are important considerations in addressing the production of foreign
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news, particularly as the international flow of news is also determined by the organisation 
of the news-processing industries (Curran and Seaton 2003).
The third approach Schudson identifies is the cultural tradition, where news is seen as 
a product of the relationship between occurrences and a culture’s symbolic system. 
Although the ‘cultural’ perspective of news has not been codified nor established as any 
sort of ‘school’, often merging with the social organisation view, it remains analytically 
distinct (1997:17). As he notes: “Where the organisational view finds interactional 
determinants of news in the relations between people, the cultural view finds symbolic 
determinants of news in the relations between ideas and symbols” (ibid: 17).
The cultural tradition links elements of the political economy and social organisational 
approaches within a framework that incorporates a materialist analysis with elements of 
the pluralist model of media influence. Consequently, it does not focus on who owns the 
news media, but on how the media are positioned relative to the power elites in society. It 
also locates the source of bias in news in the external environment within which 
journalists carry out their work, which means that content is not regarded as simply a 
matter of ownership or of journalistic practices and routines, but also as a result of the 
interaction between news organisations, the sources that pertain to their output and other 
social institutions (cf. McNair 1999).
Though early studies within this tradition used a Gramscian approach to hegemony in 
rethinking the meaning and implications of news discourse (the work of Stuart Hall and 
his colleagues at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham was the 
most influential in this area), much of the scholarship here paid attention to the audience 
through addressing news institutions’ awareness of audiences, the relations between ideas
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and symbols, the interplay within discourses, the ‘imagined audiences’ inscribed within 
media texts, as well as the nature of cultural power exercised in and through these texts, 
all of which serve to challenge rigid views of ‘ideological domination’ as the presumed 
end-point presupposed in media ownership and control models (Cottle 2003).
The main advantages of the cultural approach, however, come from its 
acknowledgement that journalistic practices are informed by cultural and social 
perspectives, thus broadening the study of journalism from its narrow ‘metonymic’ 
conception (Dahlgren 1992), referring to the narrow definition of the political, to the 
wider lens of culture that encompasses patterns of communication, practices and 
meanings which provide resources for collective life through the interplay between form 
and content. Content is the substance of taken-for-granted values, the “unquestioned and 
generally unnoticed background assumptions through which the news is gathered and 
within which it is framed,” while form refers to “narrative, storytelling, human interest 
and the conventions of photographic and linguistic presentation that shape the 
presentation of all the news the media produce” (Schudson 1997: 19-20).5 Both form and 
content are important for the understanding of news proposed in this work.
This approach has been popular within British cultural studies, where the blend of neo- 
Marxism, psychoanalysis, feminist studies, critical theory, semiotics and ethnography has 
complemented the interest in pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, cultural anthropology 
and cultural sociology in the United States. However, it was Raymond Williams (1978) 
who firmly created a place in the academy for critical engagement with journalism’s 
cultural dimensions, arguing that culture should be analysed not only through its idealist
5 For further discussion about the various structures of news, see Schudson’s “The Politics of Narrative 
Form; The Emergence of News Conventions in Print and Television” (1982).
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side, but also through the social arrangements and conditions by which cultural settings 
are put in place, therefore shifting attention to texts, practices and journalists as members 
of collectivities that influence their behaviour and output.
Though Schudson’s typology is concerned mostly with news production studies, news 
content and reception studies, too, are informed by these traditions. Some content studies, 
for instance, have shown how news is essentially ideological, with the power to limit and 
structure audience belief (e.g. Philo 1990; Herman and Chomsky 1998). Other studies 
have emphasised the political consequences of restructuring knowledge and opinion 
(Gamson 1992), the ways in which the organisation of news reports removes structural 
causes (Iyengar 1991), how news content is primarily governed by commercial criteria, 
based on what the audiences really want to watch, and how the news media play a role in 
promoting a culture of ignorance (Schechter 1998).
These three approaches mentioned are not mutually exclusive -  they are premised on 
profound differences over the nature of the state’s functioning, of journalism’s role in 
societies and of the concept of ideology. Broadly speaking, however, much of the inquiry 
within these traditions has been driven by assumptions about the perceived failure of the 
media to meet its normative potential assumed in the Habermasian concept of the public 
sphere. This has meant that inquiry has often started with constricted perceptions of what 
is meant by the public, deflecting awareness from a number of salient issues over the 
processes through which the public or publics are constituted, the media’s role in this 
process and, importantly for this thesis, the ways in which “journalism and other media 
output help or hinder in stimulating dialogue and debate” (Dahlgren 1991:16).
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It is exactly such concerns with dialogue, debate and participation that drive the 
methodological impetus in this study, an audience study of the ways in which the 
Palestinians in Britain use news and make sense of it and what this sense-making means 
for questions of belonging, identity and citizenship and what it means for societal action 
and dialogue. Before I go on to review audience studies relevant to this work, I turn to the 
theorisation of television and television news as this is the genre the informants in this 
study engage with most (see Chapter Seven). Television also remains the primary 
medium through which the public in Britain is informed about important issues; three 
polls in 1989, 1993 and 1997 suggests this holds true for up to 84 per cent of the 
population (Stone 2000 cited in A. Srebreny and C. Patterson International News in the 
21st Century, 2004)6.
3.2 Television — socio-cultural perspectives
As with the scholarship on news production summarised above, the literature on 
television is also vast; hence, I will not be surveying the whole field of research, but will 
make use of that scholarship which is helpful for developing an analytical starting point 
for understanding news, particularly television news, and its uses, and which is pertinent 
to the methodological approach undertaken in this study.
Much of the work on television has been influenced by the three paradigms mentioned 
above — a survey of work on international or global television shows that much
6 The same holds true in the US where surveys have consistently shown that Americans prefer and trust 
television news the most (see, for example, research by the Pew Centre for the People and the Press).
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scholarly attention remains confined to political economic and social organisational 
analyses of the changing media landscape, focusing among other issues on the 
concentration of the global structure of news gathering and dissemination and the gate- 
keeping processes which are based on uniform sets of values adopted by the main global 
news agencies and that have influenced the global flow and production of news.
Inquiry has also examined how new media technologies have influenced production, 
delivery and reception and addressed the challenges posed by the proliferation of 
transnational news media to the hegemony of the traditional news providers, the main 
five international news agencies, and to the impact of advanced editing techniques, the 
use of improved technologies, live news and embedded reporters on the traditional ways 
journalists carry out their work. As Patterson and Srebreny (2004) note:
While the nature of news and news production has changed in massive ways from 
two decades ago and beyond — globalisation, ownership and technology are prime 
examples — news research has failed to keep pace. The notion that journalists 
objectively mirror the key events of the day is still widely accepted within the 
industry itself, however, evidencing the limited practical influence of the seminal 
early analyses of news (Patterson and Srebreny 2004: 17)
The debate over objectivity and criticism of value-rich journalistic orientations is 
dominant in the communication literature, where there are widespread perceptions about 
the rhetorical slant of journalistic representations. However, there are some in the 
academy who argue that, for all its shortcomings, television journalism can stimulate 
socio-cultural interactions within the public sphere and that, as such, can strengthen 
public and democratic participation (see, for example, Scannell 1989). As Dahlgren
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(1995) notes, the arguments and evidence from the defence of news cannot be totally 
dismissed because “television journalism does [...] foster forms of awareness and public 
knowledge conducive to the democratic character of society, yet [...] all such 
overarching evaluations are of limited utility” (1995: 47).
It is difficult to condense the literature into a few paragraphs, but briefly, much of the 
criticism of television news emanates from concerns about the increasing blurring of the 
boundaries between ‘information’ and ‘entertainment, a distinction that journalists have 
traditionally used to demarcate their practice as being different from, or as being high as 
opposed to the low culture of popular soaps, for example. However, competition over 
what is widely regarded as fragmented audiences, changes in government regulations and 
increasing pressure of the market situation and demands of the audiences, all of which 
have radically transformed television news output, have challenged these distinctions as 
well as the old models of public service broadcasting in Europe and traditional news 
television formats in the US.
The changing formats of television news, manifest in attached as opposed to detached 
journalism and emotional content, have been criticised as trivialising political issues, 
creating, on the one hand, disagreement over what is meant by ‘good journalism’ and 
over which criteria can separate ‘serious’ journalism from popular culture (see Dahlgren 
and Sparks 1992), while spurring, on the other hand, various studies of television output 
or text which have tended to focus on what Dahlgren (1995) has called the double 
contingency of the actual process of signification in television. This process, he notes, 
derives from the familiar and generally agreed on notion of the polysemic quality of all 
communication and all texts which means that meanings are seldom fully unequivocal
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and from the fact that the contingency of meaning resides partially in the text, because it 
is only in the encounter with a public that the meaning becomes realised. Though this 
double meaning within the audio-visual text does not make the text irrelevant in research, 
it does make textual research complicated, particularly in the time of 24-hour news.
While as an enterprise, the industry of television (i.e. its political economy) remains 
central to the understanding of the institutional characteristics of the public sphere and 
while the social organisational approach is relevant to understanding the constraints on 
news production, this study is more concerned with approaches that have addressed 
television’s cultural and social implications, which I turn to next.
Among such approaches, it is Roger Silverstone’s theorisation of the centrality of 
television (1981; 1988; 1994) in everyday lives that is particularly relevant to this study. 
In Television and Everyday Life (1994), Silverstone argues that this centrality is related to 
its articulation of “the primary concerns of human existence and in which they are 
themselves primary [...] Television’s effectiveness consists of its ability to translate the 
unfamiliar and to provide frameworks for making sense of the unintelligible” (Silverstone 
1994: 181). What this means is that television becomes a resource for the discourses 
people employ to process and organise personal experiences or to mediate the horizons of 
their everyday world and those beyond their immediate reality, therefore offering 
‘symbolic’ legitimacy and validation for television’s place in their everyday lives.
Silverstone’s reference to television news is also worth elaborating. Implying that 
television news does have a social function, he draws on Giddens’ concept of ontological 
security (1990) to argue that television news is the “key institution in the mediation of 
threat, anxiety and danger” from the outside world (1994:17). Of all the various genres of
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programming on television, Silverstone writes, it is news that most clearly demonstrates 
“the dialectical articulation of anxiety and security”, therefore providing a paradoxical 
sense of reassurance (I turn to this in the analysis of the empirical material in Chapter Six 
and Seven). It is precisely this tension between televisual news’ creation of an 
apprehension and its narrative resolution which encourages the viewer to find in the 
newscast a sense of reassurance:
Reassurance is not provided only, of course, in the content of reporting.. ..Yet the 
levels of anxiety that could be raised (and of course may well be either inevitably or 
deliberately raised) are ameliorated both in terms of the structure of the news as a 
programme (the tidying of papers, mutual smiles and silent chat following a ‘human 
interest’ story complete news bulletins, except under exceptional circumstances of 
crisis or catastrophe, all over the world), and in terms of its ritualised flow (ibid: 16- 
17)
Writing in a different context, Paddy Scannell’s (1989) work on public service 
broadcasting also addresses television’s social and cultural implications, particularly in 
his arguments that television’s most important effect is to expand the sphere of the 
‘merely talkable about’ (1989:144). Avoiding problems associated with using media 
‘texts’ or ‘audiences’ to analyse the question of power and ideology, Scannell makes a 
compelling case towards understanding the ‘communicative intentionality’ (Cottle 2003) 
of programme producers and demonstrates historically how this has informed the 
production of programme forms. Scannell writes:
News intends to provide information. Adverts intend to persuade. But even where 
there is a manifest content with obvious strategic-purposive intentions (most
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obviously, as we shall see in the propaganda that saturated every area of 
programming in the Second World War), there is a necessary prior sociable 
commitment in the communicative form of every programme [...] The character of 
broadcasting as necessarily sociable lies in the form of its communicative context. 
(Scannell 1989:23)
What both these accounts, though with different emphases, suggest is that it is possible to 
understand television and television news as a ‘socio-cultural’ experience. In other 
words, “what appears on the screen is encountered and interpreted by viewers, and then 
enters their social worlds through social interaction, being reinterpreted and inserted in a 
vast array of discourses” (Dahlgren 1995:39). These theoretical perspectives set the stage 
for developing the proposed understanding of the social meanings of news, discussed 
later on in this chapter. In the next section, I turn to audience studies to address the 
development in thinking and theorisation of the news audience.
3.3 Dilemmas of the Audience
The audience as an analytical concept is relatively new. Indeed, early studies of media’s 
role in societies referred to the concept of mass society to explain the relationship 
between media and public belief. This overarching term implied that the world was 
composed of a mass of fragmented individuals who were subject to powerful media 
messages — the so-called hypodermic needle model of mass media effects. However, 
audience studies have gradually come to specify different interrelated types and stages of 
impact and influence.
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The earliest influential studies in this area remain The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld et 
al. 1944) which proposed that media’s influence comes in stages or steps, involving 
personal contacts, and Personal Influence (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955), which showed that 
whatever impact the media have is also mediated through interpersonal communication 
and other interactions within social networks. Later research associated with the political 
economy tradition focused on how the structures and processes of, in particular, news 
production, alienated people from the production process and their capacity to participate 
in the political process (see Neuman 1991; Nightingale and Ross 2003).
By the 1970s, a new period of research began to question the overly pessimistic 
theories of the media audience. Halloran (1970), for example, conceptualised audience 
members as actively structured by their position in societies by integrating studies of 
news production with studies of people’s responses to particular events, while Katz, 
Blunder and Gurevitch (1973) proposed that the audience used media to satisfy its needs 
and demands, this became known as the uses and gratification approach. However, it was 
not until Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding (1980) model that media research shifted 
towards a theory of popular culture that embraced both textual production and audience 
interpretations and that combined an understanding of media as regulatory regimes for 
maintaining social control with a recognition that these regimes also created discursive 
spaces for contestations (Nightingale and Ross 2003).
One of the most widely cited works that built on Hall’s model was David Morley’s the 
Nationwide Audience (1980), in which he examined how different groups interpreted the 
British popular current affairs programme Nationwide. His path-breaking work concluded
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that audience readings of the same text were based on “cultural differences embedded 
within the structure of society” — cultural clusters which guide and limit the individual’s 
interpretation of messages. Morley’s work challenged the hitherto prevalent formalism of 
screen theory and its obsession with avant-garde reflexivity popular in the 1970s and 
offered a more nuanced understanding of inter-discursive processes in audience reception 
by bringing together text and audience. In later work7, Morley qualified his early 
conclusions to argue that the audience’s ‘decoding’8 of the media text was connected 
with the wider field of communication (work, school, family, leisure) to which viewers 
belong (cf. Morley 1992:77).
James Lull (1980) followed in Morley’s footsteps in producing a prototypical study 
examining family uses of television that informed a wide range of empirical projects on 
media use in different contexts, while Liebes and Katz (1993) combined social-scientific 
and humanistic approaches to explore the worldwide reception of the American soap 
Dallas. Over the past two decades, mainly ethnographic reception studies that drew on 
Hall’s model and the classic qualitative audience studies of Ang (1985), Lull (1990), 
Morley (1980), Radway (1984), Hobson (1982) and so on, began to take into account the 
concrete problems associated with trying to separate text/audience from the culture 
within which the audience members are embedded, drawing attention to how audiences 
too participate in the mediation of culture and political life.
7 Although Morley’s work was seen as path-breaking in the analysis of television audience, it did not 
escape criticism (see, for example, Tulloch 1998; Curran 1990; Comer 1991).
8 The word decoding itself has been criticised for over-simplifying what audiences actually do with media 
texts. Nick Couldry (2000) argues that the complexity of what audiences do with media material matches 
the variety of functions fulfilled by the media beyond the purely textual, including a ritual, participatory 
function whose “ideological effects escape the encoding/decoding model” (2000:9).
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Other scholarship, drawing on quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, 
suggested that a series of processes and patterns clearly implicated in precise ways the 
role of the media and news in the construction of social meaning (for example, Iyengar 
1991; Philo 1990; Gamson 1992; Lewis 1991), while work by the Media Group at 
Glasgow University in 1994,1999 and 2000 showed that decisions by broadcasters 
helped influenced audience members’ negative perceptions toward the developing world 
because of the lack of explanations and contexts in television reporting (Philo 2004).
There is little doubt that most studies on the news audience have been broadly 
preoccupied by news’ political influence, an area of study that has mushroomed over the 
past three decades. Inquiry within the political science discipline has examined various 
aspects, drawing on propaganda theory, campaigns, persuasion, the effect of news on 
public opinion and its effect on whether the audience becomes more informed because of 
exposure to news. Interest in public opinion, popular in the United States in the 1950s 
and 1960s, was complimented by interest in the agenda-setting functions of news.
In the UK and Europe, among those studies relevant to this inquiry is Justin Lewis’ 
examination of audience responses to British television news (1991), which showed a 
clear relationship between ‘“texts’ preferring devices and the discourses that structured 
people’s views of the world” (1991:108), and the afore-mentioned work by Morley 
(1980) because of its drawing attention to the relevance of the domestic and local settings 
in understanding global and local processes. Also relevant to this study is Klaus Bruhnen 
Jensen’s (1990) suggestion that we need to move beyond the individual text or genre to 
provide an analytical basis for understanding the relevance of news in society. He writes:
85
.. .polysemy may be a characteristic of the reception of news, which bears witness to 
contradictions at the level of social structures. It is the polysemy of reception, rather 
than the polysemy of media texts, which must be explored in order to assess 
concretely the relative power of media and audiences (Jensen 1990:58).
Though Jensen’s proposal and work regarding the news audience shows that meaning 
production may potentially challenge dominant definitions of reality because the 
processes of making sense of television news, in particular, are over-determined by both 
the social definitions of the genre and the macro-societal structures, it is, he argues, 
ultimately “the audience-public that must insist on the substantive uses of media, both 
within the political system and in other areas of social and cultural life, by transcending 
the ambiguous role of recipient” (ibid: 74).
This, of course, means shifting attention to the audience, but not in the conventional 
way. Indeed, Jensen’s proposal shifts attention away from discussions of whether 
audience members are active, passive or critical9 to discussions of their participation and 
the forms of their participation in public life, if not politics in the strict meaning of the 
word, and to addressing the contexts within which we can transcend the notion of the 
audience understood as merely a recipient of information to an audience understood as 
public or as a participant in the public sphere.10 This shift in focus transcends the 
pessimism about the failure of the news media to meet its normative potential assumed in 
the Habermasian model of the public sphere symptomatic of much scholarship in media 
and cultural studies, and which have served to deflect sociological awareness from a
9 Chapter Five details the debate on the audience.
10 These have been pressing questions in the political communication literature, in particular, where 
scholarship, drawing on the Habermasian principle of the public sphere, has associated the term public with 
participation in politics and with citizenship (there are various arguments suggesting that media undermine 
the public sphere and political participation, such as Putnam’s 2000).
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number of salient issues, including how “publics are constituted, the media’s role in this 
process, the nature of the social bonds between members of the public and the ways in 
which journalism and other media output can help or hinder in stimulating dialogue and 
debate” (Dahlgren 1991:16).
Both Jensen’s and Dahlgren’s arguments are crucial for the empirical focus in this 
research, an audience study that examines the extent to which the informants, members of 
the Palestinian diasporic community in Britain, relate to one another and to the larger 
host society they inhabit through their uses of news, and how their making sense of news, 
their oppositional decodings or otherwise of news, may help them engage or disengage in 
public life. These notions do not mean that the informants’ appropriation of news is in 
itself a manifestation of political engagement11, but that their identification with the news 
texts, as individuals and as members of a collective, and their social uses of news allows 
us to examine what participation means and whether participation in or withdrawal from 
public life are linked to identity politics and to questions of inclusion and exclusion.
Importantly, though this is something I do not address in this thesis, this allows us to 
address the prescriptive top-down models of multi-cultural citizenship. At this juncture, I 
turn to the theorisation of the news audience relevant to this study.
3.4 Theorising the Audience for News
The attempts to capture the different aspects of audience responses to the media have 
generated distinctive research traditions. In this section, I will focus only on those
11 It is important to note that traditional measurements of political participation -  voting, party membership, 
etc. -  are not the purpose of this research.
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approaches pertinent to this work, namely the uses-and-gratification approach, the agenda 
setting and framing theories and the active audience theory.12
The uses- and- gratifications approach, a key tradition that has been in use since the 
1960s, charts the use-values and experiential qualities that audiences associate with 
different media (Blumler and Katz 1974). Starting with the question of what people do 
with media, rather than what media do to people, this uses-and-gratifications approach 
identifies the audience’s orientation towards and motivations for media use, which was 
later modified as the gratifications the audience seeks from different media (e.g. Katz et 
al. 1973). This mode of inquiry uses various empirical methods, but mostly content 
analysis and questionnaire-based surveys to gauge the meanings the audience members 
attach to texts and to understand their perceptions of the qualities of different news 
media, particularly because news lends itself to a variety of uses; as instrumental 
information, as entertainment or diversion from other concerns; as an occasion for 
identity-formation and as an opportunity for para-social interactions (see Jensen 1998). 
Since the uses and gratifications the audience members acquire from texts are broad, this 
tradition suggests that journalism’s role is essentially benevolent, and that the media 
generally have only a limited impact on the audience, who use media content to gratify 
particular needs.
However, because of its comparative neglect of content, this approach may 
overemphasise the malleability of the audience and hence the variability of reception,
12 Among other important approaches to understanding the audience of television news draws on social 
psychology and media sociology to explore people’s recall of news. Hoijer (1990), for example, argues that 
television news can test people’s memory in a real-time setting because memory is highly dependent on the 
quality of initial comprehension. Doris Graber (1990), too, says that memory for visual themes is better 
than memory for verbal themes, while Harris’ (1999) work suggests that intense emotional shots have a 
complex effect on memory.
88
problems that have beset later reception studies (Jensen 1998). Furthermore, its broad
assumptions that media are benign, meaning having little direct impact on their audience,
have been challenged by ‘critical’ theorists, who, drawing on Marxist and other analytical
paradigms, have maintained that journalism essentially reproduces the interests of
dominant groups and classes. Structuralists, drawing on the work of Lacan and Althusser,
have argued that the linguistic structures of news ‘positions’ the audience as subordinate
to the dominant class of capitalism, thereby suggesting that ideology is produced in
language, at the level of the unconscious (McNair 1999). Others, such as Hall and Eco,
have noted that that despite the presence of a dominant ideology, there is a possibility of
oppositional and different decodings by members of the audience. For this group of
theorists, ideological struggle is a hegemonic process to which journalism contributes by
1 ^“reproducing consensus about the social order” (Ericson et al. 1990: 19).
The second approach to theorising the audience is the “agenda-setting” approach, 
which argues for a direct, causal relationship between [journalistic] content and 
subsequent public perception of what the important issues of the day are. The basic 
hypothesis here is that journalistic news values act as a cue for the audience, alerting 
them to the importance of an issue, which suggests that despite limited recall of specific 
news items and despite the varied gratifications that the news may provoke or enforce, 
news stories serve to focus the public’s attention on specific issues in the political process 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972). Simply put, agenda setters argue that news does not tell 
people what to think, but what to think about (own emphasis added). Agenda-setting 
research has become one of the most influential traditions in political communication
13 A different approach sees journalists constructing the world in terms of categories, such as the normal 
versus the deviant and so on.
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work14 and has been used to explain how journalism works in different national and 
transnational contexts. However, the new media ecology reflected in the diversity of 
media form and content has challenged its presumptions particularly because of its 
limitations in providing documentation of the processes of interpretation and uses of 
media that audiences perform in everyday contexts and which are seen as the most 
important interface between institutionalised politics and people’s lives.
In McCombs and Shaw’s original theory, agenda-setting was a linear theory of media 
effects that saw effect as a range and salience of the issues the audience members thought 
about. In the later version of this approach, known as ‘framing’ studies, the theory 
acquires two focal points; effect, where the effect is not just selection of objects and their 
salience, but selection of specific features of those objects; and audience activity, where 
the frame includes the conceptual apparatus15 used by the audience in their decoding of 
media output (McCombs and Bell 1996). According to them, the framing approach links 
agenda-setting to the uses and gratifications approach by seeing agendas as a form of 
personal orientation that is actively sought by the audience (ibid).
Generally speaking, frame theory provides a framework that explains meaning 
production in media texts and in social practices as individual and as socially shared 
knowledge. An expanding literature also has examined the ways in which readers and 
viewers interpret frames and the degree to which these frames shape audience 
understandings, at best revealing the complexity of audience interpretation of news texts
14 The other two leading paradigms of political effect are the spiral of silence and the cultivation 
hypothesis.
15 Other theorists, such as Tuchman (1978), Hall (1978) and Gitlin (2003), use the concept of the media 
frame to refer to what makes the world beyond the direct experience of people appear natural. Erving 
Goffman (1974) has also argued that in everyday life people frame reality in order to negotiate, manage and 
comprehend it and to choose appropriate repertoires of cognition and action.
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and the degree to which these decodings are shaped by the complex interaction of media 
frames and personal experience (Gamson 1992: Neuman, Just & Crigler 1992). The 
conceptual framework of frame in the news is particularly significant in a research of this 
kind as the framing processes can be assessed through an audience study.
The third approach to theorising the audience is the broadly named ‘active audience’ 
theories which focus on what audiences do with media texts rather than what impact 
mediated communications have on the audience. Although active audience theory usually 
refers primarily to analyses in which the main focus is on specified audience participation 
with particularities of texts (e.g. Morley 1980; Radway 1984), a wider range of analytic 
approaches shares its key features. Recent ethnographic studies within the active 
audience approach have generally focused on the context in which media are used, 
especially the domestic frame of everyday media use (e.g. Morley 1980), as well as on 
the relationship between audience perceptions of textual meaning and some features of 
their social composition (Ang 1996; Alasuutari 1999).
Most of these studies have been criticised because the audiences targeted in mainly 
ethnographic work are contextually defined -  the contexts are domestic in nature and the 
audience composition is based in age, religion, nationality, gender, class, educational 
achievement, etc. Consequently, these microcosms of audience meaning construction and 
action have been seen as a problem for active audience theory since they are often 
described in ‘cultural terms’. In other words, the process of meaning construction is seen 
as an activity located in a group of subjectivities that is culturally or sub-culturally 
determined.
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This thesis fuses elements of the above approaches, particularly framing theory and 
active audience theory, and which allow for an empirical analysis of the cognitive 
processes16 the audience concerned uses to make sense of news. Cognition17 as an 
explanatory framework has been employed to explain how individuals as members of an 
audience make sense of international political news in diverse cultural settings and to 
develop ‘super-themes’ (see Graber 1984: Jensen 1998) which help de-construct the 
traditional functionalistic approaches to understanding the meaning of news in societies.
Focusing on the processes through which the audience makes sense of news is 
important for developing a comprehensive understanding of the news audience because it 
addresses the ways in which mediation is a political process that involves the circulation 
of meanings between institutionalised political news media and consumers of these news 
media. These notions are taken up in the analysis of the empirical work in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. I now turn to the prevalent understanding of news in the literature to set 
the stage for my own argument regarding its understanding and meanings.
3.5 The Meaning of News — Contested Territory
The meaning of news remains hotly debated, particularly between the profession and the 
academy. From a purely journalistic perspective the answer to the question ‘what is 
news?’ is relatively straightforward — news is a story about real events or information
16 This thesis takes its point of departure in the specific understanding of news that comes through the 
interview material, thereby using a bottom-up approach derived from the data. It does not, therefore, intend 
to verify or disprove the theoretical understanding of cognition, but uses it as an analytical tool to explain 
the processes of meaning-making resulting from engagement with news.
17 Goffman (1986) sees cognitive schemes as providing a basis for the conceptualisation of social 
behaviour. For him, a frame is a ‘scheme or interpretation in which the particulars of events and activities 
which we attend to are organised and made sensible’ (Goffman 1986: 10)
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that people need to know and should know about their community and world. Media 
critics, however, say news is a construction of reality, a language that journalists object to 
as it implies that journalists are pawns in a wider game of power and control, and a 
language replete with phrases such as “news is what newspapermen make it” (Gieber 
1964), “news is the result of the methods newsworkers employ” (Fishman 1980) and 
“news is manufactured by journalists” (Cohen and Young 1973).
Contestations about what news is extend to elite and popular definitions of news and 
to news formats. In most American writings on news, as well as in journalistic practices, 
for example, news is often seen in terms of sets of different dichotomies, hard versus soft, 
important versus interesting, serious versus non-serious and information versus narrative. 
Hartley (1982) and Fiske (1992) add to these dilemmas by referring to human interest 
stories as ‘non-serious’ news, while Langer (1998) sees ‘non-serious’ news stories as 
stories that focus on what he calls the domain of common sense and lived experience, 
which is popular with television audiences. These dilemmas are becoming more difficult 
to address in the contemporary news environment where the boundaries between soft and 
hard and serious and non-serious news18 are becoming increasingly porous and blurred.
Attempts to define news in broad strokes do little to resolve these conceptual 
dilemmas. Walter Lippmann (1922), for instance, famously defined news as simply “the 
signalling of an event”, echoing modem textbook journalistic definitions of news. 
However, this no longer holds true as such a distinction is not enough to distinguish news 
from other media genres that also play this signalling role in that they, too, draw the 
public’s attention to issues and events of social and political importance. Indeed, it can be
18 There is a large body of work about sensationalism in news and about the debate whether news functions 
more like infotainment. These are important debates, but are beyond the remit of this study.
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argued that all of the usual characteristics people normally associate with news or public 
affairs media can be found in other media genres, while those associated with popular or 
entertainment media can also be found in news.
An equally complex dilemma poses itself when discussing news values, which Hall 
(1973) notes, “remain among the most opaque structures of meaning in modem society”. 
In practice, all serious journalists are supposed to possess news values, but few are able 
to define what these are because they are often confused with notions of newsworthiness, 
which has been much more broadly defined in the scholarship on news production.
News values have been discussed in different ways in the literature on news. However, 
to date, the most widely quoted study on news values is and remains Galtung and Ruge’s 
(1965/1970) model on foreign news. In detailing the criteria which make some events 
more likely to be selected as news, as well as which aspects of a news item are 
emphasised once selected, they identified 12 conditions that events have to satisfy to be 
classified as newsworthy. These include frequency, threshold, lack of ambiguity, 
meaning, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, 
reference to elite people, reference to persons and reference to something negative, all of 
which are referents most journalists use when deciding on which story to tell the world.
However, as Patterson and Srebreny (2004) note, while the model of news values and 
newsworthiness remains relevant for the study of the pressures emanating from within 
media institutions themselves on the ways in which journalists do their work, it cannot be 
easily sustained as the most efficient model to explain news, particularly in the 
contemporary news environment characterised by rolling news and immediacy and by 
media literacy which, simply put, means the audience has the critical skill of analysis and
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appreciation of the social dynamics and social centrality of media19 ‘as framing the 
cultures o f everyday' (Patterson and Srebreny 2004:18) (my emphasis).
Another contentious concept used to assess news is the notion of objectivity, which 
refers to a normative principle that implies trust in journalists and journalism as it 
assumes that the facts presented to the world can be open to independent validation as 
opposed to values that form the basis of an individual’s conscious or unconscious 
preferences for what the world should be (cf. Schudson 1978).20 However, like news 
values, the concept of objectivity and the related term ‘impartiality’, both central to 
discussions of British broadcasting journalism, have come under attack from within and 
outside the profession with criticism buttressed by empirical work that has found that 
news is biased. A more fundamental critique asserts that there can be no objectivity in 
journalism (cf. McNair 1999). In recent work on the Arabic satellite broadcaster al- 
Jazzeera, Iskandar and el-Nawawy (2004) proposed that the term ‘contextual objectivity’ 
better explains how television news media present their stories in a fashion that is both 
impartial and yet sensitive to local sensitivities.
Furthermore, the increasing porousness of the classic information/entertainment 
divide that has often been used to distinguish news from other media genres makes it 
difficult to easily distinguish what constitutes news, while, at another level, as Dahlgren 
(1995) notes, the loosening of boundaries between journalism, entertainment, public
19 In political science scholarship on news, the media-centric focus has been offset by the decidedly 
normative impetus behind the examination of the relationship between journalism and the political system, 
emanating from the long-held traditions and expectations about the role of news as the fourth estate. Dating 
back to the work of Lippmann (1922), this scholarship has been mainly concerned with the political role of 
news, with work paying particular attention to measuring the effectiveness of the news media in fulfilling 
its primary roles as public watchdogs overseeing the state; as representatives of society and as providers of 
information to promote public rationality (see Curran 1996 for critique of models of media and 
democracy).
20 Objectivity, as Schudson (1978) points out, is a relatively recent concept which emerged as an ideal 
following the spread of fascist dictatorships and their propaganda in the 1920s and the 1930s.
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relations and advertising, precisely the trends which Habermas lamented, may have 
detracted attention from ‘the importance of the general media culture in producing shared 
interpretive frameworks whether the communities produced are authentic or not is 
another matter, but what is clear is that media-based interpretive communities are a 
precondition for sense-making in the modem world’ (Dahlgren 1995: 17).
3.6 News as Cultural Discourse -  Mediation, Ritual and Narrative
These different debates set the stage for addressing the proposed understanding of news 
as cultural discourse proposed in this thesis, and which helps explain how news can be 
an expression of the beliefs, cultures and values of societies and how it can function as 
ideology, therefore serving to sustain relations of domination.
This understanding, I argue, goes beyond and draws on the notions of news as ‘public’ 
presumed in the two dominant and contrasting views of news in the literature, the first as 
public knowledge, which reflects the normative functionalist perspective on news 
production prominent until the mid-1980s, and second as public culture, which reflects 
the cultural approach to news introduced in the 1980s cultural studies and which suggests
t
that the meanings conveyed in news are mediated by news workers and producers and 
received or mediated by audiences in different ways (Cottle 2000a).
21 Cottle points to a number of recent studies that have begun to examine the differentiated nature of news 
forms and professional practices and explore how news production contexts and news texts can be 
productively approached as mutually interpenetrating (Bell 1991; Cottle 1993a; Clausen 2003) thus 
showing that the earlier theoretical emphasis placed on routine tend to reflect a form of organisational 
functionalism in which ideas of journalistic practices and agency become lost (Cottle 2003).
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In proposing to understand news as a form of cultural discourse22,1 combine 
interpretative and social constructivist approaches that bring together the perspective of 
news as an ideological resource that helps in the formation and the de-limitation of public 
assumptions and attitudes (cf. Gitlin 2003) and the cultural perspective of news that takes 
into account its aesthetic and emotional characteristics , as well as its appropriation as 
ritual, which serves to link audience members in their everyday lives to the larger world 
in a symbolic way (Dahlgren 1992). The notion of discourse implies conflict and 
contestations, while the notion of culture refers to patterns of communication, practices 
and meanings that provide taken for granted orientations as well as resources for 
collective life and which guide people’s actions, speech and understanding.
Methodologically speaking, understanding news as cultural discourse allows us to 
examine the relevance of the what and the how (content and form) of news, where the 
former refers to the taken-for-granted values and the “unnoticed background 
assumptions.. ..through which the news is framed”, and the latter to “narrative, 
storytelling, human interest and the conventions of photographic and linguistic 
presentation that shape the presentation of all the news the media produce” (Schudson 
1997: 19-20).
The proposed direction, I argue, is relevant for addressing through an empirical 
investigation the power of news by addressing the “pre or non-political that becomes 
actualised at particular moments when politics arise.. .the key here is to underscore the
221 draw on Hall’s (1992) notion of discourse (which he bases on Foucault) and which he sees as a ‘set of 
statements or beliefs which produce knowledge that serves the interests of a particular group or class’ (Hall 
1992: 292). In this sense, discourse can be said to operate in a similar way to ideology, though it cannot be 
aligned with a single axis of power as the Marxian notion of ideology assumes.
23 The aesthetic characteristics of news describe the communicative forms in news or the conventions that 
allow for the transmission of certain expressions (Helland 1993).
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processual and contextual dimension; the political and politics are not simply given, but 
are constructed via word and deed” (Dahlgren 2003: 155). In other words, this approach 
acknowledges individual agency, but also the ways in which news, by drawing the 
public’s attention to collective or other political and social concerns, may direct people to 
take positions in relation to these concerns. Seen this way, news, news as cultural 
discourse functions like ideology though it does not directly influence action.
The proposed direction situates news within the theoretical framework of mediation 
which marks a step beyond recent studies of news reception insofar as it emphasises news 
as a social and political phenomenon rather than focusing on its textual representations. 
This understanding is clear in Roger Silverstone’s Why Study the Media (1999) in which 
he argues that mediation involves the movement of meanings from one text to another, 
from one discourse to another, and from one event to another. Mediation, he writes, 
involves the constant transformation of meanings, both large scale and small, significant 
and insignificant:
Mediated meanings move between texts, certainly, and across time. But they also 
move across space, and across spaces. They move from the public to the private, from 
the institutional to the individual, from the globalising to the local and personal, and 
back again [...] Mediation [...] neither begins or ends with a singular text. Its claims 
for closure, the product of the ideologies and narratives of news, for example, are 
compromised at the point of delivery by the certain knowledge that the next 
communication, the next bulletin, the next story or comment or interrogation will 
move things and meanings on and elsewhere (Silverstone 1999: 15).
Nick Couldry (2003) also suggests that the notion of mediation explains how ritual 
functions to confirm an established social order that becomes natural and taken for
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granted. Drawing on Emile Durkheim, he argues that it is not “enough to make finer 
descriptions of media practice by using existing conceptual tools; only through a new 
concept, or so I will argue, can we cut beneath the apparently chaotic surface of everyday 
media practice. Once we do so, we will find more order than we expect and in the process 
add something to media and social theory, and also, I hope, to anthropological theory; 
where not only ritual but now mediation, too, are central concerns (2003:4).
The theorisation of the relationship between mediation and ritual can be traced to the 
work of James Carey (1989) whose ritual view of communication is associated with the 
communicative process as performance rather than movement, participation rather than 
consumption, meaning rather than strategy or results (cf. Rothenbuhler 1998). In his 
analysis of ‘ritualised communication’, Rothenbuhler (1998) details four ways in which 
mediated communication has been discussed as being ritual in its form. The first refers to 
the special ‘media events’ in which television coverage functions as a key part of the 
ceremonial event. Media events have been famously theorised by Katz and Dayan (1992) 
in their seminal work The Live Broadcasting o f History in which they hypothesise that 
these events play the role of periodic social gatherings for the celebration of society24.
The second relates to the rituals of media work — an area that covers journalists’ 
routine, their use of standard questions and their interest in standard topics; the third is 
the claim that television, in particular, functions as a religion; and the fourth, which is of 
particular relevance to the empirical work in this thesis, refers to the ‘ritualised media 
use’ which refers to how audience members appropriate news as ritual in their everyday 
lives. (The analysis of the empirical work in Chapter Seven will show how the informants 
use news as ritual and how they appropriate this in their lives).
24 For a differentiated and sophisticated view of media events, see Couldry’s Media Rituals (2003).
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In paying attention to form, we take into account its narrative characteristics, 
considerations that have been held back (Bird 1988/1997) by the continuous debate on 
such dichotomies as ‘hard’ versus ‘soft, or ‘news’ versus ‘human interest’, but which 
remain relevant because they address the journalistic process in a much more complex 
manner than a ‘consensual model’ or a manipulative model would suggest. Importantly, 
this understanding means that . .the media’s narrative reshaping will be most successful 
when [it] can present new information in such a way that it accords with readers’ existing 
narrative conventions and can be accommodated within them” (Bird 1997:346).25 The 
notion of news as narrative, therefore, explains why people remember the dramatic and 
the personal stories, confirming how news can become a symbolic system in which the 
informational content becomes less important than emotional meanings and less 
important than the repetition of mythic26 truths embodied within the story form itself.
Indeed, recent scholarship has shown how audiences become more engaged with news 
when it resembles a drama. For example, in his account of the coverage of the September 
11, 2001 attacks, Keith Tester notes that the viewers became more committed to news
7 7‘precisely because it was wholly unfinished ’, (Tester 2004: 193, emphasis in original). 
What this means is that, as Scott Stossel (2001) comments: ‘Television in the era of 24-
7Rhour-a-day coverage is news as a process. (2001:37). News as a process implies a
25 This is very relevant in contemporary journalism, where there is a tendency towards tabloidisation.
26Many media critics have commented on the mythical qualities of news. Jack Lule (2001) has argued that 
news as narrative has roots in drama, folklore and myth.
27 This is collaborated in the empirical work for this thesis where the informants attach to news because it is 
similar to an unending drama, or a continuous narrative of the continuous conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians.
28 This is collaborated in the empirical work for this thesis where the informants attach to news because it is 
similar to an unending drama, or a continuous narrative of the continuous conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians.
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‘continuity’ and/or ‘circularity’, serving to underline differentiated experiences of time29, 
which, as Todd Gitlin (1980) has argued, are constructed by the media whose modem 
forms have contributed to a shift in the balance of “social memory from eyewitness and 
living memory to more mediated forms of remembering” (Hoskins 2004:4).
What this suggests is that at a time of fast-paced globalisation processes, notions of 
time and speed of mediated events have greater applicability and meaning because the 
increasing blurring of the public and private domains becomes part of the “loss of 
context.. .it is these frameworks that are today fundamentally intensively and extensively
<3 / \
mediated [...] one can even suggest that the media themselves operate as a ‘framework’ 
of memory as they assist continuously in the reconstruction of our past by dominating the 
present” (Hoskins 2004:110).
Though the individual remains the real holder of memory, there can be no doubt that 
remembering is a process that is increasingly media-afflicted, particularly by television as 
the primary medium of memory and its collapse:
Memories do not reside as a ‘store’ in the mind — as is perhaps our everyday 
understanding of human memory — but instead are provoked, being challenged, 
altered sustained and shared by others. Collective memory, in this way is the product 
of a negotiation between individuals and their wider surround at a given time and in a 
given context. Today, these features of reporting war and other events have reached a 
new intensity. Saturated and extended news coverage provides little relief in terms of 
the space and distance necessary for memory to become settled: television appears as
29 The analysis of the empirical data will show how time for the informants concerned, members of the 
Palestinian diasporic community in Britain, is mediated as a continuous time.
30 Recent scholarship has argued that Arabic transnational television channels, such as al-Jazeera, operate 
as memory banks in the ways they continuously re-weave the past in the present. Chapter Seven will detail 
how this is reflected in audience discourses about themselves and their nation.
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out dominant surround delaying or disabling the forgetting function of social memory 
(Hoskins 2004: 2-4) (emphasis in original).
To emphasise the connection between time, memory and news, the next chapter tells the 
story of the Palestinian diaspora, the significance of the political (the nation), collective 
memory and political mythologies and the twin narratives of what it means to be 
Palestinian and what it means to feel Palestinian.
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Chapter Four
The Palestinian Diaspora- Events, Memory and Nation
Without remembrance and without the reification which remembrance needs fo r  its own 
fulfillm ent and which makes it, indeed, as the Greeks held, the mother o f  all arts, the 
living activities o f  action, speech, and thought would lose their reality at the end o f  each 
process and disappear as though they never had been. The materialization they have to 
undergo in order to remain in the world at all is p a id  fo r  in that always the "dead letter” 
replaces something which grew out o f  and fo r  a fleeting  moment indeed existed as a 
“liv ingsp irit” (Hannah Arendt, 1958: 95).
What it means to be Palestinian (Palestinian-ness) has been central to Palestinian national 
consciousness (Palestinian-ism) since the emergence of this consciousness in the 20th 
century. This centrality is reflected in Palestinian oral history, collective memories and 
political mythologies, as well as in popular discourse, often providing taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the twin narratives of Palestinian-ism and Palestinian-ness that appear 
as natural markers of difference and that make it difficult to remember that their emergence 
is recent, an outcome of historically contingent forms of organising space in the world.
This chapter begins by telling the story of this organisation of space, starting with al- 
Nakba (the catastrophe) of 1948, which has gained a central location in the narratives of 
Palestinian-ism and Palestinian-ness, and in Palestinian collective memory and 
mythologies, both of which are dependent on story-telling and narrativisation, which 
require form (s) of communication and/or mediating frameworks to ensure their durability 
over time and across spaces. The relationship between al-Nakba and Palestinian nationalist 
discourses is not difficult to understand. Indeed, narratives about al-Nakba have emerged
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as symbolic lynchpins of an ideological, discursive consciousness (Billig 1995) of what it 
means to feel and be Palestinian which run hand in hand with discursive constructions of 
difference and dinstinctiveness (Hall 1991). This chapter examines this relationship by 
drawing on relevant theorisation on nations, collective memory and national identity 
before turning the focus back to the Palestinians in Britain by exploring the recent 
academic debate on diasporas. In doing so, I selectively focus on theorisation of diaspora 
from the mid-1990s to identify how the understanding of the term has evolved.
Of particular interest to this thesis is the theorisation of diaspora’s ability to look around 
(Srebreny 2000) and their connectivity, which make the term meaningful for academic 
study. Drawing on these notions, this thesis argues that diasporas cannot just be seen as 
given communities that are logical extensions of ethnic communities, but as cultural, 
economic, political and social formations in the process of becoming, which means they 
are responsive to nation and international crises, discourses and representations.
This understanding brings to attention the tensions in diasporas’ lived experiences and 
the conflicts in their identifications, not only between the self and the collective (national), 
but also between the national and the cosmopolitan1 which is essential to this inquiry as it 
draws attention to the multiplicity of voices and ideas around which diasporic members 
can think about and construct their identities (Gillespie 1995). I end the chapter by arguing 
that news narrations can help construct these meanings through their mediation of the past 
in the present, the imagined and the real and the personal and political, therefore helping
1 Beck has usefully described the cosmopolitan perspective as one that provides an alternative imagination 
(of identity) to the national, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which can also 
include the otherness of the other (Beck 2002:18), therefore drawing our attention to the ways in which 
issues of global concern can become part of people’s everyday experiences.
104
blur the boundaries between the private and public and between real experiences and 
shared or collective experiences and memories of events.
4.1 The historical context
The political and historical beginnings of the Palestinian diaspora are well rehearsed in the 
literature, but are worth recounting, albeit briefly, here. The story began with the exodus of 
about 750,000-800,000 Palestinians (some 80 per cent of the total number of Palestinians) 
from the areas of former Palestine either allocated to Israel in the UN partition plan of 
1947 or conquered by Israel in the ensuing war against Arab armies. Though the 
circumstances surrounding the exodus remain disputed,2 this cataclysmic period, referred 
to by Palestinians and Arabs as al-Nakba (the catastrophe) has passed into Palestinian 
collective memory as one of unexpected, unnatural events and a period of forced exile, 
brought about by the fighting, the violence and real atrocities or fear of atrocities.
The events of 1947-48 have since been etched in Palestinian minds as narratives linked 
to real personal or shared experiences, which have often been communicated to others, thus 
forming a significant and emotional site for individual, collective memories and mythologies 
of the Palestinian nation. Over the course of more than five decades, the Palestinian 
collective narrative has simplified, polemicised, shaped and sometimes distorted a highly
2 The Palestinian and Arab stories tell of forced evacuation and intimidation by Israeli forces and gangs, 
while the official Israeli line argues that Palestinians were induced to leave their homes by radio broadcasts 
from neighbouring Arab countries. Only in the late 1980s did Palestinian and Israeli scholars agree on the 
perspectives. This was the result of the work of Israeli revisionist historians, such as Benny Morris, Avi 
Shlaim, among others, who distanced themselves from official Israeli historicism. However, there remain 
differences over the aims of the war. Benny (1987), for instance, has argued that a master plan to evict the 
Palestinians did not exist, but that the expulsion happened as a result of the war and fighting. This has been 
challenged by Palestinian and other authors, such as Walid Khalidi (1992) and Nur Masalha (1992) who 
argued that Zionist policy both before and during the war was intent on ‘transfer’ or ‘expulsion’ of the 
Palestinian population.
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complex conflict situation (Bowker 2003). However, the sense of betrayal and helplessness 
over the events of 1948 and their aftermath and the drama of Palestinian collective memory3 
of the catastrophe remains potent, despite the passage of time and generational changes.
That said, the history of Palestinian migration, particularly to Western Europe and the 
Americas, predates that event. Politically motivated flight commenced before al-Nakba — a 
peak period was the Great Revolt of 1936-9, a popular uprising against the Jewish 
institutions which were beginning to take a foothold in Palestine. Migration, though in small 
numbers, began in the late 18th century, when mainly Christian families from the towns of 
Bethlehem, Beit Jala, Ramallah as well as Jerusalem, motivated by socio-economic, 
personal interests and family considerations, began migrating to the West, though this was 
on a much smaller scale (Schulz 2003).
For many of these Christian4 Palestinian households, migration was mainly linked to 
socio-economic factors as well as by the belief that opportunities for work and 
improvement were better in the West. Though some members of first generation of 
migrants returned later on, similar considerations continued to play a key role in 
motivating subsequent generations to follow suit. Other factors also contributed to the 
post-1948 migration patterns, including the lack of a strong and credible Palestinian/Arab 
leadership, which led to the migration of thousands of Palestinians to oil-exporting states 
of the Arabian Peninsula, Europe and the Americas over the next two generations.
Forced migration did not end with al-Nakba. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war, popularly 
known as al-Naksa (the setback), too, had a profound impact on Palestinian population
3 Imagery associated with the events of 1948 has galvanised political energy among the Palestinian 
diaspora population, particularly the refugees, since that date.
4 There are no specific figures on the Palestinian Christian population. In absolute terms, however, the 
Christian population is reported to have fallen from 6 per cent in 1944 to 3.2 per cent in 1989, based on 
different statistical sources).
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movements, leading to the forced repatriation of about 320,000 Palestinians (Masalha 1999) 
though the dispersal this time was not solely a result of mass flight and/or expulsion. Many 
refugees residing in camps in the West Bank fled to new camps in Jordan amid worries 
about their safety, becoming refugees twice over, while others were not allowed to return to 
the West Bank by Israel. In the years that followed, Palestinians continued to leave their 
homes, ‘encouraged’ to do so by various Israeli transfer schemes and ‘financial incentives’ 
(ibid).
Forced migration and expulsions, but on smaller scales, have continued throughout the 
Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza — Israel has used deportation as a 
form of collective punishment. In 1992, for instance, Israel deported some 400 Palestinians, 
allegedly suspected of membership of the Islamic group Hamas and Islamic Jihad to 
Lebanon. Subsequent regional events have contributed to the continuous though irregular 
process of uprooting. These included the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and the 1991 Gulf 
War which forced around 350,000 Palestinians residing in the Gulf5 and the Arabian 
Peninsula to flee because of political differences with the governments of Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and other oil-producing countries. Most returned to Jordan, some to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, while some middle-class and upper-middle class families emigrated to the 
West, including Britain.
Both forced expulsion and voluntary migration have had important consequences for the 
demographics of the Palestinian people. There are no exact figures on the size, structure and 
distribution of the Palestinian population — the last official census of the Palestinians was 
conducted during the British Mandate in 1931. Scattered sample surveys taken since then,
5 Palestinian migration to the Arabian Gulf region began in the 1940s. The Gulf states were not the primary 
host for the Palestinians, but hosted what is popularly known as secondary migration related to the 
Lebanese civil war and other regional conflicts.
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each with its own sampling frame, biases and concerns, form an uneven database for making 
any coherent statistical statements. However, projections by the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics put the number of Palestinians worldwide at 7.9 million in 2001. Of these, 4.5 
million were said to be living in the diaspora6 (al-Quds newspaper, 11 January 2002). 
According to UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency) data, there were 
nearly 3.9 million registered Palestinian refugees in June 2001 — the largest group (about
1.5 million) were in Jordan, 1.46 million in the West Bank and Gaza, followed by Lebanon 
(380,000) and Syria (392,000). Jordan hosts about one million Palestinians.
4.2 The Palestinians in Britian
Broadly speaking, European countries, Britain included, were not a primary destination for 
the majority of the migrating Palestinians. The reasons are relatively easy to grasp — 
difficulty of access, distance and language problems, not to mention different migration 
policies. In fact, it can be said that unlike mass Palestinian immigration flows to 
neighbouring Arab countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, Palestinian immigration into 
Europe has generally taken the form of infiltration (Malki 1992).
The lack of a specific pattern to the Palestinians’ modes of arrival in Europe has made it 
difficult to trace, create or obtain any official histories of or figures about the number of 
the Palestinians in Europe. Moreover, the ways in which European governments normally 
design their respective censuses do not offer easy signposts as to the ethnic make-up of
6 The diaspora in this sense refers to Palestinian refugees residing in camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the West 
Bank and Gaza and Syria.
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their populations. In Britain7, the 2001 general Census report, which put the various ethnic
groups’ total at 4.6 million, or 7.9 per cent of the population, does not give the Palestinians /
a distinct category, but includes them in a generic ‘Middle Eastern’ one. _
Furthermore, since census figures are based on place(s)_QfJ^irth, this has meant that
Palestinian children bom in Britain do not show up as being Palestinian. What compounds
the problem is the fact that Palestinians are not easily identifiable as a separate ethnic
group — they share language, customs, traditions and religion with o t
Abu-Lughod (1992), who has compiled one of the most authoritative demographic studies 
on the Palestinians after al-Nakba, argues that it is virtually impossible to determine 
exactly how many persons of Palestinian birth or ancestry exist today. (A 2001 study by 
the Palestinian Diaspora Studies Centre Shaml in Ramallah, drawing on data through 
fieldwork as well as guesswork, has put the number of individuals of Palestinian origin in 
Europe at about 177,000, most of which are in Germany8 and Britain).
It is, therefore, not surprising that few serious studies have been carried out on the 
Palestinians in Britain, partly, as mentioned above, because of a lack of statistics and data 
on their numbers and whereabouts or of their journey into exile, because of their 
invisibility within the wider Arab diasporic community and because the number of 
Palestinians in Britian — estimates suggest there are around 20,000^ (this compares to an
1997) though this does not mean that there is little discrimination, particularly along racial lines.
8 Many Palestinians went to Germany following the first Intifada, leading to the formation of an important 
Palestinian community with origins from Gaza. Palestinian immigrants in Germany tend to be younger than 
those in Scandinavian states or Britain.
9 Afif Safiyeh, the Palestinian representative in Britain, privately estimates there are around 20,000 
Palestinians in Britain though his office’s records comprise only 5,000 addresses for Palestinian individuals 
and families around the country. The difficulty in updating these records is related to the fact that many 
recent arrivals, estimated at about 3,000 (Shaml 2001), are mostly ex-refugees and political asylum seekers 
who do not want to officially register themselves as Palestinian for a number of reasons, including concerns 
over losing their refugee status and worries about being too easily identified as Palestinians.
Britain is said to have achieved a high level of sensitivity to multi-culturalism and integration (Parekh
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estimated 80,000 in Germany, for example) — is small in relation to the number of 
Palestinians worldwide, estimated by the Palestinian Authority at 8.7 million, of whom 3.7 
million were in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2003. Furthermore, apart from several 
scattered attempts to map their whereabouts, the Palestinians in Britain, as well as in other 
Western European countries and the US, have been relatively neglected in the emerging 
literature on Palestinian oral history and collective memory.
Broadly speaking, the Palestinians in Britain come from varied socio-economic and 
religious backgrounds. Their journeys to Britain and the time of their journeys are also 
varied. Some, particularly the traditionally well-off and business people, came to Britain in 
the 1930s to pursue their education10or forwork purposes. Some arrived after the 1991 
Gulf War, leaving openly hostile Gulf Arab countries angered over the Palestinian pro- 
Iraqi stand in that war. Other more recent arrivals are political asylum seekers either 
fleeing the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip or the refugee camps in Lebanon. 
The aforementioned Shaml report suggests that the_de^eeofintegration within die host 
society markedly differs between these^kter larger arrivals)and the smaller^ but better- 
established groups that had migrated over the past half century, and that the interaction 
between the two groups is minimal, even non-existent at times.
This lack of interaction between the diverse members of the Palestinian diasporic 
community in Britain does not only reflect differences in the timing of arrival in Britain, 
but also socio-economic situations and political and religious cleavages that influence and 
are influenced by the extent to which individuals feel secure in the host country and by the 
degree of their assimilation. Before going on to discuss the particularities of Palestinian
10 Consequently, there is a high proportion of professionals within the Palestinian community in Britain.
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national consciousness and Palestinian national identity, I provide an overview of relevant 
scholarship on nations and nationalism and collective memories.
4.3 Nations and Nationalism — Between Remembering and Forgetting
Academic inquiry into how nations and nationhood are formed gathered pace in the 1980s 
with the publication of three key works11 (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 
1983), all of which argued, though with different emphases and historical grounding, that 
nations are constructed or invented, rather than given or presupposed.12 Though these 
assumptions have been criticised, most notably by Anthony Smith — he has argued that 
the success of the invention of construction of national identities must be based on pre­
existing social and cultural forms and networks (1998) — they have inspired much 
research on the constructedness and the discursive imagination of modem nation-states.13
Building on these key studies, relevant scholarship has defined the nation as a 
community of shared memory and forgetting (e.g. Renan 1996; Deutsch 1966; Anderson 
1991; Smith 1991). Smith, for instance, describes the nation as a “human population 
sharing an historic territory; common myths and historical memories; a mass public
11 Of the three, Eric Hobsbawm, combining a Marxist outlook with Weberian functionalism, argued that the 
birth of nations was forged by ‘invented traditions’, thus forming the sustaining myths that can be 
borrowed, revived, transformed or simply invented.
12 These studies have been categorised as falling within the modernisation literature on identities, which 
counterbalanced the prevalent literature associating national identity with primordial elements. Taking 
nationalism as an inevitable and inexorable dimension of modernisation and industrialisation, many of the 
modernisation theorists sought to assess the creation of national identity through the window of elite class 
politics (Kedouri 1964) and the formation of nations as political communities with consolidated or bounded 
territories (Gellner 1983). Nations, in this view, came into being as a result of a new configuration of state- 
culture relations resulting from the demands of a capitalist-industrial economy or because of the 
acceleration of a radically changed understanding of time and space, thus providing the impetus for the 
popular imagination of nations as communities (cf. Anderson 1983, 1991).
13 This brief overview does not do justice to the exceptional literature on nations and nationalism. My focus 
on these authors, however, is related to the fact that their works had a crucial impact on subsequent 
theorisation and studies in the field.
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culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (1991: 
14). Ernest Renan, too, gives centre stage to the relevance of history, which he sees as 
mediated by ‘a double act of imagination’. For him, subjects need to imagine themselves 
as part of a national community before national history can have any significance, while 
history itself is imagined rather than experienced and, what is more, is selectively 
remembered (Renan 1996).
Other scholarship has drawn attention to the ‘essence’ of the nation as opposed to its 
construction, offering an extension of the modernist interpretations of Hobsbawm, Gellner 
and Anderson. Among works relevant to this research study is that by Walker Connor 
(1978; 1993) who argues that, to understand nations and nationalism, we need to take into 
account the essentially irrational psychological bond that brings fellow nationals together 
and which is supposed to constitute the essence of national identity or, in his terms, ‘a 
sense of belonging’. Smith’s later contribution (1999) to the study of nations and 
nationalism is also important in that he applies an ethno-symbolic14 approach that helps 
overcome some of the inherent limitations to modernist theory15 while also acknowledging 
its insights.
The introduction of a psychological dimension to the definition of nations is implicit in 
Anderson’s catchy statement that a nation is an ‘imagined political community’ (1983:15) 
and in Emerson’s notion that “the simplest statement that can be made about a nation is 
that it is a body of people who feel they are a nation” (1960:102) which Michael Billig
14 According to Anthony Smith, the ethno-symbolic approaches make a number of claims based on a set of 
basic themes, including the longue duree, the national past, present and future, the ethnic basis of nations, 
the cultural components of ethnic groups, ethnic myths and symbol; ethno-history; routes to nationhood and 
the longevity of nationalism detailed in Myths and Memories o f the Nation (1999).
15 These limitations, Smith (1999) argues, refer to the modernists’ systematic failure to accord any weight 
to the pre-existing cultures and ethnic ties of the nation that emerged in the modem epoch. Smith sees this 
failure as related to serious inadequacies in the social constructionism and instrumentalism that underpin 
modernism (1999: 9).
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(1995) links to questions of national identity. For Billig, identity, “if it is to be understood 
as a form of talking, is also to be understood as a form of life” (Billig 1995:60). This 
psychological dimension, in other words the ‘in-the-mind’ consciousness of nationhood, is 
relevant to the present case as the political and the national do not conform to Gellner’s 
(1983) argument about their congruence in modernity. Therefore, to understand ‘national 
identity’, we need to outline the general forms of nationalist thinking:
These include ways of conceiving of ‘us, the nation’ which is said to have its unique 
destiny (identity); it also involves conceiving of ‘them, the foreigners’ against whom 
we identify ourselves as different. Nationalist thinking involves more than commitment 
to a group and a sense of difference from other groups. It conceives of ‘our’ group in a 
particular way. In doing so, it takes for granted ideas about nationhood and the links 
between peoples and homelands.. .If this way of thinking seems to be commonplace 
and familiar; then it, nevertheless, includes mystic assumptions which have become 
habits of thoughts. (Billig 1995:61)
Billig’s arguments in Banal Nationalism are, as he notes at the outset, particularly relevant 
to established nations, where he points out that nationalism, when it moves in from the 
periphery, or its hiding place, only comes as a ‘temporary mood’. Nevertheless, the term 
banal nationalism can be extended to cover any ideological habits which enable the 
established nations [...] to be reproduced (Billig 1995:6). In illustrating his proposal, Billig 
conducts a survey of British national newspapers on a randomly selected day, showing 
how they constantly flag nationhood, while also reflecting a taken-fro-granted attitude 
about the existence of different nations in the world.
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Though the Palestinians’ is not yet an established nation — indeed, the national and 
political have not yet coincided in time and space16— Billig’s argumentation is 
illuminating in discussing Palestinian-ism (Palestinian national consciousness), particularly 
because of his explicit linking of the imagining of the nation to “a wider ideological, 
discursive consciousness” (Billig 1995:10), and his affirmation that the construction of 
national identity always runs in parallel to the construction of difference and uniqueness17.
The idea of national identity as imagined was proposed in Benedict Anderson’s path- 
breaking account of the historical emergence of the modem nation-state. For Anderson, the 
emergence of the modem nation-state was enabled by the creation of an ‘imagined, 
political community’ determined by shared natural characteristics and a common system of 
values and beliefs, the key reference points for the construction of a shared sense of 
belonging. In his account, Anderson clearly links this sense of belonging to the modes of 
representation in plays, novels, scores and newspapers.
Anderson’s theory, as discussed in Chapter Two, has been criticised for being too 
deterministic and also for giving too much weight to the power of nationally structured 
communications systems. However, the impact of communications systems on imagined 
national cultures cannot be trivialised because we cannot ignore the ways in which 
representation, the story-telling and evocative narrations, provide the link between the past, 
present and future, therefore remaining central to many other accounts18 of nations and 
nationalism. (Bell 2003). This means that:
16 Gellner (1983) argues that nationalism is a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent.
17 The analysis of the empirical work in this study, particularly Chapter Eight, both draws on and illustrates 
these notions.
18 The different theories of nations and nationalism can be classified into the following categories: 
primordialists, perennialists, modernists, historical ethno-symbolists and post-modernists. (For further
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Representational practices are thus inherently bound up in the process of national 
identity formation; to mould a national identity — a sense of unity with others 
belonging to the same nation — it is necessary to have an understanding of oneself as 
located in a temporally extended narrative, and in order to be able to locate oneself in 
such a way, nationalists discourse must be able to represent the unfolding of time in 
such a way that the nation assumes a privileged and valorised role (Bell 2003:69). (My 
emphasis)
Bell’s reference to understanding oneself as located in a temporally extended narrative is 
particularly true of the Palestinians, whose narratives of the self and the collective suggest 
that the accumulation of traumatic events weaves into a narrative of continuity that marks 
the texture of Palestinian history as remembered and as experienced and Palestinian 
memory as an existentially felt relationship of the past to the present (this is collaborated in 
the empirical work, particularly in the ways in which the informants commute between the 
present and the past). While painting, oral history, drama, literature and film are the main 
communicative channels that clearly portray a historicist vision of the nation, this study 
argues that news, in particular television’s, is, too, a suitable genre that enables people to 
see themselves as located in an extended narrative19 because of its mediation of the past in 
the present and of individual and collective memories. I will return to this argument later 
on in the chapter, but first I will review some work linking national identity, collective 
memory and political mythologies.
discussion of these different approaches, please see Duncan S. A. Bell (2003) and Anthony Smith’s 
(1999:2001) typology of the four theoretical paradigms of nationalism.
19 The empirical data detailed in Chapter Seven will show examples when the informants think of 
themselves, through their engagement with news, in similar ways.
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4.4 Between Collective Memory and Political Mythologies
One of the most influential theorists to make a link between national identity and collective 
memory is Ernest Renan (1996). He defined the nation as a ‘ . .soul, a spiritual principle* 
which is made up of two things “one in the past, and the other is in the present; one is the 
possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is current consent, the desire 
to live together, the willingness to continue to maintain the values of the heritage that one 
has received in an undivided form” (Renan 1996:52). For him, the stories of the nation’s 
past are kept alive in the present, in the mind of individuals, and are narrated in written 
texts as well as performed on stage and encoded on monuments.
Anthony Smith, too, focuses on the interplay between memory and national identity. For 
Smith: “[One] might almost say; no memory, no identity, no identity, no nation” (Smith 
1986:383). Bell (2003) gives an additional focus to the significance of memory in the 
construction of nations, particularly because he connects this to the construction of 
boundaries, which are important to how we understand ourselves and others, and how we 
differentiate between the stranger and the friend:
memory demarcates the boundary between Them and US, delineating the national self 
from the foreign, alien Other. Such binding memories can be passed from generation to 
generation, transmigrating across multiple historical contexts. They can be (allegedly) 
invented, acquired, and established, although more often than not they assume a life- 
force of their own, escaping the clutches of any individual group and becoming 
embedded in the very fabric, material and psychological, of the nation (Bell 2003:70).
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Scholarship on the relationship between memory and national identity is not confined to 
nationalism studies, but straddles across other disciplines, such as sociology, social 
psychology and historiography, and political studies. Interest here draws in part on the 
work of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1950; 1992) in which he argued that every group 
develops the memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity vis-a-vis other 
groups, and in part on the field of historiography, popularised in France in the 1970s.
While the concept of memory itself is largely polysemous, or even metaphoric when it 
covers all forms of the presence of the past, what is interesting in Halbwachs’ notion of 
collective memory is his distinguishing of the historical and the autobiographical, therefore 
highlighting the importance of understanding collective memory within its ‘social 
frameworks’ while shifting the analysis of the social bases of memory from the individual 
to the society as a whole.20
Halbwachs’s work has inspired a growing body of research on the meanings of 
collective memory across disciplines. In the field of commemoration studies, Yael 
Zerubavel in Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making o f Israeli National 
Tradition (1995) has argued that collective memory is “substantiated through multiple 
forms of commemoration: the celebration of a communal festival, the reading of a tale, the 
participation in a memorial service or the observance of a holiday, through which groups 
create, articulate and negotiate their shared memories of particular events” (1995:5), while 
pointing to how each act reproduces a commemorative narrative, a story about a particular
20 The distinction between the individual and the social is important in discussing memory. For theorists 
like Smith, for instance, an essential element in any land of human identity is memory. Identity in this 
sense is not a matter of sameness through time, or persistence through change, but also of reflective 
consciousness of personal connection with the past. In the case of collective cultural identities, he argues 
that new generations continue to carry shared memories of what they consider to be their past and what 
they consider to be the past experiences of older generations of the same collectivity (Smith 1999:208).
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past that accounts for this ritualised remembrance and focuses on the group’s distinct 
identity and history, thus contributing to the construction of the nation. Smith (1999) 
reiterates this point in arguing that collective memories are transmitted very often through 
oral traditions of the family, clan or community. In other cases, “oral traditions are 
supplemented, sometimes overshadowed, by canonical texts — epics, chronicles, hymns, 
prophecies, law-codes, treaties, songs and the like — as well as various forms of art, crafts, 
architecture, music and dance. All of these [...] embody and crystallise popular memories 
and myths, local, regional and pan-ethnic” (Smith 1999:208).
The potency of remembrance which preserves the Palestinians’ ‘internal map’ (Khalidi 
1997: 205) and the notion of the ‘nation’ believed to be at the core of what it means to be 
Palestinian are rooted in a largely Western model of traumatic memory in which authority 
and authenticity are grounded in narrations of extreme trauma and where the rhetorical 
power of memory is underpinned by the belief that disadvantaged communities are 
oriented towards remembering and have a rich oral tradition through which to record the 
suffering of the past.
Historically speaking, the sharing of memories and the reproduction of oral histories has 
been a family prerogative in Palestinian society. The family has thus been, as Rosemary 
Sayigh (1977) notes, a weighty ‘institution’ that has been instrumental in creating a 
Palestinian identity in exile and in maintaining the sense of a distinctive Palestinian 
community. Shulz (2003), in her historical account of the Palestinian diaspora, too, speaks 
of how Palestinians growing up in refugee camps had often recast their mothers and 
grandmothers and other elder people as orators and story-tellers, therefore keeping the 
memory of al-Nakba and its consequences alive in their lives.
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What this means is that the Palestinians’ narratives of the catastrophe of 1948 come
from multiple sites and a plurality of voices In the absence of national and state
institutions, the role of Palestinian intellectuals both in the homeland and the diaspora has
taken on added importance, with scholars such as the late Edward Said, and poets, like 
0 1Mahmoud Darwish making crucial contributions to the sustenance of remembrance.
The literature on national and political mythologies — the narratives that shape 
collective consciousness and national-cultural identity by anchoring the present in the past 
(Wistrich and Ohana 1995) — illustrates how like collective memories, they, too, are 
dynamic and central to ideas of the nation. Robert Bowker in Palestinian Refugees: 
Mythology, Identity and the Search for Peace (2003) notes that mythologies respond to 
changing needs, which emphasises their dynamism; they are durable because they are 
linked to wider frameworks of understanding among individuals of their social and 
historical context, or, in other words, to collective memories. Historian and political 
theorist Mohammed Bamyeh (2003) notes how mythologies on both sides of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict have come to represent enormous burdens, in which real 
grievances are being “buried deep under a barrage of culturalism, religion, civilizational 
discourse and identity” (Bamyeh 2003: 836).
21 Darwish in Memory for Forgetfulness (1982) writes that the “The true homeland is not that which is 
known or proved. .. .Your insistent need to demonstrate the history of stones and your ability to invent 
proofs does not give you prior membership over him who knows the time of the rain from the smell of the 
stone. The stone for you is an intellectual effort. For its owner it is a roof and walls.”
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4.5 Mediating Memory
Crucially, political mythologies can be seen as linked to processes of communication as 
they require active processes by which particular narratives are preserved and told again 
and again — these could be oral histories, stories22 that parents tell their children or stories 
that are used as part of official historical records or news stories that weave or ‘collapse’ 
the past into the present, serving to focus attention on moments that enable the 
remembrance of collective traumas and experiences, whether these have been experienced 
by the people involved or experienced by proxy.
Though this is not clearly highlighted in the above-mentioned literature, this study 
argues that the production and maintenance of collective memory and political 
mythologies are necessarily mediated (my emphasis) through their communication via the 
frameworks of memorial books, memoirs, novels, photographic books, personal 
testimonies, oral histories, documentaries and, importantly for this work, news narrations. 
Indeed, collective memories and mythologies need to be provoked, challenged, altered, 
sustained and shared by others, thus pointing to how memory is the product of negotiations 
between individuals and their wider surroundings at a given time and in a given context 
(Hoskins 2004) and emphasising how collective memory is in itself more dynamic, 
contested and variable than a first reading of the term would suggest.
In addressing how people negotiate memories and their social articulation — from 
informal conversation to public documentation and commemoration — scholars have used 
different terms, variously describing collective memory as ‘cultural memory’ (Sturken
22 Narration is an important oral activity in Arab and Palestinian society. Generally speaking, Palestinians 
have been keen to narrate their stories although some of my friends have said their parents were reluctant to 
speak and tell reflecting a sense of guilt.
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1997), ‘social memory’ (Reading 2002) and ‘new memory’ (Hoskins 2004). Writing about 
the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, Casey (2004) uses the term 
‘public memory’ in his comments on the expressions of public remembrance and public 
grief following the event. The grief therefore is public, as is the remembrance, not only 
because it is publicly expressed, but also because it is collectively shared.
Though all these terms are relevant for understanding the different ways in which 
memory is negotiated, it is Andrew Hoskins’ arguments (2004) that implicate the news 
media in the forging of what he terms ‘new memory’. He writes: “.. .contemporary 
mediated events are marked by their immediacy. The time between the occurrence of an 
event and its dissemination as news has shrunk, so that often audiences watch events as 
they unfold in real-time implicating themselves in events as vicarious witnesses” (2004:5). 
What this means, he says in his work on television news, is that rather than causing ‘a loss 
of context’ (cf. Gitlin 1980) of mediated events, television significantly affords new 
contexts. Television, therefore, functions in a similar way to human memory in repeating 
and re-enacting events or, as Sturken (2002) argues, “television’s re-enactment is much 
closer to the fluid ways in which memory operates not as a stable force but as a constantly 
rewritten script. Narrativisation is essential to memory; indeed, it is its defining quality.
We remember events by re-telling them [and] re-thinking them” (Sturken 2002: 200).
The crucial point to be noted here is that collective memory, as Susan Sontag (2003) 
eloquently reminds us, does not only involve a process of remembering, but [also] a 
stipulation that this (act) is important; that this remembered story is about how it happened 
and that the picture of that story remains locked in people’s minds. What this suggests is
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that collective memory may refer to the political mythologies of societies while ‘social 
memory’ may refer to their practice.
Talking of collective memory as a ‘social’ memory is important for my work because it 
acknowledges that memory, in this sense, is socially constructed, not only by individual 
agency, but also by mediating frameworks that serve to jolt remembering and why it is 
important to remember. The next sections explore the ‘political mythologies’ and 
‘memories’ that helped shape Palestinian national consciousness and identity.
4.6 The Narrative of Palestinian-ism
No Arab society has been researched, analysed and written about as much as Palestinian 
society. The literature related to the Palestinians and their history is vast, with a large 
number of works on specific refugee situations, the policies of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation and on Palestinian society and nationalism. Broadly speaking, the literature 
on the Palestinians serves two contradictory political purposes (Schulz 2003). On the one 
hand, it serves to present a picture of a split and divided population, not really in 
possession of a ‘genuine national identity’ (e.g. Porath 1973; 1977), and, on the other hand, 
provides a discourse emphasising Palestinian essentialism in proving an authentic nation 
with inane rights and immanent connections to the land (Muslih 1990).
Much of the Arab scholarship on the Palestinians includes statements that Palestinian 
society is unique, that its historical experience is unparalleled and, therefore, that the 
theoretical literature on stratification, development, gender studies, ethnicity, etc., is not 
directly relevant to Palestine. Since the 1970s, however, a number of important
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contributions have provided different perspectives on the evolution of Palestinian national 
consciousness and identity. These works include Rosemary Sayigh’s (1979; 1994) 
ethnographic work on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon; Johnson’s (1982) studies on Islam 
as an ideological system of meaning in Palestinian nationalism; and Kimmerling and 
Migdal’s (1993) constructivist historical account of Palestinian-ism. Helena Lindholm 
Schulz (1999) provides an insightful account of how Palestinian nationalism has been 
constructed in relation to the dynamics of external and internal factors, the dynamics of 
content/meaning and form/boundary and the role of the nationalist elite and its followers.
Following the 1993 peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israel, Palestinian 
authors have joined the fray. Rashid Khalidi (1997), in an engaging narrative, details the 
formative years of Palestinian nationalism by drawing on Anderson’s (1983) theorisation 
of the role of the press in the rise of modem national consciousness, while Yazid Sayigh 
(1997), in his well-researched book Armed Struggle and the Search for State (1997), adds 
another element to this narrative by highlighting the role of the armed struggle as the 
foundation stone of nation building.
Most studies of Palestinian national consciousness argue that Palestinian-ism emerged 
partly23 in reaction to Zionism. Indeed, several authors, including Israeli, point to how 
Zionism and Palestinian-ism were the very generative forces which have brought into 
existence both Israeli and Palestinian societies as well as the conflicts between them.
Israeli and Palestinian societies, as Portugali (1993) notes, enfold each other to the extent 
that neither is definable today independently of the other. This view is replicated by 
Kimmerling and Migdal (1993) who write that it is not possible to tell the story of Zionism
23 Other factors such as the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emerging pan-Arab nationalism also 
played a part (for a detailed discussion, see Rashid Khalidi’s Palestinian Identity; The Construction o f 
Modem National Consciousness 1997).
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or Palestinian-ism without understanding the impact they had on one another. Or, as 
Rashid Khalidi (1997) puts it, Palestinian society today cannot exist completely and 
independently of the Palestinian one, and vice versa. It is as though both societies carry the 
other with them:
it is this intertwined history, this counterpoint between two extraordinary narratives, 
and the interplay between the two senses of identity which have certain things in 
common with each other, but are completely different in so many other ways, is one of 
the themes that stands out in any study of the emergence of Palestinian national 
identity. (1997:5)
Assumptions of distinctiveness are implicit in many analyses Palestinian nationalism 
However, as Sayigh (1997) notes, there are two opposing trends in this field, one tending 
to refute its existence and to suggest that it is primarily a reaction to the emergence of 
Zionism and the creation of the state of Israel, thus emphasising its historical artificiality, 
and the other affirming the existence of Palestinian nationalism as an autonomous 
phenomenon whose roots can be traced back to earlier periods.24
Of the above-mentioned authors, it is Rashid Khalidi (1997) who makes a distinct 
connection between the emergence of Palestinian national consciousness at the beginning
t V iof the 20 century and the role of the Arab press in drawing attention to the inherent 
dangers in the region. Heavily influenced by Anderson’s (1983) theorisation, he provides 
an intricate and well documented narrative of the role of newspapers and periodicals 
published in and around Palestine in the politics and cultural life of the early 20th century
24 Sayigh argues that the widely held notions that Zionism was the main factor behind the emergence of 
Palestinian-ism ignored the historical context surrounding it.
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and since, thus providing a valid counter-narrative to notions that Palestinian identity and 
nationalism are ephemeral and of recent origin. He writes:
This is most commonly expressed as the assertion that both of these phenomena are in 
some sense artificial — the implication being that they must be distinguished from 
“real” identities and “real” nationalisms — and that they emerged only in the 1960s 
(Khalidi 1997:177).
In his analysis, Khalidi argues that the hiatus or the trope of Palestinian non-existence in 
international or national discourses before the 1960s, the decade marking the birth of the 
Palestinian resistance movement, was due to several reasons, one of which was the power 
of the ideology of pan-Arabism which served to obscure the identities of the separate 
Arab nation-states it subsumed (ibid: 181). He also proposes that the press played a 
central role in the development of Arab attitudes towards Zionism, not only informing 
readers of the day-to-day details of the progress of colonisation, but also explaining the 
aims and extent of the Zionist movement:
This is a perfect example of the kind of “imagined community” mediated and shaped 
by the press, whose members did not know one another, but who shared a certain 
body of knowledge, a certain understanding and a joint sense of grievance which 
Anderson has written about (Khalidi 1997:143).
Khalidi also draws attention to the difficulties of separating Palestinian-ism from other 
ideologies because of the existence of multiple foci of identification “partly because of 
the way in which identity for the Palestinians is and has always been intermingled with a 
sense of identity on so many other levels, whether Islamic or Christian, Ottoman or Arab,
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local or universal, or family and tribal” (Khalidi 1997:6). These conflicts of identification 
continue until today and are not exclusive to the Palestinians. What this means is that it is 
normal for a Palestinian today to identify him/herself primarily as an Arab in one context, 
as a Moslem or Christian in another, as a Nabulsi or Jerusalemite in yet another, and as a 
Palestinian in a fourth, which is not unusual given the lack of a Palestinian state. He 
writes: “This relationship between definition of the self and of the other is characteristic 
of many peoples in the Middle East and elsewhere.. .For all of these people, transnational 
identities (whether religious or national), local patriotism, and affiliations of family and 
clan have competed for loyalties. The pull of competing loyalties has been considerably 
stronger for the Palestinians than for others, so that these multiple foci of identity are 
characteristic features of their history (Khalidi 1997:10)
Bernard Lewis (1998), too, notes that political identity and loyalty among Arabs as a 
whole are determined by three considerations; the first is religious or communal, which 
means membership of the universal family of Islam, the second is allegiance to a specific 
state or dynasty and the third is at the level of the ethnic or local, where allegiance is to 
the family, the clan or the tribe. Although Arabism, namely a strong sense of 
identification with the Arab nation as a collective unity, seems to be waning, Islamism 
has gained currency in recent years, particularly following the collapse of the peace 
process between Israel and the Palestinians, the second Palestinian Intifada (uprising), the 
September 11 attacks in the US and the 2003 conflict in Iraq. That said, historically 
speaking, there has always been a special bond between Arabs in general and Islam. By 
and large, Arabs, Palestinians included, view Islam as their own religion as it was 
revealed to an Arab, in Saudi Arabia, and in the Arabic language. Broadly speaking,
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Arabs feel they belong to both the Arab community (al-umma al-arabiya) and the Islamic 
nation (al-umma al-Islamia) (Tibi 1981/1990/1997). Indeed, while many scholars argue 
that Arab nationalism is a secular movement that has nothing to do with Islam and that 
pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are rival political movements, many ordinary Arabs feel 
that pan-Arab nationalism is unimaginable without its religious foundations . Drawing 
on these complexities, Mohamed Ayish (2003) uses the concept of worldview, which 
concerns the fundamental assumptions of a people about the nature of the world as 
expressed in their philosophy, ethics, ritual and scientific belief, to argue that the 
particular Arab and Palestinian worldview, is centrally located in both Arab and Islamic 
perspectives. The Arab-Islamic worldview, he says, sees individualism as a central value 
in society, but unlike its conception in the West where it may set the limit for group 
involvement, individualism in Arab-Islamic cultures is composed of both individual and 
group identification.
4.7 Events and Identification
Though this understanding can help explain why conflicts of identification between the 
individual and the collective and between the secular and Islam remain a source of 
tension for people like the Palestinians, I use this section to argue that critical events have 
played and continue to play a crucial role in the Palestinians’ negotiation of identity as 
they have been and continue to be emotional foci of identification that trigger off 
memories in different and specific ways.
25 These notions are used by some Islamic groups, such as Hamas, whose leaders point out that Islam has 
been a component of Palestinian national identity since the early days of the Palestinian liberation 
movement.
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There is little doubt that the key event with which most Palestinians identify as a 
collective is al-Nakba (the catastrophe) of 1948. Indeed, as much of the literature on the 
Palestinians show, the experience of exile continues to overshadow all else for j i l  al- 
nakba (the generation of the catastrophe), creating a new form of cultural ferment, which 
has been largely literary, or based in communicative practices (Kimmerling and Migdal 
1993). Indeed, a folk culture conveyed by songs, ballads, poetry and narrative26 since 
then forms around three motifs — the praise and memory of the lost paradise from which 
Palestinians were expelled, lamentation about the present and the depiction of the 
imagined return, thus forming the founding stones for some of the most durable collective 
memories that have shaped Palestinian popular discourse for more than five decades:
For the Palestinians, the (national) story centres on al-Nakba, a catastrophe that produced 
a strong collective consciousness transcending all the fractures. In the misery of the camps 
—  in the permanence of temporariness —refugees developed a powerful new nationalism. 
Its fuel was longing and injustice, humiliation and degradation — bitterness and hatred 
towards the Jews, the West, other Arabs and the cosmic order (Kimmerling and Migdal 
1993:279). The drama of this narrative — both in its capacity to be related to direct family 
experience and to narrated experience — is manifested in its durability and potency as a 
critical historical event in Palestinian collective memory and mythologies despite the 
passage of over 50 years and generational changes. Indeed, imagery associated with the 
events of 1948 has galvanised and sustained political energy, mainly among the Palestinian
26 The most important works include the resistance poetry of Mahmoud Darwish, Samih al-Qassdem and 
Taqfiq Zayyad, which came from inside Israel and began to find their way across the border most visibly 
after 1967.
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refugee population and the overall diaspora, despite the overarching presence and 
dominance of the ‘other’ counter-narrative — that of the birth of the state of Israel.27
As Sayigh (1997) points out, the experience of collective dislocation and uncertain exile 
and the desire to return to a specific territory made wataniya (patriotism), the sentimental 
attachment to homeland or even a more localised birthplace, a common denominator 
among the Palestinians. However, “while al-Nakba made for the emergence of a distinct 
Palestinian-ness, the rise of a distinctly Palestinian nationalism (or its precursors, 
nationalist patriotism or proto-nationalism) was not inevitable, given the absence of the 
common political and institutional framework of the state”28 (Sayigh 1997:23).
Palestinian-ism did emerge ultimately as a dominant force, but its extent, form and 
timing depended primarily on the progress made by the scattered Palestinian communities 
in rebuilding their ‘sociological space’ that involved revising their social networks, value 
systems and norms, and cultural symbols (1997:666). For Palestinian nationalism to truly 
gain a mass following another event was required. If al-Nakba can be seen as constitutive 
of Palestinian national identity, then the 1967 war was the major catalyst behind 
Palestinian nationalist ideology (cf. Sayigh 1997).
27 For a long time, Palestinian experiences were formed in the context of persistent dissemination of 
misinformation about the historical events that led to their exile. The Israeli government has for long 
claimed that Palestinian refugees fled the country as a result of orders given by Arabs and Palestinians, an 
argument that until recently has been widely accepted by the international community until revisionist 
Israeli historians in the 1990s, such as Benny Morris and Ian Pappe, began confirming what a handfiil of 
Palestinian scholars had been writing for decades.
28 Sayigh notes that host Arab governments, still open to challenge by their own citizens, whose 
identification with the new states created by the colonial powers was not secure, responded to the influx of 
Palestinian refugees by isolating them from their populations through physical and legal barriers, or by 
inhibiting the emergence of social and political organisations with an explicitly Palestinian character among 
the refugees. For all these reasons, Palestinian political activism after 1948 was unfocused and operated at 
grass-roots level, and was often initially channelled into Arab parties espousing radical national, social or 
sectarian agendas (1997:666).
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4.8 The Narrative of Palestinian-ness: to Suffer, to Struggle, to Resist
The rupture within Palestinian society caused by the events of 1948 produced three distinct 
populations: the refugees, the Palestinians inside Israel and those in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, thus forming three differentiated sites of collective experience and memory. 
Nowhere has memory claimed to be more authentic or vital than among refugees living in 
the camps29 which emerge as the places in which “the Palestinian national spirit was, and 
still is, burning. They are the real Palestinians” (Klaus 2003: 129) (emphasis in original). 
Interestingly, though not surprisingly, there has been little official or public mention of the 
Palestinians in the wider diaspora, including in Europe and the Americas.
In most official and public discourses, the focal year 1948 repeats itself in narrative after 
narrative, suggesting that Palestinian-ness (what it means to be Palestinian) cannot be 
understood without acknowledging the impact of dispersal and uprootedness on the ways 
in which people who are living or who had lived in the area formerly known as Palestine 
began to think of themselves as Palestinian or without acknowledging that, since that 
event, Palestinian national consciousness has struggled for acceptance and legitimacy30 in 
the world.
Though some elements of Palestinian identity did exist before the dispersal (see, for 
example Khalidi 1997), there is little doubt that the experiences in exile have been building 
blocks in shaping Palestinian-ness (Schulz 2003). In fact, it was in exile that the national
29The motif of the refugee is often found in Palestinian literature. The poet, Fadwa Tuqan, not herself a 
refugee, nevertheless speaks from a position of exile and employs the figure of the refugee as the 
quintessential representative of Palestinian collective experience (see Barbara Parmenter, Giving Voices to 
Stones: Places and Identity in Palestinian Literature 1994).
30 In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir’s widely circulated remark that “There was no such thing as 
Palestinians.. .They did not exist” was significant not only for its broad impact on public discourse, but also 
as expressing a common view that over time has come to be widely held among Westerners generally. At 
the same time, Palestinian official discourse had for a long time refused to accept Israel’s right to exist.
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mythology of resistance (al-mukawama) and armed struggle (al-kifah) was asserted as a 
strategy to overcome processes of victimisation and to transcend the state of dispossession, 
denial and statelessness (R. Sayigh 1979; Peteet 1991, Y. Sayigh 1997) and it was in 
diaspora that the two central poles of ‘to suffer’ and ‘to struggle’ and/or ‘to resist’ 
composing the main components of Palestinian identity (cf. Schulz 1999) took form31 
(these mythologies were used by the Palestinian revolutionary leadership, led by Yasser 
Arafat in the 1960s. In fact, Arafat himself became part of these mythologies — until his 
death, he continued to don the garb of a revolutionary and the headdress shaped as the 
historical contours of Palestine. The popular image he was seeking to project at a popular 
level derived mainly from its symbolism, while his self-image reinforced that stance (see 
Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker’s Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian 
Revolution 1991).
The components or ‘political mythologies’ of what it means to be Palestinian, as they 
have been represented in popular discourse, appear paradoxical, in a way serving to trap 
Palestinian politics in a romanticisation of a victimised self, while functioning as an 
interactive process, reinforcing a common base for politics and action. The use of active 
verbs, such as to suffer, to resist and to struggle, is important as these verbs reflect passion 
and action, as well as a temporal dimension (implying something done now to achieve a 
goal in the future). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, notions of resisting and struggling 
galvanised guerrilla attacks against Israel, but, as Sayigh (1997) argues, it was another 
human and political disaster (the 1967 war) that led to the embodiment of ‘struggle’ (al-
31 However, the meaning and function of exile or diaspora for Palestinian nationalism and identity has 
changed. This is related to the territorialisation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as a result of the 
peace agreement and the self-rule arrangements with Israel in 1993 and the re-focusing of identity to the 
Palestinians ‘inside’, meaning inside the Occupied Territories and Gaza, because of the first and second 
intifada (uprisings) in 1987 and 2000, respectively.
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nidal) as the prime political principle and a main ingredient in Palestinian nation-building. 
Indeed, Palestinian identity was crafted around idiom-signifying actions, not to surrender, 
not to give up, not to yield, whatever the consequences.
Rosemary Sayigh (1988) in her early ethnographic studies on the Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon found that the personal qualities that were employed to describe Palestinian-ness 
were ‘struggle personalities’, ‘strength, courage, resourcefulness’. Resistance was a 
strategy to be launched against Israel, and also against exile, against assimilation in host 
societies, and against the categories that were designated to them by others. Sayigh (1979) 
captures this well in her book Palestinians: from Peasants to Revolutionaries:
The Palestinian felt after the Revolution that he’s living like a normal person again 
after a life of humiliation. The camps now are like fortresses, where in the past people 
had nothing to do but die under zinc roofs (quoted in R. Sayigh 1979:164).
While the political mythologies around the signifying idioms of Palestinian-ness have 
focused on the refugee camps as focal points, dispersal and fragmentation, also 
consequences of al-Nakba, served to focus attention on other equally key dimensions of 
political mythologies surrounding the emergence of Palestinian national identity. Khalidi 
(1997), Sayigh (1997) and Schulz (1999) all argue that homelessness and insecurity 
constitute main representations of Palestinian identity, while dispossession and 
uprootedness amplify the feelings of a people deserted and at the mercy of stronger forces. 
Dislocation is symbolised by such widely used metaphors as “in any airport you find a 
Palestinian” (Schulz, 1999). In fact, the dispersal from their original homeland has given 
rise to the narrative of the Palestinian as the wanderer of the earth and an identity that
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experiences denial32, suspicion, difference and exclusion. Rashid Khalidi elucidates this 
dimension of Palestinian identity:
The quintessential Palestinian experience, which illustrates some of the most basic 
issues raised by Palestinian identity, takes place at a border, an airport, a checkpoint; in 
short, at any one of those modem barriers where identities are checked and verified. 
What happens to Palestinians at those crossing points brings home to them how much 
they share in common as a people. For it is at these borders and barriers that the six 
million Palestinians are singled out for ‘special treatment’, and are forcefully reminded 
of their identity; of who they are, and why they are different than others... As a result, 
at each of these barriers which most others take for granted, every Palestinian is 
exposed to the possibility of harassment, exclusion and sometimes worse simply 
because of his or her identity (Khalidi 1997: If).
Within such contexts, what it means to be Palestinian has been mythologised as someone 
with an identity out of place, as well as someone suffering and struggling, either under 
the threat of occupation or the wilderness of exile. Crucially, such mythologies are linked 
to the construction space (in this case the lost homeland) and the construction of time as 
the ambiguous relationship between the present, past and future. This relationship 
(Schlesinger 1991) must be understood, at least in part, as an imaginary one, mediated by 
the continual, selective reconstitution o f ‘traditions’ and ‘memory’, and drawing attention 
to how cultural institutions and practices can help forge a link between the past and 
present. With these notions in mind, I turn to the debate on diaspora to further understand 
the relevance of the past and present in the lived experiences of diasporic members.
32 The empirical work will show how the informants relate to the question of home.
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4.9 The Meaning of Diaspora
The use of the term diaspora has mushroomed in recent years particularly within 
globalisation and transnationalism scholarship because of its relevance in addressing core 
dilemmas faced by dispersed or transplanted people: how to survive as a group, and how 
to adapt to new environments without compromising group identity. As Marie Gillespie 
(1995) says, diaspora has become a key term in contemporary theorising about 
immigration, ethnicity and identity as it emphasises the ways in which identities have 
been and continue to be transformed through relocation, cross-cultural exchange and 
interaction.
Crucially, a diasporic perspective stages the dynamic processes of identity-formation 
in a specific manner, accentuating the power that people enjoy to create themselves and 
their distinctive cultures, while at the same time associating the exercise of that creativity 
with particular histories of suffering and violence. The globalisation of media and culture, 
as Featherstone (1990) notes, is deeply implicated in this process as more sophisticated 
technologies are used by transnational media corporations to serve and attract dispersed 
ethnic markets. By articulating new kinds of spatial and temporal relationships, 
communication technologies can transform the politics of representation and the modes 
of identification open to migrant and diaspora groups (Gillespie 2000).
However, the concept diaspora remains problematic, not least because of its largely 
loose framework embracing such different categories as immigrants, guest workers, 
ethnic and racial minorities, refugees, expatriates and travellers. This problem has been 
exacerbated by the increasing use of the concept as a metaphor to signify a global
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condition of mobility, to describe any community that has emigrated and/or whose 
numbers make it visible in host communities; to describe the space where migrant 
communities reside (such as living in diaspora) and to describe a condition or a state of 
consciousness of connectedness to a real or imagined homeland.
In his comprehensive work Global Diasporas (1997), Robin Cohen attempts to 
bypass these conceptual dilemmas by shifting the emphasis from the historical use of the 
term to a wider frame that sees it as a particular kind of migration, defined not just by 
physical movement, the forced or voluntary shifts of populations from one society under 
stress to another, but also by its psychological implications to the sense of longing, loss 
and the possibility of return, which are the common dimensions of the diasporic 
condition. In this vein, Cohen makes a useful distinction between various forms of 
diaspora, not all of which result from trauma. Distinguishing between trade, victim, 
labour, imperial and cultural diasporas, he nevertheless identifies them as having 
common features which distinguishes them from other kinds of dispersal and 
displacement. Diasporas, for him, involve an idealisation of the putative home, and a 
commitment to its restoration, a strong ethnic group consciousness across the multiply 
dispersed populations, a belief in the group’s distinctiveness and an often-troubled 
relationship with the host culture.
33 Common features of a diaspora (Cohen 1997: 26, after Safran 1991) are (1) dispersal from an original 
homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions; (2) alternatively, the expansion from a 
homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory 
and myth about the homeland, including its location, history and achievements; (4) an idealisation of the 
putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity; 
(5) the development of a return movement that gains collective approbation; (6) a strong ethnic group 
consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the 
belief in a common fate; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at 
the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group; (8) a sense of empathy and 
solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement and (9) the possibility of a distinctive 
creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.
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Cohen’s discussions of the term range from its historical contextualisation to its real 
and imagined representation, in the process acknowledging that, in modem times, 
transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive 
territorial claims: In the age of cyberspace, a diaspora can, to some degree, be held 
together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artefacts and through a shared 
imagination (Cohen 1997:26). In his analysis, he describes the Palestinians as a ‘victim’ 
diaspora, victim being one of the categories he uses to describe various diasporas. These 
also include labour and imperial diasporas, such as the Indians and the British, ‘trade 
diasporas’ such as the Lebanese and Chinese and ‘cultural diasporas’ such as the 
Caribbean one.34 Cohen’s model, however, has come under criticism, not the least 
because as Srebreny (2000) notes, it suggests a sense of tradition already invented, a 
group consciousness that is already strong and a model that assumes rootedness as the 
driving force in the diasporic experience, which are the very elements that need to be 
investigated and explored.35
Among other efforts to delineate the concept, William Safran (1991) has argued that 
diasporic groups may be characterised by a triadic relationship between self-identified 
ethnic groups in a particular setting, between them and similar others in different places 
and as an uneasy relationship with the host country, therefore stressing the transnational 
character of diasporas and the symbolic and material importance of the homeland. Such 
ideal-type definitions of diasporas with their emphasis on the perceived nostalgic links 
and memories diasporas have of their original homeland have drawn other criticism,
34 The Palestinians could also be termed a trade and labour diaspora as the story (ies) of their migration 
depended not only on the historical event, but also on personal circumstances.
35 This study sees Cohen’s categorisation as useful if only as a yardstick against which one can situate 
contemporary diasporas historically.
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prompting suggestions to shift the focus from the limited and static focus on ‘roots’ to a 
more dynamic analysis of ‘routes’ (Gilroy 1993) to reflect the precariousness of the link 
between diasporic communities and their homeland (Hall 1993). Avtar Brah (1996) has 
also argued that the notion of home is much more complex than approaches to diasporas 
premised on the power of nostalgia would want us to believe as it ‘is intrinsically linked 
with the way in which the processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and which are 
subjectively experienced under given circumstances’ (Brah 1996: 192).
That said, there is little doubt that people living in the ‘diaspora space’ do retain 
romanticised and idealised visions of their ancestral homeland, referred to in the literature 
as a form of ‘diasporic consciousness’ that does not preclude tensions between here and 
there and belonging and longing. Naficy (1993), for example, has labelled this tension as 
a state of flux and his subjects as exilic liminars, while Clifford (1994) speaks of diaspora 
consciousness as an experience of in-betweenness.. .a lived tension, the experiences of 
separation and entanglement, of living here and there and remembering/desiring another 
place (Clifford, 1994: 311). Diasporic cultural forms, he writes:
.. .are deployed in transnational networks built from multiple attachments, and they 
encode practices of accommodation with, as well as resistance to, host countries and 
their norms. Diaspora.. .involves dwelling, maintaining communities, having 
collective homes away from home (1994: 307-8).
Recent research into diasporic cultural politics has provided a differentiated and 
interesting account of the link between diasporas and their countries of origin, suggesting 
this link is often fraught with tension and ambivalence as diasporic communities 
juxtapose themselves to definitions of themselves emanating from the country of origin,
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which means that diasporic identity can often draw much more on the experience of 
migrancy and settlement (Tsagarousianou 2001).
These different, though by no means exhaustive, accounts of the various ways diaspora 
has been theorised capture the ongoing difficulties of precisely locating the meaning of 
diaspora, further complicated by the acceleration of globalisation processes which have 
changed the contexts, such as the political, cultural and geographical, that impinge on the 
relevance of national identity and belonging for diasporic groups. It is within such 
contexts that the term diaspora can be seen as one of the most crucial metaphors for a 
globalised condition of identities in constant motion because as Srebreny (2000) argues, 
it offers approaches that can be historically and spatially more dynamic and that explore 
the sense of both fit and non-fit and belonging and longing that seems to exemplify 
diasporic experiences as well as capture the multiple foci of identifications or spaces in 
which diasporic identity is constructed. She writes:
Such a construction supports the conceptual move from identity viewed as either/or to 
a sense of identifications as and/and and seems preferable to the claim of identity as 
hybridity, a new mixing which seems to simply highlight some putative pristine 
original stages (Srebreny 2000: 181).
This approach to diaspora, she writes, invites “a looking around, not only in and back, but 
also a scoping all-around gaze, multi-directional” (ibid: 182), an approach, this thesis 
argues, that makes the term diaspora meaningful for academic study because it allows us 
to address how diasporic identity is constructed, and how this construction can be related 
to diaaporic members’ mobilisation around their awareness of themselves as a diaspora.
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Importantly, this approach draws attention to the ability of diasporas to construct and 
negotiate their identities, everyday lives and transnational activities, therefore reflecting 
how diasporic identities are the product of active engagement in cultural and political 
action that articulates elements from different cultures and different frames of action and 
experiences.
Put differently, this understanding means that diasporas can be understood as cultural, 
economic, political and social formations always in the process of becoming, not being, 
which means they are responsive to local, global and international crises, discourses and 
representations. This understanding is particularly relevant to this study as it brings to 
analytic attention the tensions in the informants’ lived experiences and the conflicts in 
their identifications, between the self and the collective (national) and between the 
national and the cosmopolitan/global36 as a result of their probing and looking around.
These tensions are of particular interest for an analytical approach to understanding the 
ways in which the informants (members of the Palestinian diasporic community in 
Britain) construct their identities in talking about news, especially as they have had to 
lurch between critical events, each of which has provided a new focus of identification 
that has a significance for what it means to be Palestinian and what it means to be a 
citizen in a global world. Before I wrap up the chapter, I briefly explore the conceptual 
and ethical problems in using the term diaspora to define the Palestinians in Britain. The 
term diaspora has been extensively used to refer to the Palestinian population outside
36 Beck has usefully described the cosmopolitan perspective as one that provides an alternative imagination 
(of identity) to the national, an imagination of alternative ways of life and rationalities, which can also 
include the otherness of the other (Beck 2002:18), therefore drawing our attention to the ways in which 
issues of global concern can become part of people’s everyday experiences.
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Israel and the Occupied Territories.37 But using the term to describe the Palestinians who 
left their homeland remains contentious because of national and conceptual 
considerations. The national consideration relates to a widespread belief that using the 
term diaspora to refer to the stateless Palestinians implies acceptance of the Palestinian 
dispersal as a permanent condition38 of modem times (cf. Kodmani 1997).
On the conceptual level, it is argued that although the signifier ‘Palestinian’ serves as a 
label of identity for all Palestinians, there is no consensus about its distinguishing 
characteristics, making it difficult for Palestinians living in the Western world to say that 
their situation is similar to other Palestinians living in Arab countries. These problems 
have caused much consternation and debate on a popular and national level, with some 
Palestinian communities, meaning a geographically situated community, suggesting that 
their particular situation is worthier than others of the signifier ‘Palestinian.’ What makes 
these issues more poignant is the existence of real differences between the lived conditions 
of Palestinian refugees in camps in host Arab countries and for whom the question of 
return remains a salient condition39 of their exilic experiences, and between other members 
of the Palestinian diaspora, some of whom are ‘integrated’ with host societies.40
Besides these difficulties, as Schulz (2003) argues, there is no word in the Arabic 
language that corresponds to the term ‘diaspora’, although a number of different terms 
have been used in Arabic to account for its meaning. Among these is the term al-shatat,
37 The term has therefore served to conceal the variegated experiences of the diasporic Palestinian 
communities and individuals.
38 This is a bone of contention in different failed attempts to forge peace between Israel and the Palestinians 
in that Israel refuses to acknowledge the right of return while the Palestinians insist that any peace 
agreement must cater for the rights of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.
39 Many Palestinian refugees continue to hold keys to their homes in the homeland and many refuse to alter 
the conditions of their refugee situation, preferring to live in ramshackle buildings rather than build proper 
foundations and housing because of fears that in doing so, they are accepting their refugee status as 
permanent.
40 These differences have meant that few scholars have paid attention to the Palestinians in the West.
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which means to be dispersed, scattered or separated, therefore relating in some ways to the 
original Greek notion of being scattered and dispersed. However, the term al-ghurba, 
meaning the absence from the homeland, has more emotional currency in Palestinian lore.
At the popular level, the word laji’ (refugee)41 has been used in association with 
diaspora and given a central place in popular Palestinian discourses while also valued and 
protected as a sign of the ultimate temporality of exile and of the refusal of the exiled 
population to become naturalised, or put down roots in a place to which one does not 
belong.42 Indeed, this has been reflected in the ways in which many refugees, particularly 
in Arab countries, continue to think of their status as temporary and still yeam for return. 
The predominant idiom for articulating this urge to return is the sentiment of ‘localism’, a 
powerful undercurrent that continues to run through Palestinian society up to these days 43 
Tensions of identification will be addressed in the analysis of the interview material, 
particularly in Chapter Eight. Before moving to discuss the methods of this research study, 
I return to my argument linking events, identification and mediation.
4.10 Events, Memory and Identity
Nationalism scholarship has provided numerous examples of how ‘nationalist’ movements 
have typically created master commemorative narratives44 that highlight their members’ 
common past and legitimacy in order to enhance the sense of national consciousness and
41 It is problematic to use the term laji ’ to define Palestinians in Britain. Indeed, many of the respondents 
would not define themselves as lajieen (the plural) as this often denotes lower socio-economic status.
42 Although Palestinian refugees share the same language, culture and religion with host Arab communities, 
they have often been excluded from social and political life in the host countries.
43 In fact, Palestinians usually voice strong attachments to the villages or towns of their origin. Residents of 
particular towns and villages are often identifiable by distinct dialects and intonation and women by the 
embroidery on their dresses. In addition, people were often known for their occupation.
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bonding. Indeed, as Smith (1999) notes, the potency of some ethno-nationalisms, such as 
Zionsim, can be traced to their capacity to reinterpret through these narratives the situation 
of Jewish exile and diaspora as one that can reach its fulfilment through restoration.45
In the case of the Palestinians, the potency of Palestinian national consciousness 
(Palestinian-ism), this chapter has shown, can be linked to the ways in which key and 
critical events, most importantly al-Nakba, have been potent sources of ‘shared’ beliefs 
and values, and collective memories, that have sustained, through official and public 
discourse, notions of Palestinian-ness and Palestinian-ism.
What this suggests is that collective memories have starting points in real and 
remembered events, and that their power does not come from their accurate, systematic, or 
sophisticated mapping of the past, but from establishing personal and shared images and 
memories that articulate or reinforce a particular ‘ideological’ consciousness, thus helping 
construct the nation’s identity during the formative years and beyond. Therefore, it follows 
that the significance of collective memory and political mythologies are centrally related to 
their importance in reconstituting the ideological consciousness of a nation (see the 
argument on national identity above).
The linking of collective memory to events is of particular interest for an analytical 
approach to understanding peoples’ ‘discursive’ construction of identity, especially in 
light of the different ways in which ‘events’ can be told in different media; which parts of 
these events are told and by whom; and which parts can be remembered or forgotten,
44 This is not peculiar to the Palestinians. The Israeli experience in fact has some parallels to that of the 
Palestinians in the sense that Israeli political mythology has traditionally accorded the Zionist movement a 
track record of ongoing success in pursuing and later defending core political objectives, including the 
creation and securing of a nation-state.
45 In the case of Zionism, for example, this reinterpretation depended on the ways this nationalism 
presented the Jewish history as one of millennial continuity.
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either by those telling these narratives or those receiving them. These are important 
questions to address particularly in the era of globalisation, where, as Beck tells us, 
concern must shift from ‘time-space compression’ and ‘de-territorialisation’ to explaining 
the impact of ‘globalisation and cosmopolitan society on the dimension of time and 
collective memory’ (Beck 2002:27).
Such concerns can be addressed in different ways, but in terms of memory and 
memory work, it is worth noting that whereas the construction of social memory used to 
take time, as intense, shared experiences filtered into the consciousness of any 
community through repeated practices and ritual, new technologies and the 
preponderance of 24-hour news have made the process almost instantaneous46, creating a 
situation in which history appears to precede collective memory, rather than coming after 
it, or a situation which contributes to the collapse of memory (Hoskins 2004) and where 
news, particularly television news’ repetition of images and mediation of the past in the 
present provide a different context for our experiences of time. To understand how this 
happens requires exploring “how these images re-enter individual, social or global 
consciousness in new times and new contexts” (Hoskins 2004: 8). These challenges are 
taken up in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, which explore the processes the 
respondents concerned in this study use to make sense of news particularly within the 
context of their engagement with diverse media. Before I do so, I first discuss the 
methods employed in this research and then provide a detailed sociological analysis of 
the informants.
46 In the interviews conducted for this research, many parents commented on the fact that their children 
used to complain about their telling them stories of the past and of Palestine, preferring to view the 
impersonal narratives and news stories on television.
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Chapter Five 
Methodology: Theory and Implementation
The previous three chapters set the scene for understanding the theoretical arguments that 
inform this work. This chapter explains how this research evolved, and accounts for the 
choice of an audience study to examine the ways in which members of the Palestinian 
diasporic community in Britain make sense of news and what this interaction means for 
their everyday experiences and social interaction. The assumptions underpinning the 
empirical work come from the interpretive tradition that focuses on the relationship 
between the audience and the medium of consumption, which in this case is news. The 
overall methodological approach adopted in the thesis is a synthesis of the empirical 
work and theorisation of identity, collective memory, audiences and news.
The chapter is in three parts. It begins with an outline of developments in and debates 
over audience research. It then addresses the empirical and methodological framework, 
the criteria for choosing the particular group for study and the rationale behind the 
methodology. The third part provides an account of the procedures involved in the 
collection of the data. The chapter closes by considering the analytical methods used in 
making sense of the interview material.
5.1 Audience Research — A Continuing Dilemma
Sonia Livingstone (2004) has recently summarised the difficulties associated with 
researching the audience:
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Methodologically, audience research is faced with trying to capture experiences 
which are private rather than public, experiences concerned with meaning rather than 
overt practices, experiences of all society not just the elite, experiences commonly 
regarded as trivial and forgettable rather than important. (Livingstone 2004: 82)47
In an earlier paper, she argued that audience research is facing a paradox that means 
stepping back to take stock of the situation of research. Researchers, she says, must resist 
a ‘canonical’ approach to audience scholarship and should move toward conceptualising 
audience studies as part of a larger project of understanding mediated culture, therefore 
establishing a “research agenda.. .that connects audience research with 
production/texts/contexts research as firmly as actual audiences are, inevitably connected 
with actual production/texts/contexts.” (1998: 196)
These comments sum up the state of the ongoing debate over how best to conduct 
research into media audiences, an explosive area of study over the past 20 years. The 
history of the media audience can simply be explained as a narrative of a series of 
oscillations between two opposing perspectives over who holds power in societies, the 
text (message) or the audience — these broadly fall within the remit of media scholarship 
in general, which has been concerned with establishing the consequences of the mass 
media and the difference that the modem media of communication make in people’s 
lives.
These two perspectives have influenced the direction of much research on the audience, 
beginning with the effects tradition, followed by the uses-and-gratifications tradition and
47 Livingstone, S. (2004) “The challenge of changing audiences -  Or, what is the audience researcher to do 
in the age of the Internet?” European Journal o f Communication 19 (1): 75-86.
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the encoding/decoding approach, and more recently by what the cultural turn in audience 
studies that has attempted to take account of the contexts and settings on audience 
responses, the role of interpretive communities, the possibility of resistance to meanings 
and uses and the role of unconscious response structures (cf. Barker and Brooks 1997). 
While the effects tradition predominantly sees media programmes as determining the 
construction of meanings, the uses-and-gratifications approach shifts attention to the 
audiences who are believed to be agents, selectively choosing which programmes to 
interact with, thus drawing attention to individual agency and the functions media serve 
in societies.
The third tradition, Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model (1980), attempts to theorise 
a middle ground between the above two traditions, while accounting for the social 
context within which media programmes are produced and consumed. This model 
emphasises both decoding and encoding as parts of social processes in which the 
meaning of a programme is seen as a result of an interaction between the audience and 
the context of that programme. In taking the conception of the text and the reader as 
mutually defining, literary or high culture theories were applied to the study of popular 
culture, specifically addressing the relationship between the model and actual audiences 
(e.g. Livingstone 1998), while feminist scholarship (e.g. Radway 1984; Ang 1985) 
moved attention to a marginalised audience that has been largely sidelined in mainstream 
normative theory.
With its clear break from the old effects model through the emphasis on the meanings 
of texts, particularly the ideological role texts could have on people, this new direction
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spurred much research, though some of this tended to celebrate audiences48 as tacticians 
that resist official meanings or to emphasise the domestic settings within which audience 
interaction with media takes place, therefore seeing those contexts as shaping the ways in 
which people used media (see Brooks and Barker 1998 for a critique of this model).
The development toward a discursive and/or a constructionist approach in media 
reception and qualitative audience research meant that researchers were beginning to 
distance themselves from the ‘determinate’ moment of decoding. Indeed, the new agenda 
of cultural studies entails a shift towards addressing media use and reception in an even 
broader way, where the media and programmes and messages are seen as part of social 
reality. Furthermore, the implications of the increasing mediation of everyday life has 
drawn attention to the need for more sophisticated qualitative methodologies contributing 
to a differentiated understanding of audience reception processes, especially in the 
domestic context of television viewing. Within this context, it is not surprising that the 
latest development in critical efforts to explore television’s centrality in everyday life saw 
a turn to the research strategies of ethnography to considerable advantages (Ang 1985; 
Lull 1990; Silverstone 1990; Morley 1991; Gillespie 1995; Miller and Slater 2000; 
Georgiou 2001).
Ethnography has thus been employed to provide new theoretical approaches to the 
audience (Ang 1991; Morley and Silverstone 1990), while serving to shift the way of 
thinking about audiences from one that sees them as passive recipients of media 
messages and dominant discourses to one that sees them as participants in the processes 
of the construction of meaning. Sonia Livingstone (1998) explains this shift as a turn
48 The active role of the receiver of media messages was taken to the extreme by Fiske (1987) in his notion 
that television, in particular, offers viewers the possibilities to produce their own readings and 
interpretations.
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from the moment of textual interpretation toward the contextualisation of that moment, 
the result of which has been detailed analysis of the culture of the everyday that stresses 
the importance of ‘thick description’ as providing a grounding for theory, together with 
an analysis of the ritual aspects of culture and communication and the practices by which 
meanings are reproduced in daily life.
The turn to ethnography in what is often referred to as ‘new audience studies’ has been 
subsumed under the broad field of ethnic media studies, a relatively new avenue for 
research concerned with diasporic communities and their engagement, which has helped 
expand the understanding of audiences, not only in width and in relation to the 
complexity of media consumption, but also in depth and in relation to media’s role in 
sustaining commonality (Georgiou 2001). In this field, emphasis has been placed on 
‘ethnic’ media’s role in empowering minorities and in sustaining their cultural 
particularity, therefore challenging the domination of the mainstream culture (e.g. Dayan 
1998: Riggins 1992: Husband 1994).
5.2 Between Text and Context
There is little doubt that the turn to ethnographic research, dubbed as a paradigm shift 
(Neumann 1991) in cultural studies, has been crucial to advancing our understanding of 
the ways in which audiences interact with media. As Moores (1993) says, ethnographic 
studies can help us reach a better theoretical understanding of “constrained cultural 
creativity and a proper method of interpretive cultural study” (1993: 40).
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However, ethnography has not escaped criticism partially because of concerns that 
ethnographic accounts tend to focus on micro-narrative while failing to adequately 
address the question of media power (e.g. Comer 1991; Curran 1990), raising the spectre 
of the original conundrum — how best to study audiences’ experience of media. In 
addition, the question of the polysemic audience, or the power and resistance of the active 
audience versus the power of media institutions and texts, has come back to haunt the 
academy amid criticism over the absence of adequate analysis of the political, social, 
economic and ideological determinants (Algan 2003). David Morley (1997), too, has 
argued that some work in cultural studies reflects an ‘unhelpful romanticisation of 
consumer freedoms’ that tends to forget that the original objective of reception studies 
was to illustrate the question of cultural power. However, these assessments fail to 
recognise that the cultural approach configured the mass audience differently, seeing it as 
an expression of multiple and overlapping groups and identities, rather than as a 
representation of a uniform national culture (Nightingale and Ross 2003).
Despite this valid point, fresh anxieties about the state of research have spurred calls 
within the academy for the adoption of a more contextual framework that can expand the 
understanding of the social, political and ideological structures within which media 
consumption takes place. Ang (1996) has, for instance, proposed the need for what she 
has called ‘radical contextualism’, which takes into consideration not only the contexts of 
media consumption, but also the contexts of ethnographic knowledge production itself, 
thus addressing the lack of a comprehensive theory of the audience.49
49 Even Ang herself conceded that there are difficulties in adopting such an approach, proposing to shift 
attention to the uncertain ‘trajectories of the politics of narrative and narration of story and discourse’ 
(1996:254).
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Morley (1997) has countered that more context does not solve the problem, but 
conceded that the self-reflexive character adopted by post-modern ethnography that aims 
at laying bare the power relations between the researcher and the subject of the research 
has tended to focus more on how ethnographies are written rather than what they tell us. 
Sonia Livingstone, too, has noted the “impracticality of fully contextualised research as 
everything is connected to everything else” (Livingstone 1999:9), which makes the act of 
gathering contextual information unwieldy while raising issues about the focus of the 
research. Indeed, we are told that there is a danger that the amount of contextual 
information may limit the ethnographic enterprise, leading to partial stories being told. 
Other criticism has been lobbed at the notion of the active audience (Comer 1995) as well 
as the concentration on the audience, thus losing the text altogether, which Livingstone 
(1998) suggests can be addressed by striking a balance between text and audience.
The use of textual analysis in media studies has been seen as preferable to content 
analysis as it manages to bring out the determining but hidden assumption which remains 
opaque to quantitative content analysis. Qualitative (textual) analysis also aspires to a 
level of complexity that remains true to the actual complexity and contradictory nature of, 
particularly, television’s ‘artefacts’ (Gitlin 1980), whose analyses reached its heyday in 
the 1960s and 1970s, a period characterised by Stuart Hall (1982) as the period of the 
‘rediscovery of ideology’.
The textual analysis method has been extensively used in recent years, particularly by 
critics working in the field of ethnicity and nationalism (e.g. Smith 2000), whose focus 
on the construction of national identity in mediated discourses remains relevant, 
particularly to this inquiry. However, problems arise when, as Algan (2003) argues, the
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emphasis on how a mass-produced text is received by audiences centralises the use of a 
particular text and hinders understanding of the relationship between media use and the 
cultural practices of the audience, forcing us to start looking for ways that are non-text or 
non-genre based to investigate these relationships. Radway (1996), arguing along similar 
lines, has also warned against the risk of impasse in audience research if “we reproduce 
exactly the same sort of studies we have generated in the p ast.. .Furthermore, continuous 
concentration on media activity that sees audiences as either passive or creative/active 
readers tends to simplify media use as a linear process of reception and response (1996: 
244). This, of course, brings us back to the key problem with audience research — 
contestations over the term ‘audience’ itself.
5.3 The Audience: Visible, but Contested
There is little doubt that the key contribution of audience research has been to provide a 
differentiated understanding of the audience, as not a homogeneous, passive mass, but 
rather inventive and varied in its interpretations of the message, challenging prevalent 
assumptions of linear models of media power. Furthermore, as Livingstone (1998) says, 
one of the most important outcomes of audience studies is that they made ‘visible’ an 
audience which has hitherto been devalued, marginalised and presumed about in policy 
and theory.
That said, the field of audience studies has been in constant tension, not least over the 
concept of the audience itself. The ensuing debate over whether audiences are passive or 
active, critical or resistant, is unnecessary to cover in detail here. However, some of the 
debates are worth mentioning. Among the most potent criticisms were those that saw
151
problems with post-modern trends in media theory that equated the term ‘active’ with the 
term ‘powerful’ (cf. Ang 1996). Others, such as Hartley (2002) have gone further in their 
criticism, saying that the audience may be imagined empirically, theoretically, or 
politically, but in all cases the product is a fiction that serves the needs of the imagining 
institution, which could also mean the researcher. Thus, the term audience is used to:
.. .describe a large number of unidentifiable people, usually united by their 
participation in media use Given the varying demographics of this group, not to 
mention variations between nations, the concept itself is a means by which such an 
unknowable group can be imagined. Naming an audience usually also involves 
homogenising it, ascribing to it certain characteristics, needs, desires and concerns. 
The audience is a construction motivated by the paradigm in which it is imagined 
(Hartley 2002: 11).
Furthermore, critics faulted audience and reception studies for ‘celebrating’ audience 
activity, as most prominently reflected in John Fiske’s phrase ‘semiotic democracy’ 
(1987) as well as for allowing the question of power50 to slip off the agenda. Comer 
(1991), for example, has argued that a number of empirical reception studies have 
allowed the issue of media power to be neglected, while Ang (1996), as mentioned 
above, has criticised the tendency to go for the micro-narrative at the expense of the 
macro-narrative. Arguing that oppositional decodings, to use Hall’s term, cannot be taken 
as manifestations of political oppositions to political and symbolic power in any 
meaningful sense, she suggests:
50 Although the question of power may not have been adequately answered, it would be wrong to say it has 
not been addressed. Indeed, early audience research such as Morley’s (1980) work, which builds on Hall’s 
encoding/decoding model is centrally concerned with the question of power.
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A more thoroughly cultural approach to reception .. .would not stop at the pseudo­
intimate moment of the text/audience encounter, but address the differentiated 
meanings and significance of specific reception patterns in articulating more 
general cultural negotiations and contestations (Ang 1996:137).
Other problems relate to, as Abercombie and Longhurst (1998) argue, the changing 
nature of the audience itself, from face-to-face, to mass to diffused audience, which 
cannot be contained in particular places and times, but must be seen as part of all aspects 
of daily life. Indeed, “the qualities and experiences of being a member of an audience 
have begun to leak out from specific performance events which previously contained 
them, into the wider realms of everyday life” (Abercombie and Longhurst 1998: 36-7). 
Other scholars, like James Curran (1990), faulted audience and reception studies for 
neglecting previous research, not only in reference to the structural conditions and social 
contexts of audience activity, but also to comparable aspects of the audience response 
with different research traditions, while Jensen (1998) crucially draws attention to 
methodological concern related to the focus on the decoding of particular texts, rather 
than on the actions which different media and genres may orient and facilitate for 
audiences, both within and beyond the immediate context of reception.
The key problem, as a survey of the literature shows, stems from different normative 
perspectives of power and politics. In political science and political communication 
literature, the concept of power has been generally addressed in terms of media’s role in 
enabling or disabling the political participation of their audience as citizens or members
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of a polity, thus making a clear distinction between the public and private domains. 
However, as cultural studies and feminist scholarship, in particular, have shown, the 
private domain is an important site for the creation of alternative or oppositional public 
spheres (e.g. Fraser 1990). Furthermore, the concept of the political and the related notion 
of the political public sphere, prevalent in Anglo-Saxon scholarship, have been defined 
too narrowly, often ignoring the relationship between communication, culture and 
politics. (In the Middle East, for instance, politics has always been more fluid and more 
informal than the organised politics of established democracies in the West.)
In attempting to move the arguments beyond these contestations, Livingstone and 
Lunt (1994) have proposed using the term ‘critical audience’ as it captures the increasing 
sophistication and media literacy (see Livingstone 2003 for an informed analysis on 
media literacy) within which audiences approach media texts. This has, in some ways, 
been corroborated in Miller’s (1994) and Philo’s (1996) work on different audiences in 
which they found that people are media competent because they can understand and be 
critical of what the intended message means. Billig’s (1987) work on rhetorical 
psychology can be used to expand the meaning of critical in his argument that the very 
process of thinking is a process of ideology where thinking can be seen as alternative or 
counter-hegemonic discourses that can sometimes challenge the status quo.51 In recent 
years, a number of ethnographic studies have begun to address the concerns over 
audiences by examining the use of media as an integral component in every life, offering 
more complex accounts of the different ways in which people engage with media and the
51 Another key argument is Dayan’s in which he suggests that audiences who are active are those who are 
interested in the first place. This has also been reflected in the literature on fans.
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different parameters that contribute to the media viewing processes (see, e.g., Gillespie 
1995).
When talking of the news audience, attempts have been made to redefine this audience 
from its narrow conceptualisation linked to political action. For example, Bausinger 
(1984) has, demonstrated how newspaper reading (in Germany) is a collective process 
shared among family, friends and colleagues and Klaus Bruhn Jensen (1986, 1990) has 
provided an innovative ethnographic basis for thinking critically about different news 
audiences. This work, falling mostly within the field of cultural studies, has blended the 
domains of social and cultural practices together with the textual, via an emphasis on 
language, consciousness and subjectivity as constitutive elements of social reality.
In summing up the debate, Bird (2003) notes that the notion of the audience has been 
so problematic because we cannot “isolate the role of the media in culture, because the 
media are firmly anchored into the web of culture, although articulated by individuals in 
different ways...” (2003:3). However, she cautions, that does not mean we “need to 
abandon the ‘audience’ in despair.. .even as we acknowledge the importance of global 
and national economic and political forces in constructing the ‘mediascapes’ in which we 
live, we don’t all need to become political economists.. .we need to move beyond the 
audience as a theoretically definable construct, but we should not be abandoning the goal 
of understanding real people, living real lives in which media play an ever-increasing, if 
certainly problematic role” (2003:190).
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Given the lack of agreement on whether there is indeed an entity out there that can be 
identified as the media audience,52 whose boundaries Moores defines as inherently 
unstable (1993), it is not surprising that the problem arises because we cannot isolate the 
role of the media in culture, because the media are “firmly anchored into the web of 
culture, although articulated by individuals in different ways [...] the audience is 
everywhere and nowhere” (Bird 2003: 3).
5.4 The Rationale of the Study
In setting the parameters of this research, I was conscious of these debates over the state of 
audience research, the audience itself, and over text and context, debates that seemed to go 
round in circles providing no clear direction about which approach would be best to 
undertake. While agreeing that a balance, as Livingstone prescribes, is needed, I did not 
think that this could only be done through a combination of audience research and textual 
analysis (my emphasis). Instead, I opted for an approach combining a synthesis of the 
empirical work, an audience study, and an interrogation of the literature and existing 
theories. The questions I set out to explore at the outset -  what do the Palestinian in Britain 
do with news; how they use it and what does these uses mean for questions of belonging, 
identity and community - necessitated an audience study based on a qualitative 
interviewing.
In designing the methodology, I first considered the strengths and the weaknesses of the 
different methodologies to decide on the best approach. After some consideration, I opted
52 Moores (1993) has argued that the term audiences (used in the plural form) is preferable as it denotes the 
existence of several groups divided along gender, social and cultural positionings. However, this, too, faces 
conceptual difficulties, as it does not address the question of where media audiences begin or end.
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for semi-structured interviewing not only because it was a methodology I felt most 
comfortable with, considering my professional53 background, but also because it was the 
most suitable for my particular objective, in which I aimed to open up reflexive discourses 
that involved the subjects concerned as a participating party. My reasoning was that these 
questions could be best addressed through semi-structured interviews as this form of 
research allows us to analyse how people construct their identities, and whether they 
participate in public life through their talk about news.
In making this choice, I was conscious that I was moving against the recent trend in 
reception studies within cultural and media scholarship and which have used observational 
ethnography and textual analysis as the preferred techniques for studying everyday cultural 
practices, in this research. My reasons for rejecting these were at first practical ones; there 
was no obvious public space, i.e. local settings and places of social gatherings, where 
media are consumed en masse and publicly by the diasporic Palestinians in Britain.
The Palestinians in Britain, unlike the Punjabis or the Greek Cypriots in London (see 
Gillespie 1995; Georgiou 2001), generally do not live in clusters although there are areas, 
particularly within London, that have a large Arab concentration, while social organisation 
in response to political developments generally occur in fits and bursts, which would make 
it difficult to observe and record the everyday effect of media on the communities 
involved. Lastly, observational ethnographic work in public spaces in Britain would not be 
conclusive in this study, because it is difficult to distinguish the Palestinians from other 
Arabs — ethnic markers, which include language, dress and customs, are not clearly 
demarcated.
531 worked as a professional journalist and editor for 18 years prior to taking the academic route.
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The theoretical perspectives adopted in this thesis, particularly the understanding of 
identities 'as socially constructed through talk and action and news as cultural discourse, 
informed my final decision as these necessitated an interrogation of people’s discourses 
and talk about themselves and their news consumption practices. This meant moving away 
from the triangulation favoured in recent reception studies within cultural and media 
studies, which would normally carry out a textual analysis that involves de-constructing 
the text by applying structuralist, semiotic, feminist, literary, narrative or ideological 
analysis, coupled with an audience interpretation of the text or genre under study, and 
followed by an illustration of how the content of the text was constructed by the media 
producers, which would support the analysis of the informants’ statements.
I reasoned that undertaking such an approach would serve a different purpose than the 
one that I had intended at the outset, which is a study of the audience’s uses of news in an 
attempt to find out whether they use it for identity work and what that means for the 
understanding of diasporas. Furthermore, practical considerations discouraged me from 
carrying out a textual analysis. These relate to the fact that the media genre I was 
investigating, the news story my informants engage with (that of and related to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict), was of an open-ended nature, making it difficult to decide 
which text to analyse. This consideration was further complicated by the fact that the 
respondents engaged with different news media, which made it difficult to decide which 
text to choose for deconstruction without being personally implicating in the process.
Furthermore, I was interested in exploring the everydayness of news culture which 
(Allan 1999) can provide us with a rich starting point for further research. By engaging 
with the apparent ‘normality’ of how readers, listeners and viewers make sense of the
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news, we are better able to look beyond the fixed text-audience dichotomy indicative of 
so much previous research on news audiences (Allan 1999: 129). What this means is that 
an alternative approach which recognises the need to investigate people’s deeply 
ingrained habits of interacting with news discourses as part of their lived experience of 
the everyday resists a rigid analytical separation from the conditions of its decoding. In 
its place is a conceptual commitment to interrogating the fluidly contradictory cultural 
relations of textual negotiation in all of their attendant complexities. It follows, then, that 
the materiality of news discourse is contingent upon the embodied experience of power 
relations as they traverse the contested terrain of ordinary culture.
The combination of theoretical, practical and research considerations convinced me 
that an audience study, drawing on social-scientific and humanistic inquiry, was the best 
methodology to address how the informants make sense of news and use them as 
resources in their everyday lives. Whereas the methods of data collection are drawn 
primarily from the empirical procedures of the social sciences (interviews), the methods 
of the data analysis derive from the broadly hermeneutic approaches of the humanities: 
discourse studies and thematic analysis.
It is a truism that every researcher starts an inquiry with pre-conceived ideas. Mine 
were grounded in my familiarity with the subjects of the study, their conditions and their 
situation and in the theoretical underpinnings for the research, discussed at length in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four. However, although I was aware of the general context of 
the research, I was not familiar with the particularities of people’s engagement. Indeed, I 
started with the assumption that news is relevant for the Palestinians concerned, but that 
did not mean I knew what they did with it and what it meant for their everyday social and
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cultural practices. Furthermore, my familiarity with the context of the research meant I 
started with some pre-conceived ideas about the informants and their lives, insights 
gained from my own experiences as a member of the Palestinian diasporic community in 
Britain.
As an insider, a member from within and without, I had some ideas about the political 
and social make-up of the Palestinian community, and was aware of the internal 
cleavages within the Palestinian community in Britain, based on political54, religious, 
regional (whether rural or urban) and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as of the 
interchangeable categories, such as ‘Arab’, ‘Palestinian’, ‘Palestinian-Arab’, ‘British- 
Palestinian’ or ‘British’ that complicate face-value understandings of diasporic identities.
My pre-conceptions were also grounded in my familiarity, as a journalist working 
primarily within the mainstream news media establishments, of the language of 
‘othering’ and the use of crude binaries (shorthand in journalistic jargon) that cropped up 
during moments of crisis. That said, I assumed a degree of naivete about the lives of the 
informants during the interviews, while trying to be sensitive to and curious about what 
was being said and what was left out, which allowed me to be critical of my own 
suppositions and presuppositions during and before the interviewing process. In other 
words, I put on the hat of observer, rather than participant, though it was difficult at times 
to maintain professional boundaries and emotional detachment.
In pursuing my objectives, it was imperative to resist the temptation to make an 
empirical division between ethnic (Arabic) and other media — my informants have the
54 Palestinians’ political affiliations, meaning their loyalty to certain political factions within the Palestinian 
and Arab leaderships, are the heritage of the political history of the Middle East, apart from the many isms, 
including Ba’athism, Arabism, Islamism, and Communism, that divided loyalties.
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choice to engage with either or both.55 Indeed, the starting point is the need to 
acknowledge the continuous interweaving and interplay between mainstream (Western) 
and transnational news media (mainly Arabic satellite broadcasting), which informed the 
informants’ choice of which news media to engage with.
5.5 The Research Design
My research approach adopted was to concentrate on a particular group, the Palestinian 
diasporic community in Britain, therefore forming a single case study56. Case studies 
focusing on single phenomena or groups have been recommended when the case is rare 
and ‘unique’, and when the researcher can access the phenomena that have not been 
previously studied57.
The methodology is based on semi-structured, open-ended qualitative interviewing, 
where the very nature of the researcher and the subjects (I and the informants define 
ourselves as Palestinian although that does not mean ‘we’ are a homogeneous ‘we’) 
necessitate a measure of reflexivity, a notion I attend to below. In all, I conducted 24 
semi-structured interviews with individuals, households and groups, (the following 
chapter provides a sociological analysis of the informants), a total of 52 people, with the 
aim of gathering information about their preferred sources of news, about their
55 There were some examples where language was a problem. Most informants spoke English although the 
extent of understanding English differed. This obviously had implications for their choice of the medium 
for their news consumption, as understanding news in Arabic was easier than trying to understand what was 
being said in English.
561 use the term case study in its broader meaning, rather than as in the meaning proposed by Yin (1994), 
which defines case studies as empirical inquiries that use multiple sources of evidence to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.
57 As pointed out in Chapter Four, there are few studies on the Palestinians in Britain, particularly as a 
complex diasporic group.
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perceptions of news and what it means for them. In addition, I conducted several 
interviews for background information. The first part of the fieldwork, during which 
household and group interviews were conducted, began in November 2001 and continued 
throughout May 2002. The second phase of the research, also comprising semi-structured 
interviews, was carried out between January 2003 and May 2003. The interim period was 
used to consolidate the methodology and to check whether it suited the theoretical 
impetus behind the work. The reasoning is explained later on in this chapter.
This research project was designed, as noted above, with several intellectual challenges 
in mind, including how to address identity discourses, collective memory, news and 
mediation and by the relationship between news and power. Data was gathered using in- 
depth, qualitative interviews which were best suited to my purposes because the topic of 
the interview involves the real and imagined lived world of the subjects and their relation 
to it — what I mean is that the continuous news story related to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the topic of the qualitative interview was and remains related to the lived world of 
my informants. The questions were set around broad themes dealing with how my subjects 
watched news (the circumstances of engaging with news), where they consumed news, 
which medium and language they preferred, what news stories meant to them, why and 
whether news was important for them and how they made sense of news.
The open-ended design of the questions meant that interviews were not conducted 
through a strict order of questioning, but were structured along subject-areas of discussion, 
proceeding from the general to the particular. They began at the broadest level, exploring 
which media the informants regularly engage with. My first point of departure was to 
allow the respondents to talk about news freely; the second was to find out why they
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engaged with news and what that meant for them; the third attempted to elicit comparative 
assessments of the different news media they engaged with on a regular basis; the fourth 
sought to have them describe what typically happens in their daily lives in association with 
their engagement with news ; and the fifth encouraged them to describe the uses of news 
beyond the context of viewing.59
I then asked the informants to discuss their interpretations of the news story and its 
significance in their everyday lives, and it was during these exchanges that questions 
related to their identification, their sense of boundaries, their talk of othering, belonging 
and exclusion came up. The question guide, as shown below, begins at the broadest level:
1. Which media do you have access to?
2. Which news media do you have access to?
3. Which news media do you prefer?
4. Do you engage with news regularly?
5. How many times do you engage with news?
6. Do you engage with news on your own, or with family?
7. When do you engage with news?
8. Who makes the decisions about engaging with news?
I then went on to examine the reasons for their engagement with news and what it meant 
for them. Again, the questions are at the broad level:
1. Why do you engage with news?
2. Do you follow the same news item?
3. Why do you switch channels?
4. What does news tell you?
58 This draws on Lull’s (1980) typology of the social uses of television.
59 This was the most difficult aspect of my research to get across, but it did produce interesting data.
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5. Why is it important in your lives?
6. What do you think of the different news programmes?
7. What do you think of the content of news?
Tackling these broad issues provided inroads into more specific themes relevant to this 
research, including themes related to what the respondents make of the continuous media 
events and/or of critical events and to whether and how their news consumption of these 
events had implications for their experiences in the diasporic space as well as for their 
identity perceptions and negotiations. What this meant was that the respondents became 
subjective and took positions, which is the bias that I needed to engage with the theoretical 
framework adopted here. Subjectivity meant that the respondents were emotional and 
engaged, but also reflexive about their positionings and understandings.
The open-ended nature of the questions, allowing respondents to take time to respond, to 
engage with the topic and to bring up new concepts and questions, were aimed primarily at 
forging a sense of ‘familiarity’ and at reducing the ‘formality’ of the interviewer- 
interviewee relationship. Most of the interviews took place in the familiar setting of the 
household of the informant/s and around normal activities that could afford the researcher 
fodder for some field notes and casual observations, an approach (Silverstone, Morley and 
Hirsch 1991) that emphasises the ‘social’ character of media appropriation and the ways 
consumption is ingrained in the structures of the domestic and the public.
The choice to use interviews as a research method, as Kvale says, involves a challenge 
to renew, broaden, and enrich the conceptions of knowledge and research in the social 
sciences (Kvale 1996:10). The choice to use a variety of interview forms, the individual, 
the household and the group, is informed by the qualitative nature of the research. The
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groups I interviewed were not focus groups in the strict sense, but the discussions 
generated within the group took a life of their own by the presence of other group members 
that were familiar to them, prompting a range of different remarks about a topic by 
encouraging the respondents to speak from their “individual social or material positions 
defined by their respective cultural backgrounds” (Gunter 2000:46). Even when groups 
comprise demographically homogeneous memberships, a group identity may emerge once 
participants realise they share values and attitudes, thus enabling a consensus view to 
emerge (cf. Morley 1980). Though I was aware that individuals in the group may not 
divulge what they really think, the nature of the research meant that the individuals taking 
part in these group interviews did actually say what they wanted to say, as will be clear in 
the variations of opinions and ideas detailed in Chapters Seven and Eight.
Indeed, in this research study, I use the group interviewing to investigate, as Radway 
(1984) did, the broader ‘interpretive community’ where participants’ routine 
interpretations are of primary interest. For me, the concern is the collective, rather than 
the taxonomic in nature as I wanted to understand the ways in which the interviewees, as 
consumers, were also taking part in mediation processes. Although the group research 
methodology has been criticised because of concerns about the validity of its results and 
its nature, the group interview emphasises the social nature of communication and does 
not reduce social scientific research to the individual (Gunter 2000). As Lunt and 
Livingstone (1994) note, this is important in the context of media research, where 
mechanical conceptions of media effects are giving way to more social, semiotic and 
diffusion-based conceptions of media processes.
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5.6 Interviewing and Reflexivity
My choice to use interviewing was primarily informed by the cultural studies tradition 
which generally sees interviewing as the most suitable method to study cultural 
experience, a study that necessitates looking at a number of processes that may or may 
not mesh neatly together (Couldry 2002). These, he notes, include, on the one hand, 
action, which means the actual consumption choices people make, their level of 
engagement and the direct interpretations people make of what they consume, and, on the 
other hand, talk, meaning people’s talk about the symbolic products they consume that 
necessarily brings out the social contexts of this consumption. In the empirical chapters, 
Seven and Eight, I will show how these two processes mesh together in the reality of the 
Palestinian diasporic experiences in Britain; why the informants make their choices and 
what this means for their discourses of identification and for their participation in or 
detachment from social and public life.
Semi-structured interviews, as Kvale (1996) says, help “obtain descriptions of the life 
world of the interviewee with respect to interpreting the meaning of the described 
phenomenon” therefore inviting critical discussions of the relations between the 
researcher and the subjects of the research, and allowing for a framework of reflexivity 
that can be useful for the interpretation and evaluation of the research study’s analysis 
and conclusions. Reflexivity, the thinking of the social and the cultural, means 
developing the practice of reflection, which, from yet another angle, makes apparent the 
contested and non-transparent nature of ‘society’ and ‘culture’ (Couldry 2000). 
Reflexivity, in other words, is a back and forth continuous process allowing researchers
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to evaluate how their own discourse and preconceptions interact with the subjects’ 
discourses, and the other way round. In seeking to balance the requirements of the project 
and the need of the respondents to move away from the questions asked towards 
discussions of society, politics, and, more importantly, what they see as their own 
narrative, the narrative of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict, I conducted the 
interviews in such a way as to encourage informants to address the research questions 
within the broader context of other political and social determinants that, along with 
media, influence their everyday experiences. In this way, the aim was to engage 
reflexively with the theoretical and empirical agenda set within this field as this relates to 
the question of identity (Georgiou 2001). By allowing the respondents to reflect on their 
experiences and social practices, I was able to trace some of the personal, cultural and 
political pressures that bear on these practices and experiences and which are not always 
visible.60
The interviews were conducted in informal settings, at the respondents’ homes, in 
cafes and restaurants when the informants did not want me to access their private spaces 
for their own particular purposes or for convenience. Irrespectively, after an initial period 
of getting to know each other and making them feel comfortable, the interviews were 
normally held in an amicable atmosphere, with the respondents often putting on the 
interviewer’s hat and asking me questions about myself.
60 This was achieved through the analysis of the data, which was reflexive as it involved constant reflection 
on what was being said while also juxtaposing it against the theoretical undertaking, rather than on-the-spot 
interpretation, which is a practice that I had used as a journalist.
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5.7 Dilemmas of the Fieldwork
I soon found out that fieldwork is not a simple process or not as simple as interviewing as a 
reporter had been. This process becomes complex particularly in situations when the 
distinction between researcher and informant — I and the informants describe ourselves as 
Palestinian - is not clearly defined and where boundaries between the two roles are fluid. 
What added to the complexity of the interviewing process in this case was that, given the 
nature of the political climate61 at the time of the research, respondents were worried about 
the purpose of the research and had to be repeatedly reminded that it had no hidden 
political agenda.
In my desire to make informants feel comfortable, I exerted considerable effort to 
convince them that the research objectives were not politically motivated and that I was not 
being paid for the work. In fact, there were many times when I was turned down because 
of informants’ fears that the research had a hidden political agenda. Thus, I found myself 
engaging in small talk, discussing children, education and life in Britain in general, a time 
consuming activity, but which in the end provided me with valuable insights into the actual 
lives of the informants and their experiences which indicated that living in diaspora cannot 
be taken for granted as it involves continuous contestations of power relations.
Other dilemmas were of a more practical nature. As my intention was to cover 
domestic and public grounds and to provide a varied sample cutting across gender, class, 
religious, and generational boundaries, I resisted the temptation to contact personal
61 The interviews took place amid a large-scale military campaign by the United States and its allies against 
the so-called war against terror following the September 11,2001, attacks against the US.
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acquaintances and friends. In addition to the fact that this approach would not be 
considered scientific, I was worried about my objectivity as a researcher.
I therefore sought the help of the Palestinian Higher Delegation Office in London, 
which had access to the names and addresses of some 5,000 Palestinians spread all over 
the United Kingdom. This list, however, proved to be problematic. First, it was not 
accurate or up to date. In fact, unofficial estimates suggest that the number of Palestinians 
in Britain is somewhere between 15,000 to 20,000 as the 2000 intifada, conditions in 
refugee camps in Lebanon and a change in Germany’s immigration laws brought in a 
large number of new arrivals and asylum seekers to the UK. And, second, the list gave no 
indication of how these people came to be in Britain, the reasons for their arrival or their 
status, irrespective of whether they had become bona fide British citizens or were still 
considered immigrants.
This lack of specificity and accuracy presented me with the major challenge of mapping 
the history of the informants’ arrival and the circumstances surrounding their arrival in 
Britain — this proved to be a difficult task because there was no obvious way to acquire 
accurate and reliable data about the informants. This, as I had noted in the previous 
chapter, is partly because of the lack of precise statistics on the number of Palestinians and 
Arabs in Britain due to the complexity of the British classification system and partly 
because of the invisibility of the Palestinians within the Arab community — Palestinians 
share with other Arabs the same culture, language, traditions and religion, though they 
differentiate themselves and are differentiated by others by their distinct national 
aspirations. It is also difficult to estimate the number of UK-born Arabs as such groups are 
also subsumed under the heading ‘bom in the UK’ (see previous chapter). In addition,
169
there is no community centre for Palestinians to meet or specific localities where 
Palestinians live, although there is a largish concentration of Palestinians in west and 
southwest London.62
Given the problems cited above, I set out to contact a selected number of families I 
chose randomly from the Palestinian Higher Delegation Office’s list. I wrote introductory 
letters explaining the research study’s aim and my background to some 300 households 
and individuals, only to receive five replies, two of which were not relevant to the research 
as the correspondents wanted me to take part in some fund-raising activities. I therefore 
decided to form a sample using the non-probability method of snowballing: this means 
asking an initial group of informants to put me in touch with their families and friends, 
who are then asked about their friends and acquaintances and then interviewing those 
people, a process repeated until a sample is formed.
The snowballing method, it is argued, does pose the problem of the researcher inheriting 
the decisions of each individual on who is the next available interviewee. In practice, 
however, the extensive use of snowballing leads to the construction of a rich and diverse 
sample. I supplemented this method by networking, making an effort to meet people by 
taking part in activities organised by the London-based Association of the Palestinian 
Community in Britain and by other Arab associations, including the Arab Club and the 
Jordanian-British Association. At the same time, I found myself taking part in the cultural 
and political activities as well as attending fund-raising functions in aid of the Palestinians 
under Israeli occupation particularly in the early part of 2002 and following the escalation 
of tit-for-tat violence between the Palestinians and Israeli forces.
62 This problem was, however, addressed by relying on secondary sources and estimates on the number of 
Palestinians in Britain (see Chapter Four for details).
170
In selecting the households for the interviews, I chose families where parents and 
children or siblings live together in one space. I had originally targeted 20 such families, 
hoping that all members of the family would be present. Needless to say, not all of these 
attempts were successful - in some cases, it was difficult to arrange for all members of the 
household to be present together at the same time because some family member was at 
work or because a family member, usually the male, would not feel comfortable being 
interviewed by a female. In other cases, I met the informants in public places because of 
social and other considerations (see the following chapter) and sometimes because they 
were reluctant to allow a stranger into the relative sanctity of their homes. The fact that I 
adopt Western dress may have been an inhibitor in some cases.
That said, I was determined to vary the sample to make sure I had a diversified group in 
terms of age, gender and class. In practice, that diversity also came into question. Although 
in most cases women and men took part, their participation, meaning their contribution to 
the conversation, was often not equal. Women tended to tend to house matters, such as 
making tea and coffee, lunch or dinner. However, this was compensated for when 
interviewing women on their own and it was during these interviews that I got some of the 
most valuable data for the research in that they tended to talk without apparent self- 
imposed restrictions. Men were generally, but not always, wary of what the research aimed 
at, but they did participate after realising that the work was not politically motivated.
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5.8 Conducting the Research — the Operational Framework
Despite these constraints and problems, I persevered with the fieldwork, the first phase of 
which started in November 2001 and ended it in May 2002. The second phase started in 
January 2003 and ended by end-May 2003. The households and individuals interviewed 
for the research come from a broad range of socio-economic and religious backgrounds 
(Christians and Moslems). Most of the interviewees have access to a rich mixture of 
media, including satellite and terrestrial television channels, as well as a wide range of 
print media and the Internet, though most tend to watch television news or listen to the 
radio for their daily intake of news. This meant most had access to Arabic news sources, 
including the Qatar-based Arabic satellite channel al-Jazeera and other significant 
channels like the Lebanese-based al-Manar, which many said were important for them.63
In carrying out the interviews in households, I collected valuable visual data. For 
example, the fact that in almost every household the television was continuously switched 
on to a particular news channel confirmed the centrality of news in the informants’ lives. 
While waiting for the informants to assemble, I took notes and observations, noticing how, 
in many households, ornaments and symbols of Palestine — flags, olive wood ornaments, 
calligraphy and religious symbols — were displayed prominently and were part of the 
home’s essential decorations, which in their taken-for-granted presence in prominent 
positions in the households, brought to my attention the daily but banal reminder of the 
homeland in these people’s lives.
63 Because of the way I selected the sample and the need to have a variety of respondents, I could not 
establish prior to the interview whether respondents had satellite television or had access to al-Jazeera. I 
felt it was important to establish contact, meet these people and then carry out the investigation. As it 
happened, all but two had access to satellite television.
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The interviews often went beyond the research brief, with discussions moving on to 
food, cooking and lifestyle as well as questions of Palestinian peculiarities that were not 
directly relevant to the research questions, but that allowed me to understand certain social 
aspects of interactions in the diasporic space. The domestic space was the most appropriate 
place to conduct the research, although that did not preclude the use of public spaces to 
interview people and to widen the sample beyond the rigid structure of the traditional 
household. In the public space, I conducted interviews with two groups — one with a 
group of Moslem families from the same socio-economic background in a public 
restaurant in Manchester and another with a group of five 20-30 year-old male asylum 
seekers in a pub in London. These interviews come under the category of the small group 
or peer group interview, which mean the members of the group either know or are 
comfortable with one another. Smaller group interviews also go round the problems 
associated with the focus group (usually of about six to 10 people), such as the artificial 
homogeneity of the group or the dominance of one member over the others.
The conversations with the informants focused on the use of news in their lives (see 
interview guide in the above section). I wanted to find out whether news can serve as a 
point of reference and a mediating framework of memory, and whether it can provide an 
invitation to talk, an opportunity to remember, a ritual that helps bind these people 
together, a link that binds the Palestinian community, or even much more simply that 
could be the first tentative form of contact among members of these communities. What 
seemed clear at the outset, even before the analysis started, was that, while the activity of 
engaging with news takes place in the intimate space of the home, the experience of 
consumption extends beyond that. Indeed, people’s socialisation processes revolve
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around news and discussions of these accounts and their representations, moving the 
consumption activity from the private to the public, and, in doing so, helping the 
socialising and construction of identities in both spaces. During those interviews when all 
household members were present, I had the opportunity to observe the natural interaction 
between people.
The languages in which the interviews were conducted were Arabic and English, 
depending on the language skills of the informants64. In some interviews, people 
alternated between the two. This was crucial for the smooth conducting of the interviews, 
although it was very difficult in the transcription process -  indeed, my ability to switch 
from one language to the other was important for easing and facilitating more expressive 
communication.
What is crucial to note is that the interviews were conducted during a traumatic 
period in the lives of the Palestinians. I was initially worried that the timing of the 
research would distort the results and was conscious that the timing was both positive and 
negative, positive in that the Palestinians interviewed were deeply engaged with news, 
particularly news related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and/or the perceived tensions 
between Islam and the West, but negative in that the engagement with the Palestinian- 
Israeli news developments meant that interviewees tended to ‘commute’65, in, other 
words to move the questioning and the answers to more ‘personalised’ questions related 
to the ongoing conflict with Israel. However, the analysis of the interview material 
showed that the notion of commuting was a sense-making process that informants in
64 Unlike other migrant groups, members of the first generation migrants are competent in both languages. 
This connects to the fact that most of them were of middle- to upper-class families.
65 Commuting refers to the process whereby respondents constantly switched from discussions of the media 
text, the news narrative, to discussions about their own narrative.
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general used to make sense of news and appropriate its meanings in their lives, therefore 
making the findings legitimate. This will be detailed in Chapter Eight.
The informal nature of the interview sessions — these lasted between two to three 
hours (we took a lot of breaks to make coffee, tea or to eat something) — meant that I 
had the chance to study the natural interaction between people who see themselves as 
existing as one group, allowing me to explore the dynamics of news talk in its dialectical 
expressions.
5.9 Discourse and Dialogues
Interviews conducted this way help us interpret the relevance of what is being said.
My analysis started after I finished two-thirds of the fieldwork, or after the end of the first 
phase of the interviewing, when I decided to take ‘time-out’ to sift through the data 
without actively doing any fieldwork. Though unconventional, this was intentional, as I 
wanted to be able to analyse the data collected so far from a ‘distance’, in order to 
interpret it and construct meanings. Also, I wanted to see whether a period of normalcy, 
meaning one where there were no international crises or events related to the informants, 
was possible, as I was worried about the implications of the timing of the research on the 
findings.
Distance, it is argued in social research, provides a space beyond the specificities of the 
fieldwork and the ‘emotional’ involvement that is an inextricable part of the ‘reflexive’ 
approach adopted by most researchers these days. In my training and my work as a 
journalist, keeping a distance is part of ‘good’ journalistic practice, a practice that
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effectively provided two accounts of the same narrative. Keeping a distance makes for 
good journalism because it implies a commitment to balance and objectivity as an ideal 
journalistic practice, capturing the essence of the journalist as the metaphorical fly-on- 
the-wall metaphor.
As I discovered, however, doing research meant throwing all these rules out of the 
window, and meant an intense emotional involvement with the interviewees and the 
subject of the research over the period. Gillespie (1995) argues that analysis without a 
complete withdrawal from the field has certain important advantages, one of them being 
that informants become part of an ‘interpretive community’. One disadvantage, I would 
counter argue, is that immersion in the field could sometimes blind the researcher to other 
aspects and other possibilities of the research. It was for this reason that I decided to take 
time out two-thirds of the way into the fieldwork to reflect on the objective of the 
research, to convince myself again that I was on the right track and to allow myself a 
reasonable period to reflect on the data and to relate it to the literature.
As it happened, the second phase of the research, starting in January 2003 and ending in 
May 2003, did not provide a period of stability. The violence between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis continued with an escalation of suicide attacks against Jewish targets 
while the build-up to the war against Iraq and the actual invasion which took place in 
March 2003 only served to draw attention to the lack of resolution to the narrative of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
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5.10 Analysis: Challenges and Constraints
The development of the analysis remains one of the main challenges for audience studies 
and other qualitative research. In this study, I utilised a broad method of data analysis 
most commonly derived from the hermeneutic approaches to the humanities — a blend of 
discourse studies and thematic analysis, which allowed for the emergence of interpretive 
frames or themes. These are distinctive, though sometimes overlapping, cognitive and 
emotional categories that people use in constructing an understanding of social reality 
(e.g. Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992). In discourse analysis, selected aspects of language 
use are similarly conceived as indicators of how humans make sense of the world (e.g. 
Jensen 1986). In each case, the analysis serves to establish the occurrence of particular 
forms of understanding which can be interpreted with reference to other quantitative as 
well as qualitative evidence, and with reference to explanatory theories of how social 
institutions and practices may generate such understandings (Jensen 1998).
Thematic analysis is a process for encoding qualitative information and is therefore 
suitable here. It is also an appropriate method of analysis in this particular case as most of 
the interviews were conducted in Arabic, which meant they had to be translated before 
being transcribed and coded for lists of themes.66 Thematic analysis is a way of seeing, 
which means it is subjective because as Boyatzis (1999) notes “what one sees through 
thematic analysis does not appear to others, even if they are observing the same 
information, events or situations...[it] requires observation, observation precedes
66 A theme is a pattern found in the information that at the minimum describes and organises possible 
observations or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon (Boyatzis 1999).
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understanding. Recognising an important moment (seeing) precedes encoding it (seeing it 
as something), which in turn precedes interpretation. Thematic analysis moves you 
through these three phases of inquiry.” (1999:1)
The coding for the analysis undertaken was theory-driven in that I began with an 
interrogation of the theoretical framework informing this work, and then used this to 
formulate the signals or indicators of evidence in the interview material that supported 
the theory. In such cases, as Boyatzis says, the “wording of the themes emerges from 
the.. .construction of the meaning of style of communication or expression of the 
elements of the theory. The code, therefore, is often found in the language of the 
researcher’s field, filled with the special meanings and jargon” (1999:33) of that field.
I also followed Mishler (1986) in his argument that interviews that use a relatively 
‘open’ interviewing style resemble narratives, which was a key point in the analysis as 
the transcripts of the data appeared disjointed and incomplete. However, once we realise 
that statements are fragments of narratives, we can begin to see them within wider 
discursive frameworks (cf. Lewis 1991). In this respect, the questions that I was forced to 
answer emerged in the themes and the links I made between various statements because 
the interview is only a fragment of a person’s social and cultural history, which forces the 
researcher to consider not only what is said, but what remains unspoken.
Given these imperatives and, arguably, constraints, I would like to briefly re-state the 
key theoretical underpinnings for this investigation. The first is the assumption that news 
cannot be solely understood as providing new information, but must also be seen as a
67 Theory-driven codes have been popular is the disciplines of social psychology, experimental psychology 
and comparative anthropology.
68 What this means is that theory-driven codes may involve difficulties as they often result in lower inter­
rater reliability and therefore lower validity because they are more sensitive to projections on the part of the 
researcher and to the impact of his or her cultural bias (Boyatzis 1999: 35).
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dynamic component of social and cultural life, and thus as a form of cultural discourse; 
the second sees identity as a continuous discursive process of becoming; the third is that 
diasporas are social formations that are responsive to social, economic and political 
contexts; the fourth is that the discursive construction of national identities runs hand in 
hand with the construction of difference and uniqueness (e.g. Renan 1996; Hall 1991); 
and the final assumption is that the discursive construction of identities, collective 
memories and political mythologies central to ideas of nation requires communicative 
frameworks to allow their durability over time and space. In the next chapter, I provide a 
quantitative and descriptive account of the informants and detail the analytical tools used 
in the analysis of the interview material.
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Chapter Six
The Palestinians in Britain: Diversity and Particularity
•
In Chapter Four, I gave a brief historical account of the Palestinians’ migration to Britain, 
placing this narrative within the wider story of the mass Palestinian movement out of the 
area known as Palestine before 1948. Here, I provide a demographic account and 
descriptive details of the respondents interviewed for this research, using data gathered 
prior and during the interviews. I then discuss the method used in the analysis of the 
qualitative data ahead of the more specific analyses of the informants’ uses of news in the 
subsequent two chapters.
6.1 Diverse Sample
The data on the informants, collected in the interviews and a simplified form of 
participant observation, highlight the diversity of the sample. The sample was collected 
through the snowballing sampling method, a non-probability sampling technique that is 
used when it is not possible to draw a random sample of the population from which the 
sample is to be taken. Though snowballing sampling has some methodological problems, 
one of which is that it may not be a representative sample, it remains an efficient and 
feasible method in qualitative research, particularly where the orientation to sampling is 
guided by a preference for theoretical sampling rather than the kind of statistical 
sampling associated with quantitative methods.
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A total of 54 people, male and female and of different ages, socio-economic 
backgrounds and religious orientations were interviewed, either on their own, within 
families and households or in groups. In addition, I conducted five separate interviews 
with individuals for background information, including with the then Palestinian 
representative in Britain Afif Safieh and other prominent figures and business people who 
did not want to be quoted or identified.
Four-four per cent of the interviewees were female, 14.8 per cent were Christian 
Palestinian and the remainder of the group was Moslem; 31.8 per cent were in the 18-30 
age group; 26.6 per cent were in the 30-50 age group; 23 per cent were in the 50-60 age 
group; 14 per cent were in the 60-75 age group and the rest were over 70 or under 15.1 
did not deliberately set out to exclude informants under 15 -  however, the fact that they 
generally did not want to take part, preferring to watch cartoons and play video games in 
the households I visited and the difficulty of reaching this group (many were at school 
during the time of the interviews) discouraged me from persevering.
Nearly half of the informants said they came to Britain in the early 1990s, following 
the first Gulf War. About 20 per cent said they arrived in the 1970s, either for work 
reasons or because of the civil war in Lebanon and the political turmoil in Jordan, and 
about 10 per cent said they were recent arrivals, some of whom classified themselves as 
asylum seekers. The remainder of the informants arrived in Britain at different times and 
for different reasons. For example, Salim, who at 82 was the oldest person interviewed, 
said he came to Britain in the early 1940s to work with the UN.
About 70 per cent of the informants were competent in both English and Arabic, which 
is relevant to a core concern in this research -  one of the key arguments is that the
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juxtaposition of different culturally framed news accounts of the same events stimulates 
contrastive analyses of news texts heightening feelings of difference while encouraging 
participation and engagement in public life. About 30 per cent, mostly of the younger 
adult group (the term I use hereafter to refer to informants between 15 to 25 years old) 
were competent in English only, though they had a basic understanding of Arabic. About 
80 per cent of the informants said Arabic satellite broadcasting was important because it 
allowed their children access to Arabic language in natural and everyday settings, 
pointing to instrumental and functional uses of news media, and about 90 per cent said 
they preferred Arabic satellite channels.
Television ownership was in most cases combined with diversity in access. Most of the 
homes I visited had access to satellite television, but the Farahs and Mansour (see details 
below) had no access to satellite broadcasting because of building regulations that 
prevented them from installing a satellite dish, while Reem said she did not have access 
to satellite television out of choice. Among the Arabic satellite television channels, al- 
Jazeera was the most widely watched channel at the time of the interviews. About 60 per 
cent of the households I visited, particularly those with young adults living in the home 
said they had more than one set.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Palestinians I interviewed do not live in 
clusters or in specific neighbourhoods in London or in Manchester, the two cities where I 
interviewed the respondents. Even on such streets such as Edgware Road in West 
London, an urbanised and busy street lined with stores selling Arabic food, clothes, 
newspapers and providing Internet access to the Arab world, the Palestinian presence can 
hardly be distinguished from the Arab one because the Palestinians and other Arabs share
182
common ethnic markers, such as language, dress, customs and a common religion. The 
fact that the informants live in different spaces can be linked to the pattern of the 
Palestinian migration to Britain, which was more like a process of infiltration tan mass 
migration and was due to varied reasons.
Furthermore, the interview material suggested that residential preferences do not 
reflect the need to be part of a localised community. Indeed, the choice of home or 
residence appeared to be more a reflection of other identifying criteria, such as class or 
socio-economic situation. For example, a few of the more affluent families I interviewed 
resided in the upmarket suburb of Hampstead in London, which is also popularly known 
to the home of a large proportion of London’s Jewish community, suggesting that living 
alongside the ‘other’ was not of immediate concern for these participants. Some other 
families, such as the Karims, who had moved to a north London suburb because it had 
cheaper housing said they were pleasantly surprised to find that their Jewish neighbours 
were much more welcoming than their former English neighbours. For other informants, 
it was the ‘cosmopolitan’ character and the ethnic mix of some of London’s 
neighbourhoods that attracted them. This is the position taken by Reem, for whom her 
middle-class identity, her marriage to an Englishman and her feeling comfortable with 
diverse ethnic groups have all helped define her residential choice.
Most of the interviews with families and individuals were conducted in the homes of 
the respondents. Of the three ‘group’ interviews, two took place in public spaces, the first 
was in a pub in London because the group was composed of young male asylum seekers 
who did not have suitable homes for a meeting, but were keen to take part to reflect their 
voices and concerns and the second took place in a restaurant in Manchester with a
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Moslem family and their male friends because they were concerned about privacy. The 
other, with a group of middle-aged and middle- to upper-class women, took place at one 
of the respondents’ home. A couple of interviews with individuals also took place in 
public spaces as the respondents did not feel they knew me well enough to invite me to 
their homes. The household and group interviews allowed me to observe the interactions 
between members of the household, while the individual in-depth interviews allowed me 
to achieve a more intense rapport with the interviewee, providing me with rich data about 
themselves, their feelings and their identity. Members within the group interviews were 
familiar to each other, making it possible to call these interviews as ‘peer-group 
discussions’ (Sasson 1995), which refers to naturally-occurring groups, or groups whose 
members are familiar to each other, and which is more pertinent to the informants 
concerned in this study -  this term also avoids the common problems associated with 
focus group and their use in marketing research.
The majority of the households interviewed were nuclear families with parents and 
children living under the same roof. This does not mean that the interviews with 
individuals suggest they live on their own, but that the circumstances and contexts of the 
interviews dictated that they were interviewed on their own. Some, for example Um Ali, 
had been widowed, while others’ husbands or children were not available during the 
interview. In some cases (see details of Maha below), I had a sense that the male member 
of the household did not feel comfortable being interviewed by a female.
During the interviews, it became clear to me that the informants’ uses of news and the 
individual processes of constructing meaning were related to cultural contexts and social 
relations. For example, there was a sense that the family continues to be central in
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people’s everyday lives as it creates a context for the sense of common belonging and a 
context for participation in community. However, it was also clear that the family as an 
institution has undergone dramatic changes as a result of the Palestinians’ dispossession, 
social fragmentation and wars. The family structure has been shattered because men 
migrating for labour have left families behind, which has meant that although the family 
continues to be of prime importance for social affairs, there has been a trend away the 
hamoulah (extended family) structure in favour of nuclear families. Many of the 
informants talked of the problems of meeting up with their extended family. This is the 
case of Jamil (see below), whose siblings have ended up living in different countries 
following their dispersal from the homeland.
The timing of the research and the escalation of the conflict between the Palestinians 
and Israel offered an excellent context for addressing the informants’ uses and 
appropriation of news. The sensitivity of the topic to all respondents in the research was 
very relevant in this case, highlighting how the question of the collective may become a 
sensitive issue in certain contexts.
Broadly speaking, the interview material revealed a sense of identification with what I 
call a ‘Palestine-centred’ entity. However, despite this shared sense of identification, 
many of the informants made essentalising distinctions about their socio-economic status 
and their places of origin, voicing attachments to the villages and towns of their origins 
reflecting the continued relevance of localism, a powerful undercurrent that continues to 
run through Palestinian society until today. For example, those who came from semi- 
urban areas, such as Jaffa and Nazareth, were keen to point out the distinctions between 
urban and rural backgrounds.
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Such cleavages, reflecting socio-economic as well as educational and in some cases 
religious differences (Christian Palestinians often come from the more affluent towns) 
within any community, may normally unite or divide the informants along several axes of 
difference. One such axis of difference related to the informants’ reasons for leaving the 
homeland, a sensitive issue among many Palestinian exiles and refugees because of 
insinuations that they should have stayed behind to fight the Israelis and hold onto their 
land and property. Others, particularly those from middle-class or affluent socio­
economic background, held onto another axis of difference concerning their status, 
insisting that their situation cannot be equated with that of refugees. That said, their talk 
and the context of the research -  a period of heightened anxiety about the self and the 
collective -  suggested that these distinctions were transcended as the informants voiced 
identifications with a loosely-defined Palestinian entity (see Chapter Eight).
In attempting to move away from abstract comments about identities -  comments that 
suggest what identity should be more than what it means to the informants - 1 addressed 
questions that relate to the respondents’ real experience and media interaction as the 
responses to queries about social networks, participation in activities, institutions and 
rituals can give some indication about the relevance of identity and belonging to people.
In some cases, it can bring to light some dominant trends in these people’s attitudes and 
experiences. So, when the majority of the respondents said that they define themselves as 
Palestinian, this appeared to confirm the strength and/or dominance of attitudes to 
collective boundaries. In addition, when the informants said that they mainly socialised 
with other Palestinians, rather than with their English neighbours, I deduced that the 
primary boundaries were set or constructed around what it meant to be Palestinian.
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The informants’ continuous switching between different news channels is compatible 
with the ways they think and talk of their identities, which came across as continuous 
movements between polarised positionings. At the same time they expressed concern 
about the Palestine-Israeli conflict and about its coverage, they also emphasised their 
loyalty to Britain. In their shifting emphasis about their belonging, there was no sense of 
an absolute contradiction. This was particularly the case for those who were bom in 
Britain or who spent their formative years in Britain. Experiences of security and safety 
in Britain provide a source of feeling at home. What appears to be significant is that this 
sense of security is provided by them having a British passport and by the social security 
provided by the political system, though this does not mean that they feel included or 
integrated in the host society. For the majority of the participants, however, an increasing 
sense of belonging or partly belonging in a self-defined national community structured 
their self-identification and some of the choices they made in their everyday lives.
The interview material and my collection of data while waiting to be served with tea or 
coffee provided me with valuable insights about the participants’ lives and relationships. 
For example, most households appeared to have recreated Palestinian homes in their use 
of decorations. With pictures and models of the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa 
mosque, posters of Yasser Arafat, embroidery and mother-of-pear and olive wood 
engravings of Palestinian icons, they seem to be recreating their original surroundings.
For many of the informants, Palestine remains a central feature of their everyday lives. 
Even for those who say they have friends of diverse cultural backgrounds, the focus of 
their socialisation remains with people from the homeland. Some of the informants said 
they belong to Palestinian or international organisations, such as al-Awda (Return) and
187
the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, which focus on the Palestinian question. Others, such 
as Sharif (see below), have taken the initiative to form voluntary groups to counter the 
dominant media representations. The informants’ responses, comments and expressed 
attitudes are discussed in detail in the two subsequent chapters. In the following section, I 
give a more descriptive account of the informants. All names bar Sharif s have been 
changed for confidentiality.
6.2 Household Interviews
The Said Family: My relationship with this family began at the start of the fieldwork. 
Hussein Said contacted me by phone when he learned through a friend of his that I was 
conducting research on the Palestinians in Britain and invited me to visit his house to
i t .
meet his wife and children. I saw this family twice, the first on 24 of January 2002 and 
the second a couple of weeks later on 11th of February. My first interview was more of a 
socialisation exercise, where I was invited to join Said (50) and his wife Amani (35) 
along with their four children Qusai, (9); Safa, (7), Lu’ay (5) and Qais (4 months) for an 
extended lunch. Luckily, I had my tape recorder ready and proceeded to ask a few 
questions in between eating, drinking, watching the news together and playing with or 
feeding the children. During this time, Hussein and Amani gave me valuable information 
about themselves and their background and provided me with rich data on the power 
relations in the household. The Saids live in a modest two-storey home in west London. 
Their neighbours are mostly immigrants like themselves, mostly of Pakistani, Indian, and 
Arab origins. Hussein is self-employed and he considered himself as working class. The
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couple professed themselves to be good Moslems, but said they were not fundamentalists. 
The Saids came to Britain in early 1991 following the first Gulf War when Hussein lost 
his job in Kuwait. However, he did not apply for asylum status as his contacts with the 
Arab community in London secured him a clerical job before his arrival. Hussein was 
bom in the West Bank town of Tulkarem, which he left in 1967 when Israel defeated the 
Arabs in the second Arab-Israeli war. Amani was bom in Amman, Jordan, to Palestinian 
parents.
The Saids have one television set, but have access to satellite broadcasting. They also 
have access to the Internet, which Hussein uses for business, for e-mailing friends to 
discuss the latest news events and for finding out what the Israeli media are reporting on 
the ongoing hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians.1 Hussein also uses the Internet 
to alert his friends and colleagues about the latest developments he has seen on Arabic 
satellite channels and, though this is rare, to send emails of complaints about news 
coverage to the BB. “I do get very angry (about their coverage).. .but I do not have much 
time,” he said. The Saids rely on television for their daily news. They rarely listen to the 
radio and rarely buy the London-based Arabic papers citing their cost as a reason.
This household is a good example of gendered identities. Hussein dominated the 
discussions and showed his control by telling me he dictates which news programme and 
channels his family should watch. However, there were times when Amani challenged 
this domination. For instance, she complained about her husband’s insistence that the 
children view transnational Arabic satellite television, citing their use of bloody images. 
The children, though present, did not want to participate in the interviews, preferring to
1 This seemed to be an activity that many respondents, particularly those with Internet access, engaged with 
on a daily basis. The favourite Israeli paper they access is Haartez.
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take time out to watch cartoons on television, which Amani said they would not normally 
do with Hussein around as he insisted on the family watching the news together.
The Saids were acutely conscious of their Palestinian-ness, which came across in their 
talk about their socialisation and belonging. This emerges in Amani’s comment: “We do 
consider ourselves British. We do not live the atmosphere here (sic). Inside our home, 
everything is Arabic, outside we know the English through the school. We do have good 
relations with the neighbours, but there are differences.”(London 24 January and 11 
February 2002).
The Mansour Family: I got in touch with this family through the snowballing method 
discussed above. When I called to explain my research, the Mansours were originally 
reluctant, but agreed to see me after several phone calls. However, they were very 
welcoming when I turned up. The Mansours are a well-to-do family -  they live in a prime 
residential area of west London. Ali, 64, is retired, but remains active in business. His 
wife Nuha (50) is an active member of the Syrian and Arab communities in London. The 
couple came to London in the 1980s because of Ali’s increasing involvement in property 
development in London. Ali was bom in Haifa in the former Palestine and Nuha in 
Damascus. They have one daughter Ruba, 19, who was bom in London, and who attends 
university in London.
The Mansours’ account of their uses of news reflects how their daily lives are 
structured around news. This is detailed in Chapter Seven. Both Ali and Nuha are 
bilingual, though Nuha preferred to speak to me in Arabic during the interview. Ali 
switched between English and Arabic, while Ruba spoke in English only -  she said she
190
did not feel confident to converse fluently in Arabic, but can understand it and therefore 
can take part in the family’s news viewing practices. The Mansours is a close-knit family 
and their activities are usually family-centred though Ruba is increasingly pushing for 
more independence. They said they were not practicing Moslems and that they respect all 
religions and cultures. Nuha said she was beginning to feel integrated in British society, 
and Ruba’s talk of her identity reflected movements between openness and closeness that 
were linked to the context of the research rather than cultural considerations: “Personally 
I befriend people that I get along with that I have something in common with, whether 
they are Arab or not. In fact, I have a Jewish friend.. .she’s Iranian. I’ve known here since 
I was 11, we are very close. But, as far as politics go, we don’t go there because we’ve 
been there once and it was a disaster... as far as the whole Israel thing it is touchy and for 
me the Palestinian thing is touchy so we don’t go there at all.” (London, February 25, 
2002)
The Farah household: The Farahs is a family consisting of Odette, a 90-year-old 
widowed Christian Palestinian and her daughter Leila, a 60-plus single Christian 
Palestinian who has recently retired from her job as a secretary after almost 40 years of 
service, first in Lebanon and then in Britain. Leila and Odette live in a purpose-built 
block in north London overlooking a busy road. They arrived in the UK from Beirut in 
the late 1970s to escape the Lebanese civil war. They are middle-class Palestinians who 
had a better lifestyle, according to them, when they lived in their Jerusalem house up to 
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which forced them to leave to Lebanon.
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The block they live has diverse families and individuals from different socio-economic 
and religious backgrounds, but Leila said that most of their neighbours were Jewish and 
that her mother, who was a fanatic card player, did not mind playing the odd game of 
Bridge with them as long as she won. Arabic is the spoken language at home, but Leila is 
fluent in English and Odette can understand it perfectly though she prefers to use Arabic 
at home. Odette’s son Fuad lives nearby and calls on them every day.
The interview I conducted here was mainly with Leila, one of the three people who 
answered my letter to members of the Palestinian community in Britain informing them 
of my research plans and asking for interviews and introductions. Leila was interested in 
the research proposal because she describes herself as addicted to news and also because 
she is keen to talk about her memories and share her lived experiences in diaspora with 
someone other than her mother or her close family. This observation is in itself 
interesting as it confirms that very few studies have been carried out on the Palestinians 
in Britain. During the interview, Odette intervened a couple of times to talk about her 
memories of the homeland, her life before, the journey to exile and her ongoing legal 
battle with Israeli authorities over the ownership of their house in Jerusalem, which 
remains unresolved. The Farah household, like many others I visited, boasts several 
pictures of important places of significance to the Palestinians, such as pictures of the old 
town of Nazareth. I also saw other visible signs relating to Christianity, such as olive 
wooden crosses hung on different walls.
Leila is an avid news user -  she reads the papers regularly and watches mainstream 
news media and BBC 24, but she has no access to satellite television because of building 
regulations. However, she says that she gets second-hand reports of al-Jazeera \s news
192
accounts through her brother Fuad (see below), who calls on them every day. Odette 
prefers to read the Arabic-language daily al-Quds, which Leila buys for her daily. Leila 
was very keen to show me clippings of articles on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict reported 
in the weekly Jewish Chronicle which her brother brings to her to read. Later on, she sent 
me several clippings from this paper to read. The interview with Leila lasted two hours 
and was conducted in both Arabic and English. (London, November 15,2001)
The Muhsens: This is a middle-class Moslem Palestinian family living in Southwest 
London, comprising the mother Widad (60), a widow, her two sons Khaled and Sami, 32 
and 28, respectively, her daughter Judith (30) and nephew Bilal (21) who is staying with 
the family while finishing his university education in London. The Muhsens came to 
Britain in the 1990s from Kuwait where they had been living since the early 1980s 
following the civil war in Lebanon. All the children were bom in the refugee camp of Ein 
el-Hilweh in Lebanon. Widad herself is a refugee who left the former Palestine with her 
family to Lebanon in 1948. Her husband Osama, also a refugee, was killed in the mid- 
1980s during a visit to Lebanon.
All family members are bilingual, but the younger son Sami is not comfortable with 
Arabic, finding it easier to converse in English. Khaled, Sami and Judith all work in 
major financial institutions in the City of London. I arranged the interview with this 
family through the snowballing method. My initial phone call was made to Widad, who 
was very excited about talking to me and invited me to the house at a weekend to make 
sure that all the children were there. The fact that Widad was the prime organiser of this 
interview was interesting in two ways, first it suggested that she was to the main power
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holder in the household; and second it made it uncomfortably clear that the male 
members of the household were reluctant to take part in the research, particularly when I 
first arrived. Later on, Widad’s and Judith’s enthusiasm in answering the questions and 
my persistence and probing worked to draw in the reluctant others.
Both Widad and Judith said they were practicing Moslems and, although they did not 
wear the traditional Islamic dress, they identified with Moslem values and traditions. The 
male members were less particular about their identification with Islam, instead saying 
that they identified as Palestinians. Both female members of the family said they did not 
feel integrated in Britain, with Judith ridiculing the suggestion, saying: “Never, even if 
we stayed for 500 years. We are friendly. We have our neighbours, but we don’t socialise 
with them like going over to have a cup of coffee or meet every Christmas we 
don’t . . .Even when at school I used to feel that the English people in my class are not the 
same... Politically, there is nothing in common.” Bilal said he felt the same way and so 
did Widad and Khaled, but Sami said he was integrated.
The family has two television sets, one in the kitchen the other in the family sitting 
room. They have access to satellite and terrestrial television and they also use the Internet 
extensively. The interview was conducted at their home and lasted for about three hours. 
(London, April 15, 2002).
The Barhoums: The interview here was conducted with Ahlam (45), her son Maher (17) 
and his friend Adeeb (21). Mr. Barhoum was abroad during the interview and Ahlam’s 
younger children Mona (10) and Nazeem (8) were playing at the neighbours. The 
Barhoums is an upper middle-class Moslem family. They live in a residential area in
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north London that is known to have a large Jewish community. Ahlam was bom on the 
West Bank, but went to Beirut to pursue her education. Maher is at school and Adeeb, the 
son of family friends who had moved back to Kuwait, is at university in London. Maher 
and Adeeb were bom in Kuwait. The Barhoums moved to London in the early 1990s for 
work purposes following the first Gulf War. The younger children were bom in London. 
The language used in the household is English and Arabic, though Maher preferred to 
speak in English. Adeeb and Ahlam were more fluent in Arabic and continuously moved 
between the two languages in the interview.
As in the previous household, the social interactions within this family were interesting 
to observe and it was clear that Ahlam was the key power holder in the family. She often 
won the argument with the younger adults. The three respondents considered themselves 
to be secular, having respect to religions and cultural diversity. In fact, Maher said that 
about 90 per cent of his classmates at his school were Jewish, which had not bothered 
him at all until the outbreak of the second intifada and what he called the negative 
coverage of Palestinians and suicide bombers. Ahlam said this event had encouraged her 
to become more active in community and public work and to take part in protests against 
Israeli policies. (London, February 25, 2003).
The Karims: The interview with this family took place in the second phase of the 
fieldwork (see previous chapter) almost towards the end of the interviewing process. I got 
the address of the Karims through my contacts with the Palestinian community and called 
Sawsan who said she would be very happy to welcome me to their home in the Enfield 
area on the northeast outskirts of London. The Karims identified themselves as a middle-
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class Moslem Palestinian family. The family comprises Sawsan (48), a teacher, Daoud 
(52), a doctor, Bashar (21) and Nada (23) -  Nada was not at home as she had had just 
started work and was out for the day. The Karims came to London from Kuwait in 1992 
following the first Gulf war. Their two-storey home to which they moved two years 
earlier is situated in a predominantly Jewish neighbourhood, but the Karims said they had 
never had such congenial neighbours, though the contact with them had become minimal 
following the uprising.
Both Sawsan and Daoud were bom in the town of Tulkarem on the West Bank, to 
which they plan to return when their son Bashar finishes his university education. Their 
children were bom in Kuwait, but spent their formative years in London. Though devout 
Moslems -  they took time out to perform their daily prayers -  the Karims did not seem to 
be bothered by my Western style dress. As in many of the other household interviews, 
Sawsan was given more time to talk, suggesting that Daoud and Bashar may have 
considered this as more of a socialisation exercise among women. However, the male 
members became more interested in the conversation when we turned to the question of 
news and its meanings in their lives following general discussions about themselves and 
their media preferences. As the discussions wore on, Bashar became more animated and 
more expressive as he talked about his disillusionment and unhappiness about what it 
means to be a Palestinian ‘living diaspora’, noting that the news events had made him 
conscious of being different. “Although I like different cultures, I realised that I get along 
with a certain type.. ..the type like me. Also, when the intifada happened and all the 
pictures, it became clear to me that it was important to be with people you care about and 
who care about you. I had Jewish friends then, but they don’t care about this. The English
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in general are not interested and the Arab community here is divided, lots of division. 
Frankly, this has made me want to get out of there. I am beginning to feel it does not 
work.” (London, March 20, 2003)
The Asfours: This household interview comprised Randa, a 45-year-old Christian 
Palestinian and Raed (20), her son from her first marriage to a Christian Palestinian, at 
their home in central London. I arranged the interview through the snowballing method. 
Randa said she came to London in 1992 with her second husband, a British businessman, 
with whom she has twin daughters, aged 10. She described herself as upper middle-class. 
As her daughters are still young, Randa said she did not work. Raed was at a vocational 
training college in London.
Randa was bom in Amman, Jordan, to Palestinian parents who left Jaffa following the 
Nakba of 1948. She described her parents as being typical of many Palestinians who have 
settled in Jordan in that they do not engage with politics. Like them, she had not been 
interested in politics, but said she became more involved following the second intifada, 
which in her words made her confront her own Palestinian-ness. “In the past when people 
asked me I used to say I came from Jordan. It was easier, but recently I feel the need to 
say I am Palestinian and to say that I am a Christian Palestinian to counter the image that 
it is an Islamic cause, it is not. It is a political cause,” she said.
The Asfours have access to satellite television. Like most other respondents, Randa 
constantly switches between channels. In describing herself as addicted to news, she said: 
“I feel out of sync if I do not see what is going on. It is also essential to know to discuss 
with others.” She was strongly critical of the mainstream media saying that it made her
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helpless and angry at the same time. However, she said she also liked to watch BBC’s 
Question Time programme because it gave her an additional insight into what was going 
on in Britain.
Interestingly, Raed had strong emotional reactions to news coverage and to the plight 
of the Palestinians. Unlike in many other interviews where women were generally more 
emotional than the men, Raed got agitated when we talked about media coverage and the 
meaning of events. “I have been feeling a lot different lately. Our generation never really 
cared about news, but since the second intifada, we have been following the news 
because we need it mentally and emotionally. I feel very sad. It is very sad and at the end 
of the day what is clear is that Israel does not want to give in or change.. .they just want 
to occupy the land. In fact, I actually support the suicide bombers.” ( London,
The Wafiqs: This interview also comprised mother and son. Nadwa, 55, is a middle- 
class Moslem Palestinian living in West London. She came to Britain with her ex- 
husband in the 1990s from Kuwait following the first Gulf War. Her son Omar, 35, was 
bom in Kuwait. Omar does not live with his mother, but came to his mother’s house to 
take part in the research during his lunch break. Nadwa has two daughters as well, but 
they live further away and were not available to take part. The interview, organised 
through the snowball method, lasted three hours, during which I interviewed Nadwa on 
her own for the first hour before interviewing mother and son together in the last two.
The interview with Nadwa was conducted in Arabic and with the two in both Arabic and 
English.
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Omar runs his own printing business. He is married to a Cypriot (Christian) woman and 
has two children under the age of five. Nadwa said she was a practicing Moslem, but that 
she did not interfere with her daughter-in-law’s beliefs. However, she said that her 
grandchildren should be exposed to Islamic and Arabic traditions. “That is why it is 
important to have channels like al-Jazeera. They can learn Arabic easily,” she said. The 
interaction between mother and son was interesting as it showed that Omar had assumed 
the position of the head of the household, which is normal when the mother is divorced. 
(London, January 31 2002)
Sasha and twin sister Nadia (24): Though this is not a conventional household 
interview, but I put it in this category because I could not put it in the individual or the 
group categories. Sasha ad Nadia are middle-class Christian Palestinian graduates who 
live in a west London suburb with their father and mother. The twins were bom and 
brought up in Kuwait and moved to London in 2001 because their father was relocated 
and because they wanted to pursue their education at university. The interview with the 
girls took place at my house as they felt more comfortable talking to me without their 
parents around. The interview was arranged through the snowballing method.
Both Sasaha and Nadia said their father was not too happy about them being getting 
more involved with current events -  this did not seem surprising considering that the 
family continued to live in Kuwait whose policies following the first Gulf War were seen 
as discriminatory against the Palestinians. Sasha and Nadia said that they had not been 
interested in current affairs before they arrived in London, a time that coincided with an
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escalation of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians. The interview lasted two 
hours and was conducted in English and Arabic. (London, March 18, 2003).
6.4 Individual Interviews:
Maha: 34-year-old Moslem Palestinian of middle-class status. She has two young 
children, four-year-old Wael and eight-month-old baby Ali. Since having the babies, she 
has stopped working to look after the children. Maha lives in a mixed middle-class 
neighbourhood in west London. She came to Britain in the early 1990s from Kuwait, 
where she was bom to post-1948 Palestinian refugees, to continue her education (she has 
a degree in pharmacology that she obtained at Edinburgh University). She met her 
husband Luay in Britain. Luay was at home during my visit, but did not want to take part 
in the interview because he was working, though it appeared to me he was not keen on 
being interviewed by a female.
Maha described herself as a news addict. She has access to satellite television -  she 
installed a satellite dish following the second intifada to engage with diverse news media. 
Maha has excellent command of English, but she alternated between Arabic and English 
in the interview though I posed the questions in English. Though Maha defines herself as 
a good Moslem, she does not wear the veil except when she leaves the house. Her talk of 
her identity shifts and changes according to the changing context, reflected in her 
constant negotiation of boundaries within the diaspora. In the interview, Maha’s talk of 
her identity reflected how this was constructed with reference to the homeland and with 
reference to the diasporic space. For her, Arabic satellite television has been important
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for defining her identification as a Palestinian. She watches Arabic satellite television 
almost all day, though she constantly switches to mainstream media. The interview lasted 
for two hours and took place in the afternoon when Maha’s children were sleeping. Maha 
is also interested in radio and listens to the Arabic broadcast Spectrum at night after 
children are in bed. (London, February 14, 2002)
Lutfi: Lutfi is the brother of Leila (see Farah household above), whom I interviewed 
separately at his sister’s house after she convinced him to take part in the research. Lutfi 
is a retired 65-plus Christian Palestinian who started a business in export and import that 
took him to African countries and later on to London. He left Jerusalem in 1948 with his 
parents and went with his family to Lebanon. Lutfi first came to Britain 1975. He is 
married to a Greek national and has two daughters in their 20s. None of them were 
present at the interview.
Lutfi is a self-avowed news junkie, reading most British broadsheets as well as the 
London-published Jewish Chronicle to enlighten himself, in his words, about what the 
Jewish press is reporting on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and then passing on what he 
sees as relevant news items and analysis to his sister Leila who archives everything. Lutfi 
is also a fan of al-Jazeera, particularly because it provides an alternative view to that of 
the mainstream British media. (London, January 18, 2002)
Jamil: A retired 72-year-old Christian Palestinian businessman who lives in an upmarket 
area of southwest London. Jamil came to Britain in 1964 to train as a chartered 
accountant, and was forced to stay because of the 1967 war and the fall of Jerusalem. The
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rest of his family is dispersed in different parts of the world. Jamil is married to a Belgian 
national and has two children, a boy and a girl, both in their 30s. None was present during 
the interview, which was arranged through the snowballing sampling method.
Jamil has access to satellite and digital television, citing his wife’s need to engage with 
French-speaking channels and his own preference for Arabic transnational broadcasting 
as the reason behind the abundance of channels he and his wife can engage with. Like 
other older informants, Jamil’s daily schedule is defined by his use of news. He reads a 
variety of papers, including the Arabic language daily al-Quds, listens to the BBC’s 
Radio Four, then turns on to al-Jazeera for more detailed news on Palestine. The 
interview lasted three hours as Jamil spent a lot of time commuting, moving from 
discussions of the news story to talking about his personal life and story. The language 
alternated between English and Arabic. (London, May 3,2002).
Um2 Ali: Um Ali was one of the most colourful interviewees. She is a 65-plus widow 
who lives in a purpose-built apartment in north London. She describes herself as a 
middle-class devout Moslem Palestinian. Um Ali has four children, three of them in 
London and the fourth lives in Washington DC. Her life story - she spent a lot of time 
commuting between talk about news events and her life -  is, according to her account, 
one of constant struggle and achievements. Um Ali came to London in 1975 with her 
oldest son after he was shot in the leg during the Lebanese civil war. Her three daughters 
stayed in boarding school in Beirut until they graduated. Um Ali was bom in the town of 
Nablus and her late husband came from Haifa. They got married in Palestine and stayed
2 Um means mother of, which is a common term of reference in the Arab world. Ali would refer to her 
oldest son.
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in Nablus until the 1967 war after which they went to Jordan, then Lebanon. Um Ali said 
she ran her husband’s work, an advertising agency, single-handedly when he died in the 
early 1970s of a heart attack.
Um Ali described herself as addicted to news. Indeed, her two-room flat was inundated 
with diverse media. There were two television sets (she has access to satellite as well), 
one in the living room, which she said is on all the time and the other in her bedroom, 
which she uses to record news bulletins on diverse channels while she is watching the 
news in the sitting room or during prayer times. “I record as much as I can and then 
compare notes,” she said. In addition, she has three radio sets, one in the bedroom, the 
second in the kitchen and the third in the sitting room. The television was switched to al- 
Jazeera during the interview and it was interesting to watch Um Ali’s body language -  
she would tense up and ask me to be quiet to hear what was going on. Um Ali also reads 
the Arabic papers and makes clippings to give to her friends to read and compare notes 
and up to date. She took time to show me her fat folder of clippings, all on the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Um Ali said she was only interested in political news, 
particularly news about Palestine. “My children laugh at me and say we are going to put 
you a bed and a pillow inside the television. Really, I have an obsession with television 
news,” she said. Um Ali said she also watched the BBC, but did not always understand 
what was going on. The interview took three hours and was conducted in Arabic. 
(London March 25, 2002).
Sharif (real name): Sharif is the 24-year old founder of Arabmediawatch, an Internet 
group aimed to counter bias in mainstream Western media that he started in 2000
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following the second intifada. “There was so much distortion and inaccuracies and 
ignorance. Not just the Palestinian conflict, of the Arab world in general. We just felt we 
needed to address that and since I was a journalist, |I was ready to do that.”
Sharif was bom in Kuwait and came to London in 1991 with his parents and siblings 
following the Gulf War and because of his late father’s work. Sharif lives with his mother 
and his siblings in a house in central London. The household can be described as upper 
middle-class. Though he has access to diverse media, including Arabic satellite 
television, Sharif regularly follows the mainstream news media because of the nature of 
his work. His engagement with news, as he puts it, has allowed him to appreciate the 
meaning of identity and community and to participate in public life. The apparent ease in 
which he shifts between Palestinian-ness and cosmopolitanism is reflected in his views 
about participation and action. “I am not going to live my life being afraid of expressing 
my opinion because here is someone who might turn against me. You cannot go on 
ducking and hiding,” he said. The interview was conducted in English at his home and 
lasted two hours. (London, April 12,2002).
Mansour: Middle-class 58-year-old former sports commentator, who is now semi­
retired. Mansour lives in a suburb in northeast London with his wife, Julia, who is Irish. 
They have two grown up children who are at university. Neither Julia nor the children 
were present at the interview. I organised the interview through the snowballing method.
Mansour said that he was an avid news user and that he needed to engage with news to 
know what is going on in his hometown of Asira, a village on the West Bank. He has no 
access to satellite television because of building restrictions, but says that he can access
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the diverse reports on the Internet. Mansour was bom in Asira on the West Bank and was 
recruited from Jerusalem in 1968 to work with the BBC’s sports sections. He was in 
Jordan visiting relatives when the 1967 war broke out and had to stay there until he got 
the job offer from the BBC. (London, January 18, 2002).
Fuad: Middle-class 49-year old Moslem Palestinian living in West London. He is 
married to a Greek national and has two grown-up children. Fuad was bom in Ramallah 
on the West Bank, but left his birthplace with his parents at the age of 15 following the 
1967 war. He sees himself as a news addict, consuming a diverse range of news media in 
various forms. Fuad’s accounts of his news experiences provided a good perfect example 
of the ways in which identity can be seen as a continuous discursive process of 
identification as he constantly moved between positionings and points of reference, “I am 
definitely a Palestinian, and the news makes me more so.. .But I don’t feel a stranger here 
though. Britain is like a second home, but Palestine is the first,” he said.
Fuad said that he talks about Palestine to his daughters all the time and meets his 
friends to discuss news on a regular basis. He told me that his parents were not refugees 
as his father was a teacher who found work in schools in Amman. Fuad came to Britain 
in 1975 for work and has been here since. He has access to different media, including 
satellite television. He also regularly reads the Arabic-language papers, particularly al- 
Quds and al-Hayat. Interview was conducted in Arabic and English in a restaurant and 
lasted one hour. (London, March 16, 2002)
205
Reem: 45-year old Moslem Palestinian living in northwest London. Reem works full 
time as a music teacher and is married with no children. Reem calls herself a radio person 
as she does not care for television -  she is the only one among the respondents who said 
she had made a conscious decision not to install a satellite dish because “most of the 
programmes are silly and lightweight programmes. Al-Jazeera is the other extreme.. .it is 
too intellectually presumptuous, and frames everything in terms of Islam or Palestine. It 
becomes a bit too much as it makes you conscious that you have to confirm that you are 
Moslem and Palestinian.” Reem also criticised the mainstream news media and the 
British broadsheeds for their coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” One of the 
biggest problems is that these media’s correspondents cover the conflict from their cushy 
comfortable environments of their hotels in west Jerusalem and they do not see. They do 
not see the Palestinian side so their coverage is not objective in the first place already it is 
not objective.” Reem was bom in Kuwait to parents who left the former Palestine in 1948 
following the war with Israel. She came to Britain in the 1980s to pursue her university 
education and has stayed her ever since. The interview was conducted at her home in a 
north London neighbourhood. It lasted two hours. The language was English and Arabic. 
(London, May 4, 2002)
Faras: 28-year old banker who has been living in London for two years. He was bom in 
Nablus on the West Bank, but was brought up in Jordan where his parents had gone for 
work following the 1967 war. Faras lives in central London, but the interview, organised 
through the snowballing method, was conducted in a hotel lobby as he did not want me to 
go to his flat. Though he has access to satellite and thus a diversity of channels, Faras 
said he did not like the emotional reporting and what he called the lack of objectivity in
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Arabic satellite reporting. He was also critical of mainstream news media, such as the 
BBC, but said he liked to read the Guardian and Independent newspapers because he 
liked their correspondent’s work, particularly Robert Fisk’s. Faras was conscious of what 
he was saying most of the time, and it was difficult to assess whether what he was saying 
was because he felt a sense of duty as a Palestinian to say he felt Palestinian. At the same 
time, it was difficult to assess how he really felt about being Palestinian in Britain as he 
was clearly worried about his work status. However, Faras began to feel more relaxed as 
the interview wore on, yet his talk of identity remained ambivalent and confused. 
However, his comments were a good example of how talk of identity is related to 
mediated experiences. “Until I left Jordan, I never thought about Palestine. Nobody asked 
me about this, but when I came here people (after watching the news) ask me about it and 
I feel that for us living here, I need to make a statement because I need to feel I belong, I 
cannot just forget about it. I am becoming more conscious of my identity whereas in 
Jordan everyone knows my father and there is no need to assert myself.” (London,
March 6, 2003)
Siham: Siham was bom in Jerusalem in 1948. She left Palestine and went to Syria along 
with her parents after the war, then came to Britain in 1964 with her parents because of 
her father’s work. She then went back to Syria to get married, but after having her 
children, her husband divorced her, and she came back to Britain in 1990.1 met Siham in 
a restaurant in the early stages of the research -  she was not keen to meet at her home - 
and at a time of intense turmoil particularly as it was two months after September 11. 
Though I used a tape recorder, I had to rely on my notes as it was difficult to transcribe
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the interview because of the noise interference in the restaurant. Siham is a heavy news 
user and has access to a variety of news media. She, however, prefers newspapers 
because she enjoys reading the editorials. (London, November 29,2001).
Salem: 82-year old Christian Palestinian living in Hertfordshire in Britain. Salem came 
to the UK in 1959 to work with the UN as director of statistics. He is married to an 
English lady, who speaks Arabic and they have two grown up children who live in 
Scotland. Salem is a good example of an economic diasporan as he came to the UK for 
work. Salem said he followed the news regularly. Though he has no access to satellite 
television, his children fax him copies of diverse news accounts they downloaded via the 
Internet. The interview with Salem -  he actually called me and said he was interested in 
being interviewed -  was the longest and least productive of the interviews I conducted. It 
lasted about five hours (we had lunch and tea as well) and it was obvious that Salem’s 
mind was wondering as he spent a lot of time telling me about his work and 
achievements. (Hertfordshire, May 3, 2002)
Daoud: 55-year-old Moslem middle-class Palestinian. He lives in southwest London. 
Daoud did not want me to meet him at home, citing work commitments and lack of time, 
so we agreed to meet in a cafe in west London. Daoud also did not want me to use the 
tape recorder, and I agreed to take notes. He is married with two children, whom he said 
are not interested in news or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the moment, but they still 
ask him for stories about his life growing up in Palestine, which he left with his family as 
refugees and they went to Jordan. Daoud keeps up with what is going on by meeting
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friends and discussing news with them. He said he had no time to watch television or 
read the papers as his work in a restaurant in London takes up all his time. The interview 
was conducted in Arabic. (London, December 16, 2001).
6.5 Group Interviews:
Group interview with five asylum seekers in London: Samir, Ali, Husam, Raed and 
Wael. These young men are all between 28-30 years old. Ali was bom in 1974 in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, to Palestinian parents who migrated from Palestine. He came to Britain in
2000 as an asylum seeker. Samir also bom in 1974 in Jabaliya refugee camp in Gaza. He 
completed his studies for medicine in Russia and came to Britain as an asylum seeker in
2001 following the start of the second intifada. Husam was bom in 1973 in Gaza. He 
came to the UK as an asylum seeker in 1999 because of financial circumstances. He 
works as a decorator in London. Raed was bom in 1973, also in Gaza, but came to the 
UK in August 2001 as an asylum seeker. Wael was bom in 1975 in Gaza and came to 
Britain in 2001 as an asylum seeker. He hopes to continue his medical studies in Britain. 
Samir, Ali, Raed and Wael are waiting to hear about their asylum status and cannot leave 
the country in the meantime. All but Husam have access to different media, including 
Arabic satellite channels. Husam said he preferred to get his news from his friends and 
from the Internet. All are heavy news users, which is not surprising judging from their 
situation as asylum seekers and also from the fact that they are recent arrivals in the UK.
I arranged this interview through the snowballing method, though it was Samir who 
made the first contact upon hearing from friends that I was conducting the research. All
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five group members were very interested in the research’s topic and all were confident 
that I was not going to mention their real names. The interview, which lasted for three 
hours, was held in a pub in central London as the five did not feel comfortable being 
interviewed in their homes. The interaction between the group members suggested this 
was more like a peer discussion as all group members were known to each other. The fact 
that we were discussing sensitive issues pertaining to the informants made for heated and 
interesting debates. All the informants understood and could speak in English, but they 
preferred to converse in Arabic, though they did use some English words every now and 
then. The group’s members’ personal experiences, as asylum seekers, influenced the 
ways in which they talked about themselves and the community as their sense of 
exclusion was palpable. (London, February 1,2002)
Group interview in Manchester: This group consisted of Mahmoud (35), wife Suha 
(32) and children Lama (12), Ali (10) and Deema (5); their friend Omar (36), his cousin 
Bassam (33), friend Ibrahim (55) and son Mohammed (25). All participants said they 
were low to middle-class Moslem Palestinians. This interview was arranged by Bassam, 
who contacted me upon receipt of my letter detailing my research plans. The interview 
took place in an Arabic restaurant in a suburb of Manchester as none of the informants 
wanted to invite me to their homes since I was a complete stranger to all of them. Once 
we met and exchanged formalities and greetings, the group relaxed, and the conversation 
provided me with some of the richest material for the research.
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Mahmoud was bom in Gaza. He left his hometown 19 years ago to pursue his medical 
qualifications in Ireland, then came to Britain in 1994 with his wife Suha, who was bom 
in Qatar. Suha teaches Arabic at her children’s local school. Omar is also a doctor but is 
not allowed to practice as the British medical establishment would not recognise his 
medical qualifications obtained in the former Soviet Union. Omar said he came to Britain 
from Kuwait following the 1991 Gulf War because it was the only country that would 
give him a visa -  many Palestinians in Kuwait had only travel documents. He works as a 
delivery man. Bassam was bom in Kuwait. He came to Britain in 1990 with his family, 
but could not return to Kuwait because of the repercussions of the Gulf War. He works as 
a builder in Manchester. Ibrahim was bom in 1947 in the former Palestine. He left with 
his parents as refugees following the 1948 war, ending in one of Amman’s refugee 
camps. Ibrahim then went to Kuwait to work as an English language teacher. He came to 
Britain in the 1990s ostensibly to obtain a Masters degree, but in reality to escape Kuwait 
whose government was hostile to Palestinians because of their support for Iraq during the 
invasion of Kuwait. His son Mohammed works at a computer firm in Manchester. 
Ibrahim’s wife and daughters did not attend the interview. He said his wife was not well 
enough to attend and his two daughters stayed at home to look after her. However, it was 
clear that he did not want them to come because I was not known to them. Ali was bom 
in Libya in 1967 to Palestinian refugees and came to Britain in 1990 for work purposes. 
Of the group, Ali has yet to acquire a British passport, classifying himself as an asylum 
seeker. He now works in a restaurant and as an occasional taxi driver.
All the group members, apart from the children, were very keen to talk about 
themselves and their community. Suha was given as much time to express herself and the
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husband and wife interaction, her intellectual capabilities and her comfort in answering 
the questions suggested that allowing her to give her opinion was not only performed for 
my benefit. The interactions among the members of this group were interesting as though 
they are very close and tend to socialise together, they had differences in their expressed 
attitudes. For example, Ibrahim, the oldest, admonished his son for what he said his 
reluctance to socialise with his British co-workers, saying that he needed to do so because 
he lived in their country. At the end of the interview, which was conducted in Arabic and 
lasted three hours, I was invited to join them and about 20 other Palestinian friends for a 
meal at the restaurant, giving me the opportunity to interact with other women and 
children and listen to their talk though I did not record these conversations. (Manchester, 
March 5, 2002)
Group Interview in West London home with four well-to-do Moslem women in 
London comprising Lama, Ilham, Fadwa and Mona: This interview was arranged 
through the snowballing method and Lama invited me for afternoon tea at her house to 
meet her friends. None of the women’s husbands or children was present. Ilham was bom 
in Nablus in 1950. She came to Britain in 1979 after her marriage to a Pakistani national. 
She has two grown up children and is involved in human rights organizations. Lama is of 
the same age, though she was bom in Amman to Palestinian parents who fled Jaffa in the 
former Palestine in 1948. She went to Saudi Arabia with her husband after she got 
married and then came to the UK in 1990 just before the Gulf War. She has two grown­
up children. Fadwa was also bom in Nablus in 1950. She came to Britain with her 
husband in 1972 as they could not work in Nablus following the 1967 war. She has three
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grown up children. Mona was bom in Damascus in 1949, where she stayed until she got 
married when she moved to Jordan, where her children were bom. Mona and her family 
came to Britain in 1978 because of her husband’s work. None of the four women works, 
but they all said they are beginning to be involved in charity work to raise funds for the 
Palestinians in the homeland. Lama and Mona said they take part in protests against 
Israeli policies, something they would not do in the homeland and which reflects their 
security and confidence about their status in Britain. The interview was conducted in 
Arabic and lasted three hours. (London, April 10, 2002).
6.6 Analysing qualitative data: Coding and Theme Development
The core methodological tool used in this study was in-depth interviewing of individuals, 
households and groups, of the same age group or of the same socio-economic and socio­
religious background. After getting acquainted with the informants -  the interviews 
always started with lengthy personal introductions by the informants and by me - 1 
conducted semi-structured interviews that focused on their decodings and their attitudes 
to news, particularly to news of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This ongoing 
story provided an excellent context within which to explore the attitudes the informants 
had to the different ways the event was narrated by diverse news media because it 
allowed the respondents to develop their own narrative, particularly in relation to relevant 
topics, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and other related events.
As noted in the previous chapter, the approach I followed was to get involved in the 
data, almost to the degree of immersion, before starting to code the information
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thematically. Coding means assigning labels or tags to the inquiry, based on one’s own 
concepts and condensing the data into analysable units (Coffey and Atkinson 1996), 
similar to the procedure advanced by the proponents of grounded theory. The analysis 
started early -  mine started during the fieldwork- because this procedure allowed for 
constant comparisons between new data and existing ones. I stopped acquiring new data, 
meaning I stopped the interview process, when I found that the new data was repeating 
the old ones, this is often referred to as saturation point in qualitative research.
The coding was informed by the theoretical framework, which influenced the 
methodology, a synthesis of theory and empirical material which suited the open and 
exploratory nature of the research questions. The themes I developed were a result of a 
synthesis of a top-down (theoretical) and bottom-up (empirical) approach, or the 
combination of an inductive and deductive approach. The fact that some of the interviews 
were carried out in Arabic meant that it was not possible to use the support of computer 
packages for the analysis of qualitative data (such as Nud*ist and Atlas-Ti) as these do 
not recognise Arabic script and even though I translated the interviews, the sequencing of 
the answers to the questions posed did not entirely match the interview sequencing 
carried out in English.
The procedure I followed for coding was a simple but tedious one as I had to deal with 
a large amount of paper and different coloured highlighters. The coding framework for 
the analysis of the interviews used standard identification variables including the method 
of the research (interview, household or group interviews) and while taking into account 
the gender, age, occupation and religion of the informants concerned.
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The thematic categories I developed can be broadly identified as themes of attitudes 
towards news, attitudes towards mainstream news media, attitudes towards transnational 
news media, themes of awareness of construction of news and ignorance of construction 
of news, critical readings of news content, ideological (dominant) readings of news, 
themes related to commuting to personal experiences; themes related to references to 
identity, references to community, references to belonging and themes related to attitude 
to host country and reference to empowerment. In the following two chapters, I turn to 
the specific themes that emerged in the interviews while trying to give voice to the 
informants.
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Chapter Seven 
News, Ritual and Mediation
The news media have been broadly understood as a precondition for the political, 
economic and cultural participation of individuals at the local, national and transnational 
or global levels. Thus, the impact of news on its audience has often been measured in 
terms of the extent to which it interests people in politics and/or helps them make 
decisions as ‘informed’ (my emphasis) and reasoning citizens.
Drawing on semi-structured interviews with the informants, this chapter reflects how 
they do not engage with news for its informational values alone — indeed, the news 
narratives they engage with are often already known to them through other 
communicative means and channels including, among others, mobile phones and new 
communication technologies as well as face-to-face communication. Paradoxically, the 
interview material shows that the informants place news in their daily lives, therefore 
suggesting we need to pay particular attention to the social uses of news to address its 
relevance and meanings in people’s lives.
This chapter will show that the centrality of the news genre to the informants is 
crucially related to its social uses, which take two interrelated forms; the first to organise 
everyday life and societal interactions; and the second to frame the personal and the 
political, providing a point or points of reference for the informants to interpret and/or 
make sense of everyday events and for managing anxieties, discussed in the following 
chapter, as well as for social action and interaction. In detailing these uses, I pay 
particular attention to what the informants do with news, how they react to it and what
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news means for their social action and interaction, in the process highlighting the tensions 
that come to the fore in their preferred and oppositional readings of news.
In focusing on the uses of news, I draw on the ritual or mediational approach to media 
(Carey 1989; Silverstone 1994; Rothenbuhler 1998) to support the theoretical direction 
proposed in this thesis suggesting that news can be addressed as cultural discourse which 
serves to link people in their intimate spaces in ritualistic and symbolic ways to the wider 
public spaces they inhabit while drawing attention to matters of concern. I start by 
drawing on the interview material to show the different ways in which the informants 
engage with news while highlighting the centrality of news and its social uses. I then 
outline the diverse news media the informants engage with and what they do with the 
different narrations before exploring how and whether their engagement with news media 
enables them to take part in societal dialogues and/or to challenge different news frames 
and representations, actions that suggest that people, too, take part in the overall 
mediation processes either by legitimising the ‘meanings’ and/or ‘frames’ in news or by 
challenging these frames.
7.1 Centrality of News -  Instrumental Uses
In most of the interviews conducted for this research, news was singled out as the genre 
that calls for particular and extra attention by individuals and by the household as a unit. 
News, whether in print, on the radio or television has occupied centre stage in Palestinian 
and Arab societies in general and has often been called the most popular drama in these 
spaces. Of the different news media available to the informants, television was reported
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to be the most popular and most heavily used. The Internet came second and print, in its 
various forms, last1.
When referring to television, the informants’ accounts showed that their engagement 
with television news usually takes place within specific social settings — television news 
viewing is reported as a family affair2, involving more than one member of the 
household. Informants said engaging with news is more often than not lively and active, 
often interspersed with comments from family members about the news account or about 
characters in the narrative,3 emotive responses to its content and form, and discussions 
about its implications to the family’s well being, to the larger society as a whole and to 
international relations and politics.
What was interesting, however, was that the informants’ accounts of their news 
engagement practices suggested that the personal and the political were inseparable. 
Everyone (those interviewed for this research who was considered or self-considered as a 
member of the Palestinian diasporic community in Britain) was expected to engage with 
news, underlining how this activity was perceived as a national or political duty. This 
came across clearly in statements such as: “Did you see what has happened in Gaza?” or 
“What do you think about today’s news?” and so on.
11 did not carry out a quantitative analysis or survey to analyse which medium the informants engage with 
most, but deduced the trends and the relevance of television news from the interview material.
2 This comment must be qualified as the increase in the number of television sets in the home means that 
members of the family may be viewing different programmes at the same time. That said, however, the 
informants suggested that The focus on news is not surprising given the open-ended nature of the narrative 
of and related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict — the second intifada (uprising) that erupted in September 
2000, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US and the 2003 Iraq war and its aftermath — and the 
resulting uncertainty surrounding Palestinians’ lives, including those outside their homes, in times of crises, 
members of the household tend to view news together.
3 Although the methodology used for this research was semi-structured interviews, there were times when I 
was able to witness this process of active viewing during the fieldwork, particularly when visiting 
households where the television was mostly turned on.
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Furthermore, the respondents’ talk about news often refereed to reports or incidents 
that people were presumed to have seen on television news broadcasts, listened to on the 
radio or read in the newspapers. In fact, in many of the interviews I conducted, the 
informants would switch roles with me, posing as interviewers and asking me to 
comment on a news report they had engaged with on television the day before or on that 
same day, reflecting how they assumed that I, also a Palestinian, must have engaged with 
that same narrative. The implications of these patterns of consumption for questions of 
belonging, for being part of ‘us’, and for boundary-mapping, are assessed in the 
following chapter, but what is relevant to note here is that engagement with news is 
inscribed as a key activity in the informants’ everyday lives. This comes across in the 
following excerpt during the interview with the Muhsen household interview in London:
Widad: Osama (my son) and I sit every morning drinking coffee and I ask him what 
he thinks of what had happened yesterday and so on.
Judith (daughter): We talk about it and get upset.
Widad: I have a sister in Palestine and I call her day after day and I speak to other 
members of the family in Lebanon to discuss what is going.
Judith: To tell you the truth, there is a lot happening and going on. There is a lot to 
talk and argue about.
The centrality of news in the respondents’ everyday lives and social interactions 
manifested itself in different ways. Most of those interviewed for this study said they 
engage with news stories on a daily basis, while many said they turn to news programmes 
(news bulletins and current affairs programmes) more than once a day. In several 
households I visited to conduct the interviews, the television was on all the time, either 
switched on to al-Jazeera, the news and current affairs satellite broadcasting station
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based in Qatar, to CNN or BBC 24.4 The Farah household is typical of this state of 
affairs. Here, Leila, a retired secretary in her early 60s, and her 90-year-old mother 
constantly switch from one channel to another, highlighting the centrality of news in their 
daily lives. The family has no access to satellite television5 and hence does not receive 
Arabic satellite television. Instead, they watch CNN, Sky News and BBC News 24 on a 
continuous basis. Leila’s brother, who lives with his family nearby, has access to satellite 
television and calls his family everyday to tell his sister and mother what has been 
reported on these channels. In addition, Leila daily buys the London-published Arabic 
daily al-Quds for her mother to read:
You will be surprised by how important news is to us. We have news on all the time. 
My mother reads al-Quds everyday. We have Dubai, the only Arabic channel we can 
access here, but we watch CNN and BBC 24 all the time.
7.2 News as Ritual
Most respondents described in detail their news consumption practices: how this usually 
started early in the day, what they were doing and how this activity shaped their social 
agenda for the rest of the day. In this respect, engaging with news was often reported as 
the first activity or ritual (my emphasis) that individuals or the family as a unit partake in. 
In the Mansour household, this ‘ritual’ comes into stark relief in the family members’ 
accounts of their daily routines. For example, husband and wife Ali’s and Nuha’s daily
4 The nature of the methodology did not allow me to ascertain how many television news channels the 
respondents have access to, but the interview guide meant that informants needed to provide information 
about the different media they use during the interviews.
5 The Farahs said that building regulations in their apartment block prohibited them from installing a 
satellite dish on their balcony.
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schedule begins in the morning when they turn on BBC Radio Four to listen to the Today 
programme. They also read the paper and turn on the television to see what is going on. 
The news channels they watch regularly include BBC 24, CNN and al-Jazeera, which 
Nuha likes more than her husband, a retired businessman who remains active in Arab 
associations in London and is a member of CAABU6. They have one daughter Nada, 19, 
who attends university in London, and who by her own admission does not engage with 
news first-hand, but yet is also engaged with news in proxy through her parents’ 
discussions of news. Nuha, also an active member in several Arab associations in Britain, 
describes here their daily schedule as revolving around different news media:
In the morning, at breakfast, Ali and I read the Arabic papers, like al-Quds and al- 
Hayat. We do not buy Ash-Sharq al-Awsat because it is sponsored by Saudi Arabia. 
Sometimes al-Hayat is not so good (about the Palestinians). But al-Quds we read 
everyday. Ali also reads the Financial Times, the Guardian and the Independent. I 
also watch all Arabic channels, everything.. .and the English (BBC) channels. I view 
them all. And, of course, I watch the news on al-Jazeera [...] I also have Syrian and 
Egyptian television channels, which I watch sometimes. There is nothing wrong with 
them, but when it comes to news, it (is) clear that they are government mouthpieces 
(sic), so I like al-Jazeera.
Such comments, and similar ones made by other respondents, confirm that engagement 
with news is not related to its informational values, but rather to its place as ritual in their 
everyday lives. This further emerges in the following comment by Jamil, a retired 
Christian businessman, who has access to hundreds of terrestrial and satellite channels, of 
which 15 are in Arabic:
I have all these channels for me and my wife, who wants to access the French 
language ones. Of course, I have no time in the day to see all of them, but I spend 45 
minutes of the morning switching channels to see what is happening in Palestine and
6 The London-based Council for Advancement of Arab British Understanding.
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also in the world as anything in the world impacts ‘our’ area. Recently, I have begun 
to watch ANN (Arab News Network) as it gives more analysis. I receive al-Quds 
every day, but I also read the Guardian, the Economist and Newsweek on a regular 
basis. Then there is the e-mail and websites, which I use to access the Israeli press, 
like Ha 'aretz — we need to know what they are saying — and other papers in the 
Arab world. I do not watch the BBC anymore unless they have some programme 
about Islam or Palestine. And, if I am not at home for these, I sometimes record them.
Other informants tell similar stories, though the patterns of engagement with news differ 
as these are dictated by various duties and routines, by work schedules and variations in 
their lifestyles. Maha, a mother of a two-year-old boy and a six-month old baby, says her 
news viewing patterns changed since having the children. Rather than starting this ritual 
in the morning, her consumption of news is her last activity before going to bed. During 
the day, Maha keeps the television turned to al-Jazeera or the Lebanese Hezbollah- 
backed channel al-Manar “so the kids can get to know Arabic” and “so I do not miss out 
on anything” in between attending to her children. She has no time to read the papers or 
use the Internet, but keeps informed of developments in the Palestinian territories by her 
husband, who daily scans the different news websites, both in Arabic and English, to find 
out what is going on. Depending on her time, she either switches on the radio to listen to 
Spectrum, an Arabic radio station, or to Newsnight on BBC Two because of its analytical 
content:
Newsnight is very important for me. I like (the presenter Jeremy) Paxman a lot. 
He is aggressive, but he brings different viewpoints. BBC 2 4 1 like, too, because 
they have news on all the time and sometimes I turn to it [...]. I feel I have more 
opportunities to engage with news because there are a lot of news programmes 
and different forms of information, irrespective of whether I agree or disagree 
with their viewpoint. Panorama is good, for instance, because it gives me 
different angles on the news.
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Across the board, respondents talked of how news was a background in their daily 
routines and schedules — some talked of how they listen to news bulletins on the radio 
while having breakfast or watched television news while having lunch or dinner. This 
confirms findings in similar studies that have shown that the use of media is not always 
carried out in isolation. For example, some informants said they listened to or watched 
news and current affairs programmes throughout the day, though this was dependent on 
the workload and other activities, attesting to the centrality and urgency of engaging with 
news as ritual that punctuates their activities. This is clear in the excerpt from the 
interview with the Muhsen household:
Bilal: It depends on whether we have time.
Khaled: And the timing.
Sami: Well for me, I use the Internet.
Widad: I watch the news on al-Jazeera and al-Manar.
Judith: Yeah.. .all day if we can.
Bilal: It also depends on who is at home really.
Widad: I like al-Jazeera because it (sic) is all news.
Interestingly, the key differences in respondents’ accounts of their daily news 
engagement routine were mostly related to the medium of news consumption rather than 
the action of engaging with news itself. For instance, some of the informants said they 
turn to the Internet to follow the news when they have no time to watch television news 
to keep informed and be aware of the diverse representations in the media. This is an 
excerpt from a group interview with a group of asylum seekers in London. All members 
were males in their late 20s:
Samir: Well, we use the Internet a lot.
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Ibrahim: yeah, the Internet. It is very important in our lives because we can also read 
the different papers there. Besides, it is free access.
Many informants attributed their engagement with news to their need to ‘keep up with 
reality’, therefore clearly identifying news with reality. However, given the ubiquity of 
the news media in the informants’ lives and the extent to which they are embedded in 
their daily practices, their need to engage with news is also related to its function as a 
regulator of their daily activities, pointing to the ways in which engagement with news 
punctuates daily life and the ways in which news provides its audiences with an almost 
paradoxical reassurance through ritual.
Silverstone (1994) has described this ritual as momentary suspensions of the 
ordinariness of everyday life, thus marking a special space and time. Like Carey (1989), 
he has stressed that even though rituals suspend the ordinary aspects of everyday life, 
rituals are about this ordinariness. Therefore, rituals are not detached from everyday life, 
but are a continuing reflection of one’s place and position in it. Jensen (1995) describes 
this momentary suspension as “time-out [...] a separate social practice.. .[that] places 
reality on an explicit agenda as an object of reflexivity, and provides an occasion for 
contemplating oneself in a social, existential, or religious perspective” (1995:57). Crucial 
to Silverstone’s and Jensen’s discussions about the ritual role of mass media is that rituals 
and time-outs depend on establishing an attentive relationship between the text and the 
reader, which suggests that “the essential feature of rituals (unlike formal ideology) is 
that they are available to personal appropriation” (Couldry 2003:53).
Across the board, the informants’ appropriation of news as ritual comes across as a 
form of ritualised action that is intentional, performed, created, recreated and charged
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with a particular social meaning for the particular social group, or as Rothenbuhler (1998: 
64) says: “Ritual becomes a communication device for uniting the ideal and the material, 
the general and the particular, the cosmic and the ordinary, the past and the future, the 
structures of history and the happenings of individual lives.” Crucially, this appropriation 
relates to the informants’ social uses of news, which I elaborate on next.
7.3 Social Uses of News
The interview material reflects how the respondents’ engagement with news, particularly 
television news, with family members and friends symbolically integrates each member 
into the family as a social unit, re-confirming each member’s place and position in it. 
These findings correspond with Lull’s (1980) comprehensive framework on the family 
uses of television in which he identified these uses as ‘structural’, which refer to the ways 
in which television news serves to regulate, structure and accompany other activities, and 
as ‘relational’, which designate television as a medium of exchange for interaction within 
the households.7
Morley (1992), too, has emphasised the domestic nature of television, suggesting that 
viewing is still largely conducted within, rather than outside, social relations (except in 
the case of those who live on their own). The premise here is that viewing performed 
collectively by the family/household, rather than the individual, raises important 
questions about relations of power, particularly in addressing who makes the decisions 
about watching and how these decisions are taken, and so on (cf. Morley 1992).
7 In his framework, each category had a number of subcategories. For example, under structural uses, he 
distinguished between environmental and regulative uses (Lull 1980).
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In my sample, it was clear that the social uses of news served to integrate members of 
the family into the unit and to re-confirm each member’s place and position in it. This 
was reflected in the ways in which parents reiterated how they always encouraged their 
children to partake in the family viewing of news.
What was interesting, however, was that for most of the informants, engagement with 
news did not appear to a gendered8 activity — both men and women engage with news 
ritualistically and discuss the narratives with family members and friends. This may be 
partly explained by the fact that the interviews were conducted during a period of 
heightened political and national anxiety. However, there are more compelling reasons to 
explain this — the analysis of the interviews shows that most of the women interviewed 
are motivated to engage with news because it enables them to take part in conversations 
about its meanings or to show they are news competent, thus playing an important part in 
their socialisation processes.
That said, gender and generational differences were more noticeable among working 
class families when compared to middle and upper middle class families. In the former 
groups, women normally turn to the head of the household for interpretations of news, 
reflecting embedded social and cultural norms. Maha, for example, always asks her 
husband for his analysis of the news because he is “better (sic) at analysing news. He 
really knows what is going on and is always right in his predictions.. .Look, he even said 
Iraq was the next target.” These patterns confirm other findings on gendered media 
consumption (see Morley 1986), while underlining the relational uses of television (cf.
8 Though I tried to vary the sample in terms of age groups, it was difficult to interview children in their 
early teens, either because they were not available at the time as they were at school or because they were 
not considered to be mature enough by their parents to take part in the interviews.
226
Lull 1980), particularly as an occasion to demonstrate competence or dominance in 
relation to other members of the household, either through knowledge or argument.
This understanding comes across in different guises in the various interviews. In the 
Said household, for example, Hussein, the father has the role of interpreter and 
commentator on the news. He decides which channels to watch and how often, and 
operates the remote control and usually switches between channels to access the different 
‘versions’, in his words, of the news report. Hussein also chooses in which language 
news is watched, and comments on the news programmes to his family. This pattern was 
also reported as being the norm in other households.
However, the analysis of the interview material also reflects that traditional power 
relations in families are increasingly being challenged (by women and children), though 
not severely contested. For instance, in the same household mentioned above, Hussein’s 
wife Amani openly complains about his constant habit of switching channels, saying she 
worries about the effect of this activity on her children as the ways her children are 
subjected from a very early age to images of blood and violence, particularly those shown 
on Arabic satellite channels. Her nine-year-old son Qusai, too, says he is fed up with 
news and prefers to watch cartoons in English.9 This is how she puts this concern:
My husband wants to tell them they are Palestinian. He wants to show them that 
children like themselves are killed because they are Palestinian, but I am worried 
about this. There is so much blood and violence. They are scared, scared. Qusai has 
now vowed he will never go to Palestine, and that he will never go on a plane10
9 As would be expected, the interview material with other families and children confirmed that news and 
current affairs programmes are not popular with children.
10 This is a reference to the September 11 events.
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In many households I visited for the interviews, the television set, which often 
occupies a prime position in the household was often switched on to a news programme 
— BBC News 24, CNN or an Arabic satellite channel. Often, informants would interrupt 
the interview during the news bulletins or when they saw a news flash across the screen 
to find out what was going on. Children who happened to be at home at the time were 
asked to sit still and partake in the experience, reflecting how the notion of ritualised use 
of news is also about getting to know one’s place in society. This was confirmed in 
statements such as 'we need them to know what is happening in our homeland’, to 
understand the ‘ suffering o f our Palestinian brothers and sister \  thus underlining that 
becoming ‘news competent’ is seen as a crucial marker for belonging and for becoming 
Palestinian (cf. Gillespie 1995) that some parents believe their children must be aware of 
at a young age.
What was interesting, though, was that those who said they did not follow news 
regularly, such as 19-year-old Ruba in the Mansour household, were still well informed 
on current affairs and news, particularly news related to the collective or the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict suggesting the continued relevance of informational networks and 
interpersonal communications -  the constant talk about news in households and among 
friends, an age-old cultural practice that is an embedded feature of Palestinian and Arab 
societies.
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7.4 Obsession or Detachment? The Paradox of News’ Uses
The analysis of the interview material showed that the pattern and intensity of interacting 
with news changes according to what is going on and the severity and urgency of events, 
thus dictating to some extent the ways in which news was put to social use and drawing 
attention to the relevance of the political and historical context in the analysis. Many 
respondents said their investment in news intensified since the second Palestinian intifada 
(uprising), reflecting how the urgency and immediacy of this event influenced their news 
engagement patterns and experiences. This emerges in the following comment by Sasha, 
a 24-year-old Palestinian in London:
When we first came here, we didn’t know much about what was going on.. .but we
began to be really involved (with news) with the second intifada.
Such remarks were repeated by others. This is an exchange between Husam, an asylum 
seeker, and his friend Raed in the group interview in London:
Husam: It was not the same before the intifada. But this event influenced my life a lot 
as my life became the news (my emphasis) and the other way round. Even my 
daughter, who is three and wants to watch the cartoons, I bribe with a chocolate to be 
quiet. Now she says my father only watches news, so that the word news has become 
part of her dictionary although she does not understand what it means.
Raed: Yeah. After the intifada, I installed a satellite (dish) because I needed to see all 
news broadcasts.. .Now I have Arabic and American and English news and 
programmes, also Polish and Russian11 ones.
11 Raed studied for his first degree in Russia, as has Husam.
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Across the board, there was a sense that this event and subsequent ‘unplanned’ media 
events (cf. Dayan and Katz 1992; Srebreny 2002), such as the September 11,2001 
attacks in the US and the war in Iraq, had turned into obtrusive dimensions of the 
respondents’ daily news agenda. The following extract from the group interview with 
family members and their friends in Manchester illustrates this:
Mahmoud: On a daily basis, I see my friend Mohammed and ask him how are you 
and have you heard the news. There was an operation in Jerusalem the other day and I 
called someone immediately on the mobile because I was in the car. I asked him to 
see what al-Jazeera was reporting. My first question to my friends is ‘how are you?’ 
and the next is about news. It is because we are part of the Palestinian community.
This comment suggests that engaging with news is considered to be an activity that 
every Palestinian or every member of the Palestinian community must partake in.
Furthermore, in talking about news, many respondents said their engagement with 
news was like an addiction or obsession, emphasising that they felt something was 
missing if they did not interact with news programmes at least once a day. The notion of 
addiction suggests an intermittent, but consistent form of engagement with news. “I f  I  do 
not listen to the news or see what is going in the world, Ifeel there is something missing, 
particularly what is happening in our homeland ” was a comment repeated again and 
again. Another was: “I f  I  do not engage with news, then I  feel cut offfrom the others, the 
rest o f the world” (my emphasis). This is how Raed (one of the asylum seekers in the 
London group interview) puts it:
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Raed: I have been here for 10 months and in that time I have become addicted to 
news. When I came here, I found that I needed to watch the news every hour of the 
day, just like back home, so I use the Internet to access different news websites. First 
I go to al-Jazeera’s website, then to BBC Arabic, then BBC 24, then CNN. This is 
my routine.
Others said the television was turned on all the time12, while some told of how they 
would sit in front of their television sets for hours on end, following the news of and 
related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, minute by minute, while switching channels 
from one news station to the next. Um Ali, a widow in her 60s, describes her addiction to 
news:
I am obsessed with news. The television is on all the time. If there is something 
important on the news, then I turn up the volume. Otherwise, I turn it down while 
doing the housework. If I am out of the house, or if I have visitors, I record the news 
on al-Jazeera. I record everything. Even though things have happened, I still watch 
the news when I get back home. I do not go out of the house often. Do you believe 
this? I have to watch the news. I have a friend who is like me. She always follows the 
news and always calls me when something happens. Also, she would turn on al- 
Jazeera if I am watching another channel and then we compare news. Sometimes, she 
tells me there is a news alert and that I need to see it. I telephone my friends and 
children and tell them to turn on the television to watch this and that. I give them the 
news broadcast and tell them what they had missed. For instance, on September 11,1 
was returning home on the bus and then I saw all these people and thought why is this 
happening. When I arrived home, I turned on the radio. I had the television on as 
well, but was about to start my afternoon prayers. I was waiting for the muazzin to 
announce the call for prayers and then my daughter called from Washington to say 
‘mama, see what is happening.
Um Ali’s news consumption practices also dictate her daily routine, while her 
appropriation of this ritual is reflected in her participation in social activities because it 
provides her with a point of entry to engage in social talk, confirming the connection
12 This was true in some of the households I visited, particularly those of the lower income groups.
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between the ritual activity of engaging with news and its social uses -  here, news 
facilitates communication and provides an agenda for conversations.
Not surprisingly, the interview material showed that the informants were more 
interested in those news narratives they can relate to or run away with (Bird 2003). Time 
and again, respondents referred to the centrality in their lives of the news story related to 
the conflict with Israel, while the analysis of the interview material showed that the 
obsession with news intensified during ‘critical’ events such as the intifada because such 
events create a degree of uncertainty in the respondents’ lives13, again pointing to the 
paradoxical notion of reassurance provided by news mentioned above. That said, many 
respondents said all news was relevant. 'The news is connected' (my emphasis) was a 
recurring comment.
Paradoxically, a number of informants, including some of those who said they were 
addicted to news, also said that they could not watch the news any longer, a clear 
reference to visual (television) news. Omar, for instance, said: “There is a suicide 
bombing and you know.. .you just know what Israel is going to do next.. .what is the 
point? " of engaging with news, suggesting a sense of powerlessness and lack of control 
while pointing to the paradox between the informants’ actual news viewing practices and 
the emotional contexts of the mediation process. The following excerpt during a group 
interview with four women in London illustrates this:
Fadwa: I have got to the stage where I am not willing to watch the news any 
more. I get up with all the discussions and debates. I got to the stage where I 
really do not want to (watch) news anymore. I have come to the stage of despair, 
really. I prefer not to know what is going on because it makes me very miserable 
and depressed.
13 These points are expanded on in Chapter Eight.
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Mona: I am, too, fed up with watching news all over again.. .Sometimes, I prefer 
not to watch the news. The news from our country is so horrific and horrendous 
that we cannot endure to see what is going on any more. We have come to the 
point where there is so much despair that I don’t want to watch or hear 
anything... Really, I prefer not to because it causes me misery, misery. I cry my 
eyes out.
However, some of the younger adult informants (between 15 to 30 years old) said they do 
not engage with news because of a lack of trust in journalism and the media, reflecting a 
critical stance of news as form and content rather than of news as information, which 
make it crucial to investigate what people say and what they do with news, or, how they 
use news.
The critical stance of the informants is apparent in the following comment by Adeeb, a 
22-year-old university student, interviewed along with his friend Maher and Maher’s 
mother Ahlam at their home in London:
I do follow the news. But I have completely gone off at the moment. I find it 
honestly.. .just satirical (sic) and boring. They (the news media) are just going on and 
on about the same thing and it is really making you sick.. .1 watch all channels, al- 
Jazeera included, but honestly, the way I see it is that they (al-Jazeera) are doing 
exactly the same thing as the others. They are just trying to influence people.
Two crucial points need to be made in relation to these aspects of the informants’ news 
engagement practices, the first suggests that although the informants see themselves as 
part of a collective, they are a diverse news audience; and the second suggests that 
detaching oneself from news depends on both contextual knowledge and on the degree o f 
trust towards the journalists and the media.
Importantly, as the informants’ comments suggest, detachment or switching off can be 
understood as related to their awareness of the ideological framing of political events by
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diverse news media, including transnational Arabic television channels, which I turn to in 
the following section.
7.5 Which News Media?
The media landscape available to the Palestinians in Britain is one of the richest in the 
Palestinian diaspora, comprising a variety of print and broadcast channels with different 
orientations and claims on their audiences, thus providing a compelling and complex 
context for the audience’s interaction with news. Indeed, since the beginning of the 
Lebanese14 Civil War in 1976, London, in particular, has served as an unparalleled centre 
of Arabic-language media.
The Arabic print media, for example, includes a number of daily newspapers, printed 
in Arabic in London comprising, among other publications, al-Quds, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 
al-Hayat, all of which carry a great deal of news and commentary about events from 
Palestine and the Arab world. Al-Quds, in particular, addresses the dispersed Palestinian 
diaspora not as a diaspora15, but as members of a larger Palestinian nation (ash-Sha 'b al- 
Falastini). Although respondents commended its pro-Palestinian stance, few buy the 
paper on a daily basis, citing its cost and the lack of wide distribution, resorting, instead, 
to reading its editorials16 and news sections online.
14 Before that date Lebanon was the home for a variety of Arabic-language media, both official and 
oppositional.
15 See Chapter Four for a discussion about the ethical and political problems surrounding the use of the 
term diaspora to describe the Palestinians in Britain.
16 Many respondents mentioned the paper’s editor Abdul-Bari Atwan as being instrumental in promoting 
the paper’s pro-Palestinian stance and integrity.
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Apart from al-Quds, the print media available to the Palestinians and Arabs are highly
17institutionalised. This is reflected in the editorial stance of the mainstream Arab media, 
which often mirrors what their financiers want to be said. This is not an anomaly as Arab 
information media systems have always been closely tied to politics and have typically 
been monopolised by the various Arab regimes, which have controlled the Arab media 
systems either directly or indirectly through licensing, legal action and financial means.
The development of transnational Arabic satellite television, from and within the 
Middle East, began in the 1990s, a decade which started traumatically with the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and the deeply divisive 1991 Gulf war (Saqr 2000). The first entrants 
to the field were the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) and the state-owned 
Egyptian Space Channel (ESC), though the former differed from the latter in that it 
officially described itself as a privately-owned channel18.
Interest in Arab broadcasting was spurred by a desire to counter CNN’s domination at 
the time of Arab audiences because of its live coverage from Baghdad during the 1991 
Gulf War. But it was not until 1996, when the Qatar-based al-Jazeera began broadcasting 
to the Arab world and beyond that the changing media landscape began to have an impact 
on the Arabs in their homeland and in diaspora. Often dubbed the CNN of the Arab 
world, al-Jazeera19 has been widely credited with redefining Arab broadcasting. With its 
blend of programmes and its emphasis on giving air time to critical voices in the region, 
al-Jazeera has been hugely popular with Arab audiences long before it gained ‘world
17 The differentiation between mainstream and oppositional media, of which there are several, is 
intentional.
18 In reality, some start-up funds were provided by the Saudi ruling family via the brother-in-law of the 
Saudi ruler, King Fahd.
19 Al-Jazeera emerged as a 24-hour channel broadcasting in classical Arabic, the language understood by 
everyone in the Arab world as well as by diasporic Arabs. It was founded following the collapse of the 
partnership between the BBC TB Arabic service and the Saudi government over conflict views on content.
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fame’ following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US through its exclusive footage 
of video tapes of Osama bin Laden (Miladi 2003).
Most of the respondents in this research study said they have access to satellite 
television. The few who did not have access to satellite television said this was either out 
of choice, such as Reem, a 45-year-old Christian Palestinian in London who said she 
preferred mainstream (Western) media or because of building restrictions that prevent 
them from installing a satellite dish -  such is the case of the Farah household. Most 
respondents had access to a wide range of Arab transnational broadcasting stations, 
including al-Jazeera, Dubai, al-Manar, MBC, ANN20, whose programmes have changed
91the ways viewers receive news of their region in their own homes. As Saqr (2000,
2005) points out, these channels are popular because of their introduction of interactivity. 
Contrary to popular perceptions, al-Jazeera was not the first the use interactivity -  MBC 
had already set precedents on both counts, radically changing traditional newscasts which 
had relied on very long items dealing with news about leaders or short items dealing with 
regional and international developments. However, al-Jazeera’s key contribution to the 
regional and transnational media landscape was its staging of debates22 and current affairs 
programmes guaranteed to stir controversy. Programmes such as The Opposite Direction 
and More Than One View, for instance, have achieved high ratings because they open the 
floor for free debate about some of the most sensitive issues in the Arab world, including
20 Arab News network, devoted to news and current affairs, was set up in London in mid-1997 by a 
disaffected branch of Syria’s ruling family.
21 Although many Arab national channels are also broadcast on Arab satellite channels, these are not as 
popular as transnational television because their agenda is still seen as mirroring government agendas and 
earning them the nickname of ‘protocol news’ channels.
22 The presenters of these programmes invited guests with opposed views to confront each other over 
acrimonious inter-Arab disputes (see Saqr 2005).
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the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, gender equality and democracy both in the region and 
beyond.
7.6 Instrumental Uses of News
The interview material showed that the most popular programmes on Arabic satellite 
channels23 were news and current affairs programmes concerned with the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Respondents, in particular, mentioned al-Jazeera’s hour-long
“7  Aprogramme Under Siege , introduced to allow Palestinian callers to talk about their 
experiences of Israeli attacks on the West Bank towns and refugee camps in April 2002 
as well as al-Manar’s Palestine Resists, Palestine is Steadfast and They Remember 
(Yatathakaroun), a programme that allows ordinary Palestinians to tell their stories.
Many of the respondents’ accounts suggested they used these channels for instrumental 
purposes which come across in comments such as ‘ we need to find out about what we 
heard is going on at home ', or 'news, particularly satellite television’s, helps transport us 
there The references to space and its implied connection to the homeland are clear in the 
following exchange in a group interview in Manchester:
Omar: To be frank, the access to these satellite channels and their news programmes, 
whether cultural or otherwise, really relieve the tediousness of exile and they help us 
to be patient about staying here. Without them life would have been very difficult. 
These satellites have solved a big problem.
23 Many Moslem respondents said they also engaged with satellite channels that broadcast religious and 
traditional content, such as Iqraal-M ajd or al-Manar, which broadcast mostly Islamic religious 
programming such as interpretations of the Quran or the Hadith (Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and 
teachings).
24 This was later renamed as the al-Jazeera Pulpit, under the slogan the platform for those without a 
platform because as attention shifted to Iraq.
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Suha: For me, too, of course. They always make us feel we are close to the homeland. 
Also, they influence the home and our feelings, whether we are sad or happy, we are 
connected to these feelings and we feel that we have gone out of the inside (the 
homeland) without really meaning to.
As Jensen (1998) notes, the space dimension is both a mental and a socially constructed 
space, bounded by absolute, geographical distance, but also by an ‘experienced’ spatial 
and temporal distance from events, as noted in Suha’s comments above. Importantly, the 
dimension of space is also implicitly linked to a dimension of time, stretching far back 
into the past as well as into the future. This notion comes across in comments such as ‘the 
homeland we want to live i n which signals the respondents’ hopes for a future that has 
not yet been realised. In commenting on their channel preferences, al-Manar25, the 
Hezbollah-backed station broadcasting from south Lebanon, scored high on the list of 
transnational broadcasting channels that the respondents said was supportive of the 
Palestinians because, according to some of the informants, it consistently put the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict at the top of its news agenda. Some respondents, for example, 
noted that al-Manar would start a news broadcast with the statement: “This is the news at 
nine o’clock, according to the time in occupied Jerusalem.”
Many respondents also said they prefer Arabic satellite television channels during 
heightened political uncertainty, a preference that points to the respondents’ awareness 
that these television news programmes, through their choice of language and
25 The Lebanese Hezbollah group, backed by the governments of Syria and Iran, was founded to resist the 
Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1992. In 2000, Hezbollah applied for permission to broadcast by satellite 
to ‘spread resistance news’ across the Arab world and beyond. Al-Manar increased its daily satellite 
transmission following the Palestinian intifada in September 2000 from four to 18 hours. Far from adhering 
to neutrality and objectivity, al-Manar was seen as a weapon of psychological warfare against Israel.
238
representations, provide different foci for discussion than their Western counterparts. The 
following exchange in the Muhsen household illustrates this:
Khaled: In general, the problem with the (Western) media is the words they use. 
For instance, why do they have always to say ‘violence in the Occupied 
Territories’, making people think that people there are out on the street and not 
about the causes? At the end of the day, they dictate the terms of reporting in a 
way al-Jazeera, for instance, does not. One has to remember that having an 
alternative source of information is still very important.
Widad: Yeah, they (al-Jazeera) use the term freedom fighters when referring to 
the Palestinians.
Having said that, the interview material also reflected how the preferred medium for 
engagement with news is also dictated by the attachment, often greater among members 
of the older generation, to Arabic language media. Indeed, being proficient and 
conversant in a language (some of the informants are more fluent in Arabic than in 
English) often dictates which news media they engage with. However, that does not mean 
the older generation only engages with the Arabic language news story. Indeed, some of 
the older informants, who have been in Britain for more than two decades, said they felt 
equally comfortable with mainstream channels, often narrating their experiences with the 
BBC, in particular, with a sense of nostalgia.
7.7 The Critical News Audience
The aspects of the respondents’ news consumption practices reported above are just one 
part of their daily engagement processes. Indeed, the interview material shows that the
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informants are also highly critical of the news, in respect to both its form and style. Most 
of the criticism against the form (content) of reporting of, in particular, mainstream 
(Western) news suggested that the informants were aware of the framing in news. This is 
how Omar puts this across:
There is something about the media in this country. It is very, very worrying.
They are all really from an English point of view. If you were to watch on any 
given day, all, the BBC, ITV, Channel Four, Sky and Channel Five, you could 
almost guarantee that you will see the same, almost exactly the same. It is almost 
the pinnacle (sic) of propaganda because you ostensibly have this free, freedom of 
the press, but how it is how they are reporting the same news every night, exactly 
in the same order and exactly the same time. Obviously, the media are controlled 
by a few people. I would not say they are positively biased towards Israel. What I 
would say is that they probably on purpose leave out large sections of the news. 
They would tend to say five Palestinians were killed today.. .whereas, if they 
wanted to, they could show graphic pictures of those killed. Very, very powerful 
images that would be very damaging to Israel and they don’t show them. They 
definitely show the Israeli images, definitely.
Reem, a 45-year-old Christian Palestinian woman in London, comments on the same
issue:
It is brainwashing. People have no idea what is going on. They only know what 
they see.. .and being an Arab, I know more than what I see on TV, so I am not 
going to be affected by it. It does not take a genius to figure out that one side has 
the most powerful country backing it financially and with artillery and everything 
and then you have the other side, it doesn’t have anything. It is using stones. So, 
come on.
Such comments reflect criticism of the ideological and informational content of news 
which the informants clearly see as mis-representing what they perceive as reality. 
Crucially, as suggested in the comments, these criticisms also reflect how the informants
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essentialise themselves -  a key process in identity work which I discuss further in the 
following chapter. However, what is interesting about such criticism is that it not only 
reflects expectations that television news should be supportive of ‘our’ side and ‘our’ 
story, but also that the informants believe that the Western news media do have effects on 
the wider public through their ideological framing. Paradoxically, many informants said 
they constantly switched to British public service news programmes such as NewsnighX 
on BBC Two, citing its credibility and depth of analysis. This is how Mona puts this 
across:
I like Newsnight particularly when they (sic) have discussions about us and about 
Palestine. Two weeks ago, they had something about the US foreign policy and 
they had a lot of discussions about this. Someone came up from the ethnic 
minority here and she really lifted our heads. Of the satellites, I watch CNN 
because I want to find out what they are saying. I do not have a favourite. BBC 24 
of course is very important as they give you different viewpoints. The image is 
more important than the word. If the Israelis have been affected, then the news is 
first, but sometimes they do not even mention it.
At the same time, many respondents were critical of the ideological framing of Arabic 
transnational television channels, pointing to another paradox - although these media do 
provide them with a shared agenda for conversation and although they are aware of these 
media an oppositional public sphere for discussing different and shared concerns, the 
informants were also aware that these media also employed frames in the news as is 
illustrated in the exchange below in the Asfour household during an interview in London:
Adeeb: I find Arabic television serious propaganda. It is exactly what the Americans 
do. The same as CNN.
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Ahlam: No al-Jazeera and al-Manar are different.
Adeeb: Obviously, I don’t understand everything because my Arabic is limited. But 
honestly the way I see it is that they are doing the same thing, they are just trying to 
influence people.
These examples of ideological criticism contrast markedly with another type of criticism, 
which is aesthetic in nature and which is directed at the style or format of news. For 
example, some of the informants said that Arabic news was sensationalist (I pointed to 
this in the above sections when referring to paradoxical comments about news being no 
longer watchable which refer to format and style of news) and melodramatic -  
respondents were critical of the airing of bloody images of victims on both sides of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, particularly by Arabic satellite television.
Other informants criticised the style of news presentation, which they said was populist 
and audience grabbing -  though they said it was one of their favourite programmes, some 
respondents were critical of al-Jazeera’s popular show al-ittijah al-muakes (the Opposite 
Direction), saying it resembled a live shouting match between ideologically and 
politically opposed people.27 Furthermore, several informants mentioned that Arab 
satellite broadcasting channels, though billing themselves as independent channels that
26 The use of television as a sensational medium of communication has been evident in extensive and 
repeated images of bloody conflict. The video film about the Palestinian teenager Mohammed al-Durra shot 
dead in his father’s arms was sufficient to attract viewers’ attention and inflame anti-Israeli sentiment.
Other images of stone-throwing Palestinians facing heavily armed Israeli soldiers and tanks added a great 
deal of drama to the events in the West Bank and Gaza. Ayish (2001) says that the sensational component 
in Arab television news maybe to attract viewers’ attention to Israeli actions against civilians.
27 Arguing in public is not uncommon in the Arab world, but the informants’ sensibilities could be 
attributed to the awareness of living in a Western space.
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are free of government control28, operated as umala (government agents). This is how 
Nadwa explains this concern:
Al-Jazeera, I am afraid of. There is something inside me which tells me there is 
something behind it. See, for example, the political stance of Qatar, which 
supports it financially. People get carried away about this (the fact that it can say 
anything and allows different voices on air). At first, I used to watch it 
incessantly, but then I started to feel the programmes are made as a cover for 
something else.29
Some of the informants said that even al-Jazeera ’s introduction of a particular brand of 
interactivity which made people more aware of public debates within and outside the 
Arab world was not fully representative of its audience because officials from 
disapproving Arab government constantly refused to take part in the debates30.
What was interesting, however, was that it was only when they commented on Western 
news media that the respondents offered indications of what news is or ought to be, 
reflecting their awareness of the frames in the news news. In criticising the ideological 
content of news, the informants were consistently redefining and reinterpreting the 
narratives offered by journalists, suggesting that despite their insinuation that these
28 The exploration of Arab satellite broadcasting development and civil society and democracy in the Arab 
world is a topic of continuing interest and requires another thesis. However, as Rami Khouri, a prominent 
Jordanian columnist noted, the truth is that the face on the Arab screens has not changed, which means that 
the new Arab media are appendages to the ruling political and economic order in the region, not challenges 
to it. (Jordan Times, 27 November 2002).
29 Al-Jazeera's relationship with Qatar’s government has come under scrutiny, not only because it is funded 
by the government, but also because its Chairman Hamad bin Thamer al-Thani is a cousin of the country’s 
ruler. Many have pointed to the fact that al-Jazeera rarely discusses the emirate’s internal affairs, though 
some studies have pointed out that the station rarely covers the internal affairs of any Arab country.
30 Sakr (2005) notes that the interest in particular Western formats confirms that the trend towards 
interactivity seems to be a dominant theme in the evolution of Arab satellite channels, but also poses the 
questions about whose interests it serves. Though interactivity shows a more balanced relationship between 
producers and viewers, her study reveals the reluctance of most broadcasters to allow their audiences to be 
freely and fully represented anywhere in all their schedules, and least of all in newscasts and talk shows.
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media, through their ideological framing, have an effect on people, the overall effect 
societies is not direct (because they know what the reality is).
This reflects how they, as receivers of news, become participants in the mediation 
processes. Indeed, the interview material showed that the informants’ interpretations of 
news are far from random — the informants approached news with an awareness of its 
diverse frames and representations of social, cultural and political realities and the 
potential power of the mediation processes. What is clear is that their reinterpretation of 
the news agenda relates to the degree of their awareness of the construction and framing 
of news, and their media competence and literacy31, factors that are relevant to take 
account of in addressing the relationship between increasing mediated access or media 
literacy (Livingstone 2003) to political news and participation. This emerges in this 
exchange in a group interview in Manchester:
Suha: How the BBC and Channel Four tell the story is what people will follow. 
Hanan Ashrawi came many times and spoke to the BBC and she spoke well, but her 
words are forgotten and there is no trace of them in the minds of the West.
Ibrahim: Hanan is allowed on the BBC once a year, but the daily news is different. 
They bring Hanan and they bring Netanyahu and then they bring someone neutral. 
Mohammed: But it is how much time they allow each.
Ibrahim: (interrupts) No, they are not fair.
Suha: Maybe they all are given equal times, but at the end of the broadcast, the 
presenter throws a couple of words which are the important ones and these remain in 
the minds of the people. These words are always the most important. Whatever you 
say, they have one sentence which gives an impression and ideas to the viewers.
The most common critique of the construction of news came across in comments that the 
Western media are hostile to ‘us’ and do not show ‘our’ side of the story. In this respect,
31 I use media competence to refer to contextual knowledge, while media literacy broadly refers to the 
ability to interpret media texts (see Livingstone 2003).
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many informants criticised what they called the ‘bias’ in projecting images of certain 
events and what they perceived as implicit and explicit references to Palestinians as 
terrorists. These notions emerge in the following two comments, the first by Husam in a 
group interview in London, and the second by Omar in a separate interview:
The media is the problem. The (Western) news says that Arafat is part of a 
Palestinian mafia and that we (the Palestinians) are all members of this mafia. The 
effect is clear. Even if you are an Englishman and you engage with your news, 
you can realise that the American and European news is biased.
Now they are saying we (the Palestinians) are terrorists. What we see on 
television (the Arabic channels) actually opens the question of where terrorism is, 
with us or with them (sic). They are our enemies or, as they claim, we are their 
enemies, but they are harming us in a way that we are not harming them. If we 
talk exclusively about Palestine.. ..What has made the world feel with Israel or 
show sympathy to it? It’s because they always show that image. We don’t have 
that image. They (Western media) show that Arabs are always the problem. This 
is our problem. Our media is not the same as theirs. Our media has ignored certain 
things. The Europeans, the Americans and the Jews, the media there is stronger 
than ours. This is because they are with Israel. They always tell us the roots of the 
Arabs and also show things that may not apply to us or be within us.
Furthermore, many of the respondents criticised the language uses in news, objecting to 
the use of terms such as ‘Islamic terrorists’ or ‘Moslem fundamentalists’ when discussing 
the Middle East. Many respondents drew parallels with other conflicts, such as in 
Northern Ireland, where the violence had been spared religious tarring, reported as a 
conflict between ‘loyalists’ and ‘nationalists’.
Such criticism of the perceived ‘double standard’ of Western policy can thus be 
understood as their awareness that these meanings can be mediated through language. 
Few respondents, however, linked their criticism of the news to real incidents involving
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themselves or other members of their group with the media, though some said that they 
had heard of incidents and of the experiences of others through the media. This confirms 
other research findings (for example Philo 1990 on the audience interpretations of the 
British miners’ strike) that suggest it is difficult to distinguish between experience, 
irrespective of whether this is a personal experience or the experience of others close to 
them, and interpretation of news as people draw on the former in making sense of news. 
What this means is that the informants’ critical readings of the news texts were not only a 
result of their membership in a self-defined collective, but also a result of tensions 
between the ‘cultural’ frames in the news texts and their real or imagined experiences.
7.8 The News Audience, Mediation, Participation and Context
In order to place news within the framework of mediation proposed in this thesis, the 
focus in this last section will be on the instances when the appropriation of news as ritual 
(the ritualised use of news) translates into participation in or disengagement from public 
life. As Silverstone (in press) notes: “Mediation requires us to understand how processes 
of communication change the social and cultural environments that surround them.. .at 
the same time it requires a consideration of the social as in turn a mediator, institutions 
and technologies as well as the meanings that are delivered by them are mediated in the 
social processes of reception and consumption (Silverstone 2004: 17).
The analysis of the interview material shows that news engagement patterns cut across 
gender, generation and socio-economic divides. Some informants said they are fed up 
with news because nothing is going to change. Others, however, suggest that the advent
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of Arabic satellite television provides them not only with the choice of viewing, but also 
with the incentive to be able to negotiate, and publicly criticise news narratives, therefore 
confirming that the news media can act as the mediators between public institutions and 
private or collective interests.
Indeed, some of the women interviewed for this research study, particularly those with 
grown-up children, said their access to diverse news since the second Palestinian intifada 
had spurred them to take part in protests criticising Israel’s and the US’s policies or in 
fund-raising events for the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, many 
respondents said it was because of the diverse news narratives that they had become more 
active in organising events, such as sit-ins and protests, as well as fund-raising campaigns
“S 'S
to support the Palestinians in the homeland. This quote by Maha captures this clearly:
.. .(engaging with diverse Arabic news) allows me to have the strength to discuss 
things with people out there (in the British public sphere). Watching the news and 
the different coverage of events has given me the strength to open a debate with 
the British and the others.. .it has given me permission for entry (into societal 
dialogue) and to show them the double standards of coverage.
What this comment and others suggest is that the availability of diverse news media can 
enable more active and public participation in diasporic and public debates, or what I call 
arguing out, which means moving concerns from the private to the public sphere. The 
following exchange (which I report in full) in the Asfour household illustrates this:
32 Many Palestinians who arrived in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s shied away from any involvement in 
political actions. Many older generation Palestinians tended to live on their memories, and had no wish to 
visit Israel despite the fact that they had British passports. It was as though, for them, the place had been 
frozen in 1948, like a photograph — an Arab country with Jews in it, not the other way round.
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Ahlam: The minute I go out and meet people and foreigners, I make sure to tell them 
what is going on. If I am talking to Arabs, I try to make them participate in events. I 
feel the sense of injustice is too unbearable. If you don’t do anything, you get totally 
depressed. The last two years, I have become very active. I find it not only 
therapeutic, but it is also everyone’s duty to go out there and make people aware of 
what’s happening because they really have to know. We can make more of a 
difference than all the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories put together.
Adeeb: I don’t dispute that, but..
Ahlam: (interrupting) Look at other people, the Jews who are supported by all their 
people in diaspora.
Adeeb: I understand that.
Ahlam: I hate the apathy. People ask ‘so what can we do’? It is here that we make all 
the difference, we have legal rights we have British citizenship and we can put 
pressure on the British government. People’s opinion makes a difference. It makes a 
difference, yes.. .we are all reading papers and writing letters and articles and they 
have to take consideration of our opinion. We grew up in a culture that says someone 
like me (a woman) cannot make a difference. It is true that one opinion may be worth 
a zero, but here it is different.. .Every week, I write a letter in response to news story 
and eventually they (the people in power) will think we have these British Arabs and 
if they want our vote they will have to listen.
Adeeb: You are talking about something different. There is the Jewish lobby and 
there is nothing we can do to change that. I, for one, am not going to believe that by 
not buying a shirt from Marks and Spencer, I will make a difference.
Ahlam: You can vouch for yourself. I will cut off my hand before I do that. I believe 
in making a difference...This is a media war. The idea is not to get so disgusted with 
news so that you just go out and club. No, you do your bit, or even think about doing 
your bit and then get on with life.
The comments by Ahlam clearly reflect that her engagement with news media not only 
show how she feels enabled to argue out, but also how she in doing so she is exercising
'X'Xher rights as a citizen rather than just as a user or a consumer of news. Such dimensions 
of engagement with news go beyond the intimate spaces to the public space and beyond 
the use of news for informational purposes, suggesting that mediated communication 
cannot be understood as a one-way transmission of information.
33 This resembles the arguments by Livingstone and Lunt (1992) in their work on talk shows in which they 
refer to the ways in which talk shows can become a cultural forum in which the viewer as citizen may 
participate in public debate.
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Other respondents, particularly young adults and those bom in Britain with no real 
experience of the journey to the diasporic space, made a clear link between their arguing 
out and the increased and continuous news coverage of critical events, such as the second 
intifada, which coincided with the proliferation of Arabic transnational satellite news 
media. However, while their participation in public life and politics was because of a 
sense of duty and commitment, as self-defined Palestinians, they also related this activity 
to their awareness of their responsibilities and rights as citizens of the host country.
Some of the informants said they were able to engage in public life because they felt 
secure, allowing them to publicly challenge dominant media frames and mainstream 
(Western) media’s representations of the Palestinian-Israeli narrative. Sharif, the 26-year 
old founder of Arabmediawatch, the news website dedicated to challenging the 
mainstream (Western) news media’s representations of the Arab world in general and the 
Palestinian and Iraqi problems in particular, provides a good example of how notions of 
citizenry combine with the imperatives of belonging to a particular collective :
We monitor the media everyday, the British media. We set up an action alert so 
people who don’t receive it everyday get it once or twice a week. I think in terms 
of the things that we do, a lot of the results are intangible. I mean in terms of 
engaging the media, we cannot really measure the effect it has, but it is 
something. The Jews have been doing this for years and they are very 
active.. .Everyone was getting a sense in this country, particularly with the second 
intifada, that we need to do something and the media was the best way of 
portraying to the masses the Arab message. Our action is not about antagonising 
the others. You can reflect your opinion: if there is someone in the position of 
power who does not like your opinion or you, they are going to have an issue with 
you. You cannot go on ducking and hiding; this is the way we see it and this is the 
difference between our generation and yours (talking to his mother). When we 
started this whole media thing, all my mother’s friends said we are crazy, that the 
Jews are in the media and that they will eat us out. I said that is exactly why I 
wanted to start this because they are like that and because all of you think like that
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that is why I am in the media and if we always think like that then you are always 
gonna be like that. You have to fight them head on; you cannot always duck.
What is clear is that though such activities are driven by the interests of the informants as 
members of a particular collective and by their awareness of their rights as citizens in the 
host culture, the public expression of private interests serves to show that understanding 
the relationship between news and its audience must take account of the social context of 
production and consumption. Furthermore, these processes reflect how the role of news 
in societies can be best understood through the ritual model of communication which 
suggests participation and action and which underscores how mediation becomes a 
political process in so far as the meanings generated by producers and present in media 
texts are worked on by readers and viewers.
7.9 Mediation and Power
Before going on to detail the implications of the informants’ engagement with news to
questions of identity and belonging, it is worth summarising the key points reported in
the sections above. First, news emerges as a dynamic component in the informants’
everyday lives. Second, the activity of engaging with news is both active34 and
interactive, serving to blur the boundaries between the private and the public. Third, the
centrality of the news genre to the informants is crucially related to its social and political
uses which draw attention to how news can be understood as a form of cultural discourse.
34 This must be qualified because there is no way to certify how the informants actually engage with news. 
However, my experience with some of the informants - 1 was present when they watched television news -  
and my familiarity with the social and cultural background of the informants allow me to put this point 
across with some confidence.
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The emphasis in this chapter has been on the social uses of news, which can be 
addressed in an audience study of this kind as it moves attention beyond the relative 
privacy of the act of media reception to address the “wider ramifications of 
opposition”(Jensen 1990: 58), thus drawing attention to how the news media, seen 
through these contestations and oppositional activities, provide the framework for 
identity and community.
In focusing on the social uses of news, or what the informants do with news, I have 
shown that the informants do not see news as providing information only, but also as a 
form of cultural discourse that can confirm their own beliefs and perspectives of the 
world and that can provide them with likely orientations for action while linking them in 
ritualistic and symbolic ways to the wider public spaces they inhabit.
The analysis of the interview material showed that the informants’ engagement with 
news transcends the public/private divide. It also showed that the instrumental uses of the 
news are in constant tension with the critical dimensions of news consumption, therefore 
necessitating a differentiated understanding of the news audience and of the meaning of 
news in societies. Furthermore, the analysis showed that news media could be potentially 
empowering, though this cannot be fully equated with the conventional understanding of 
political power or without taking into account the different contexts of consumption, 
including the informants’ increased access to diverse mediated information.
As the sections above showed, it was because of the informants’ awareness of 
mediation as a political process, which came into stark relief in their contrasting and 
criticism of different mediated news accounts that they saw as denying them control and 
status that they began to seek more active discursive and ‘participatory’ roles in the
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national (British) sphere. It was their awareness of the ways in which the dominant forms 
of imaging and story-telling could be resisted and countered and their awareness of their 
rights as citizens in the host culture that they could argue out or mobilise beyond their 
intimate spheres.
The interview material pointed to the tensions in the informants’ discourses about 
news, reflecting the inherent contradiction in the power and the meanings of news -  
while the informants’ accounts that Western news narratives do have an effect, they 
consistently redefined the news agenda, reflecting how media power was not direct, but 
diffuse, and how they were aware of the power of mediation, but also aware that they 
themselves could be active actors in this process. What was clear, however, was that the 
resources and motivations that lead people to participate or withdraw from public life, as 
shown in the analysis of the interview material reported above, are also linked to the 
imagined or lived experiences (the social and political contexts) of the people concerned. 
In the following chapter, I turn to the relationship between news and identity, one of the 
key questions in this research
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Chapter Eight 
Identification: What it Means to be Palestinian
This chapter brings together the theoretical perspectives discussed in Chapters Two to 
Four and the data drawn from the empirical work, an audience reception study that forms 
the backbone of this research. The material presented below explores informants’ 
discourses and perspectives of themselves and their community through their engagement 
with news rather than technological, aesthetic or other characteristics inherent in the text. 
The aim is to examine the different dimensions of identity construction from down-to- 
earth perspectives, thus grounding the research questions in empirical evidence.
This perspective goes beyond the methodological impetus informing this study. I did 
not define the social implications of news nor did I assume, a priori, its appropriation in 
the informants’ lives. Rather, I set out to explore whether and how the informants use 
news, and whether their appropriation of news (making sense of news) can influence their 
thinking and discourses. In particular, I wanted to address the following questions: What 
is the relationship between news and discourses of identity? And do news stories allow 
people to adopt essentialist and/or more open positions related to their identity?
In addressing these questions, my concern is with the ‘news stories’ the respondents 
choose to engage with — these are the stories they relate to most, as individuals and as 
members of the wider community they associate with as well as the host country they 
inhabit — and with the implications of their engagement for their everyday interactions 
and actions. This consideration is justified empirically (see Chapter Five) and 
conceptually (see Chapters Two and Four) particularly in the contemporary media
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environment of 24-hour news disseminated by multiple and diverse news organisations, 
both in terms of ideology and form.
The interview material is organised under thematic constructs that shed light on the 
links audiences establish between the world as represented in news discourses and their 
everyday lives. These themes draw on the inter-related analytic categories of 
comprehension and interpretation1 and narrativity, the processes or mechanisms the 
informants use to make sense of news. Though interrelated, comprehension and 
interpretation can be distinguished; the former, as Livingstone (1990) notes, focuses on 
the extent to which texts, however complex, may be said to convey information, while 
the latter is fundamentally socially located, suggesting that the experience and knowledge 
(my emphasis) of the reader or viewer plays a central role in the act of decoding the text.
Narrativity, on the other hand, brings to attention the need to locate the meaning of 
‘news’ events in temporal and spatial relationship to other events (Somers and Gibson 
1994), while also taking into account people’s affect and self-reflexivity. Narrativity 
relates to the analytical concept of commuting (Liebes and Katz 1993), the process 
whereby informants’ talk shifts between reflections on the narratives of news to their own 
personal narratives. Narrative, in this sense, is both a form of reasoning and a form of 
representation; it is the fundamental epistemic means by which people organise and make 
sense of their experiences, and therefore, as Dahlgren (1995) argues, is a strategy that can 
operate within the figural mode of signification. Commuting takes place at an 
interpretative level, drawing attention to how people make sense of news by drawing on 
their personal experiences or by drawing on the experiences of others.
1 Interpretation focuses on the ways in which texts involve narrative or conventional frames, create cultural 
connections and resonances and implicate mythic or ideological meaning, while comprehension is 
influenced by textual knowledge (Livingstone 1998).
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These analytic categories help us understand the diverse ways in which the 
informants use news as a point of reference for interpreting and/or making sense of 
everyday events, for managing anxieties, for drawing parallels with their personal 
narratives as well as with the collective narrative of the group as a whole, and how, 
through their reflection on, articulation of, emotional connection to and investment in 
news they narrate and experience their identities. These narrations and experiences, this 
thesis argues, change over time and in (my emphasis) time, these are the mediated 
moments and times (contexts) during which people are propelled to think about who they 
are and why it matters to be who they are.
By analysing the various discourses that news stories, particularly those related to the 
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, trigger among the respondents concerned in this 
study, this chapter examines the tensions in the project of identity construction, which, as 
argued in Chapter Two, involves continuous processes of identification that serve to 
underline the dialectic relationship between cosmopolitanism, which means an 
acceptance of the otherness of the other and Palestinian-ism (Palestinian national 
consciousness) which implies particularity. This relationship, as Beck (2002) says, relates 
to how nations (the collective) and our connections to them are discursively produced and 
reproduced in the era of globalisation, and to the significance of both events and 
collective memory in these productions and reproductions (my emphasis).
In highlighting the themes (these are deducted from people’s attitudes to news) that 
weave through the informants’ discourses about their worldviews - these concern the 
fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world as expressed in their philosophy, 
ethics, ritual and beliefs (Wallace 1970 cited in Ayish 2003) - my narrative takes into
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account the cultural, political, spatial and temporal situatedness of the informants in order 
to understand the contested dynamics and relations of power they grapple with when 
making sense of symbolic products, including news, and to emphasise the tension 
between real and narrated experiences, the private and the public, the self and the other, 
the past and the present, and the personal and the political. The chapter begins by 
examining the implications for identity construction of the main thematic constructs that 
inform the analysis of the interview material — crisis, boundaries and belonging — 
which come across as interrelated themes in the informants’ talk about news stories of 
and related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
8.1 Imagined Community in Crisis?
The first analytical construct, the theme of crisis, weaves through most of the informants’ 
accounts of their engagement with news stories, though the news events they talk about, 
the second Palestinian intifada:2 (uprising) that began in September 2000 and the 
unrelenting violence since then, the September 11 attacks in the US, the US-led war on 
terror and the war against Iraq, do not involve them personally.3
In making sense of these news events, many informants voiced concerns about 
themselves and their families, concerns that pertain to the ways in which news draws 
attention to events and concerns about them, thus bearing on people’s sense of 
‘ontological security’ and prompting questions such as: ‘Am I safe? Is my family safe? Is 
the nation that I belong to safe?’ (cf. Giddens 1984). Silvio Waisbord (2002), writing in
2 This event is often referred to as al-Aqsa intifada as the protests erupted after Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon visited the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, considered as one of the holiest Islamic shrines.
3 Of course, these events pertained to the Palestinian nation as a collectivity.
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the context of the September 11 attacks, has explained trauma, from a mainly 
psychological perspective, as unbinding the sense of self, thus affecting how “individual 
and collective actors come to terms with their identities. By ripping [...] existing 
boundaries, trauma destabilizes [...] the self and creates the need to re-instate a sense of 
order.” (ibid. 205)
The interview material shows that these ‘unplanned’ media events4 (cf. Dayan and 
Katz 1992; Srebreny 2002) caused instability in the informants’ lives, triggering notions 
of instability and insecurity among a majority of respondents, irrespective of their age or 
gender, resulting in an increased preoccupation with their own and their family’s security. 
This is how Nadwa explains this:
Look at the situation we are in. We do not feel secure anymore. Look at what the 
UK government is doing, can you trust them as every minute they come up with 
something new, some new law. I cannot explain to you how I feel, because what 
you see is totally impossible. This is beyond our imagination.
Discourses referring to the continuous crisis were articulated across the board, but 
women respondents were generally more emotional and agitated in discussing these 
concerns as they tended to focus on the human facets of the news and on how their own 
families, children and friends might be affected by these accounts, thus pointing to a 
degree of gendered discourse. This comes across in the following comment by Amani:
The news and the images have affected our lives. My eldest boy, who is nine, is now 
scared, he is talking of joining the British army. Leith (who is seven) is so worried 
and is always asking what is happening to the Palestinian children and asking “are 
they going to kill us, too.
4 Although these are not media events in the sense that Dayan and Katz referred to in The Live 
Broadcasting o f History (1992), they are media events in the ways they brought audiences and 
communities together.
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Male informants, on the other hand, were more circumspect in their reflections on the 
sense of crisis, concerning themselves with attributing blame and guilt, analysing the 
evolving situation and proposing solutions to the continuous conflict. However, what was 
interesting was that in reflecting on concerns about the self and their families, both male 
and female respondents’ narratives shifted to voice concerns about the collective, 
encompassing the Palestinians in Britain and in other diasporic spaces and the Palestinian 
nation as a whole, thus serving to underline the continuous tension between and the 
interweaving of the personal and the political (national) and the personal and collective 
memory that come into play during such moments.
The respondents’ talk reflected how right from the beginning, these ‘connected5 
mediated events’ had a powerful emotive impact on them, setting off moments of 
discovery that they linked to other memories, real and imagined, individual and 
collective, in precise ways, confirming that overall processes of mediation are involved in 
this interplay. This emerges in the following exchange during a group interview in 
Manchester:
Mahmoud: ...We (the Palestinian nation) are at the centre of the mess now, not 
isolated. The impact on us and on politics has been huge. We see this at our own level 
because we are Palestinians. The reason that we speak a lot about politics is that what 
we watch on television has an impact on us. It is a direct impact really. We have 
families in the Occupied Territories and when we travel, we also suffer. We feel it in 
our everyday lives
Suha: Yes, this mess has made others become anti-Palestinian, anti-Arab and anti- 
Moslem. The whole world now does not see our side o f the story. Sharon has done all
5 ‘Connected’ refers here to the ways in which these events were portrayed as linked both in journalistic 
and political discourse as well as in the informants’ narratives of the news.
258
his deeds and there is not a single word of protestations against it. Before, it was 
different. Now everybody is silent.
Mahmoud: Even the average American person. His bias has increased so now we 
cannot see the difference between the Americans and the Israelis.
Bassam: There is no doubt that these events and the way they are covered (in the 
Western media) has influenced politics. America is now discussing the possibility of 
finding an alternative Palestinian leadership. This is really dangerous.. .and they are 
illogical. How can they blame Abu Ammar6 for an operation in Jerusalem when he is 
surrounded, cannot come and go.
Ibrahim: Well the problem is that under this big banner of fighting terrorism, the US 
could intervene anywhere, in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Somalia. Even Saudi 
Arabia is under threat.
Mohammed: Yes, this news event has been negative to us (the nation). People look at 
you and you know that the news is against you.. .All my colleagues are now saying 
poor Israel, and I am getting very upset and worried. (My emphasis)
What emerges from these comments and similar others is a sense of an ‘imagined 
community in crisis’ (Anderson 1983), welded together by notions that its members, 
whether in Britain, other diasporic spaces or in the homeland, imagine themselves as facing 
a continuous crisis, and constructed through ‘a wider ideological, discursive consciousness’ 
(cf. Billig 1995). The discursive consciousness of the ‘imagined community in crisis’ 
emerges in the following comment by Ali, a 30-plus asylum seeker, during a group 
interview along with five of his friends:
The news story (of the intifada, the suicide bombings and September 11) has an effect 
on our cause as Palestinians and on our lives. It has a comprehensive effect on all 
fronts. Those who wanted to get visas to Britain were not able to anymore. So it is not 
only from a personal level, but also from a general level as it affects people’s views 
about us (the imagined nation). (My emphasis)
6 This is the popular nom de guerre for Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.
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8.2 Perceptions of Power and News
Notions such as “the whole world now does not see our side” and “the news is against 
us” reflect, as argued above, the respondents’ concerns about themselves and the 
collective, but also to their perceptions that news is powerful in that they link to the 
various and specific ways in which news mediates and represents reality and which they 
see as excluding them from the ‘national (British) public sphere’.
Suggestions of exclusion from this sphere were prominent in respondents’ comments 
on mainstream (Western) media’s news narrations of events of and related to the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, narrations they saw as reflecting cognitive scripts and models 
of behaviour shaped by the experience and narration of previous events (cf. Karim 2003), 
or, put differently, shaped by traditional journalistic ‘frames’ that have been employed to 
make sense of violence, terrorism and Islam. This emerges in Maha’s comment:
Why should the world stand with ‘them’ (Israel) and support them.. .this is 
because they (the Western media) give this picture of us as the ‘baddies’ [...] for 
instance, they are now saying we are terrorists. Where is this terrorism they are 
talking about? Is it with them or with us? There is a lot of difference in telling the 
news. They (Western media) always use the wrong language — I hear the word 
fundamentalist, I hear the word terrorist.. .always referring to Islamic and 
Palestinian groups. When you think of the Irish problem, they did not say terrorist 
Christian groups. They called them the IRA.
As does the following remark by Lutfi, a retired Christian Palestinian businessman, 
during a separate interview in London:
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It’s very clear, they (the Western media) don’t know how to go about it and they 
are doing their best to target the Palestinians.
The use of frames (cf. Giltin 1980) is a common journalistic practice and is often 
manifested in the predominance of ‘crude binaries’ in news reporting particularly during
<7
times of trauma as journalists, as an interpretive community (see Zelizer 1997,1993) , 
make sense of events and attempt to lend authority to their narrations. Such frames, 
which Gitlin (1980) refers to as dominant frames that are taken for granted by media 
practitioners, were particularly noticeable in news reports of and post-September 11. The 
term dominant does not to refer to a monolithic or static set of ideological and cultural 
frames, but following Hall (1979), to show how these frames structure events they signify 
in a manner that reproduces given ideological structure in an almost unconscious way, 
even for the encoders.
What is of analytic concern are the ways in which such frames served to focus 
attention in the national (British) sphere on discourses that tended to establish essentialist 
and polarised news accounts relying on ‘us’ and ‘them’, the ‘West’ and the ‘rest’ 
dichotomies, belying complex realities and creating conflicts of identification for the 
Palestinians in Britain. It was in this polarised context that most informants, irrespective 
of gender and age, tended to question the mainstream (Western) media’s representation
Q
of events which many said bracketed them within such categories as ‘Islamic
7 Journalists refer to these practices as short-hand journalism that is used to convey meanings to their 
audience through the use of cryptic and often stereotypical language.
8 Many respondents were emotional and angry in commenting on the repeated use of images (by CNN, for 
example) of Palestinians celebrating on the streets of Gaza following al-Qa’eda’s attacks against the US, 
suggesting these images were fabricated and used intentionally to sully the reputation of the Palestinians.
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fundamentalists’, and ‘supporters of terrorism,’ a double-categorisation9 that served to 
catalyse dogmatic modes of thinking10 about the continuous crises, bringing to the fore 
discourses emphasising the informants’ political and religious identifications. This comes 
across in the following comment by Judith during a household interview involving 
herself and other members of her family in London:
The news affects us in many ways. I do not think there is a lot of discussion about 
the background. For instance, if we talk of the intifada, they (the Western media) 
rarely give any explanations. The only one thing that is said is that we are Islamic 
and terrorists and that we are brainwashed.. .The mainstream media does not want 
to say anything else. It makes me feel different.
Indeed, even those informants who described themselves as having a secular orientation, 
i.e. neither allied to Islam nor to Christianity, engaged in discourses that reflected their 
identification with particularistic positions. In this context, their making sense of news 
suggested they were involved in ideological processes of thinking (Billig 1987/ 1995), or 
in strategic articulations that they used to challenge hegemonic discourses and the status 
quo. Lutfi’s comment illustrates this:
The problem with the Western media is that they portray the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict as a conflict between Israel and Moslems. This is wrong. The media have 
no idea what they are talking about.. .Up to 25 years ago, you could not tell who 
was Christian and who was Moslem, but they have made it a religious conflict.
9 This draws on Billig’s (1987) critique of categorisation literature that sees categorisation as a cognitive 
imperative, thus giving only a one-sided view of human action. Billig suggests that human understanding 
always occurs in a context of argument or conflict. In this sense, even our private thoughts arise out of an 
internal dialogue in which we pit different positions against each other, so we take positions to counter 
other positions. That said, self-categorisation theory places emphasis on the cognitive aspect of social 
identification and collective action, that is, the point at which people begin to act as a group is the point at 
which they begin to identify themselves in terms of the group.
101 follow Billig (1987) in noting that thinking in this context does not happen in a simple one-sided way, 
which means it has to be examined within social contexts and factors, including linguistic ones.
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And in the following comment by Sharif in a separate interview:
The (news) coverage changed things on this side of the world, definitely. It changed 
things in the Middle East, kind of, but not so much on the street level, but in terms of 
diplomatic circles and upper levels. You know, after September 11, everyone is afraid 
of flying across the Atlantic. I think there is an ignorance in the sense that the way the 
(media) put themselves in the shoes of the people in the Middle East.. .they were 
saying that the Palestinians did not cry enough. I think if you just put yourself in the 
position of someone who has had some relative killed by an American weapon and 
has spent decades under occupation with the support of America, I don’t see how 
such comments would change things for them. On the street (in the Occupied 
Territories), things have not changed. For me, too, it has not changed anything, but in 
terms of media coverage and how it affects the Middle East, that is a different thing.
8.3 News as Cultural Discourse: Content and Form
There is little doubt that the thematic construct of crisis and the emergence of notions of 
the proposed ‘imagined community in crisis’ discussed above, relates to the specific 
temporal conjuncture of this research — the fieldwork coincided with an intense 
escalation in violence and acts of reprisal between Israelis and the Palestinians since 
September 2000, when the second Palestinian intifada erupted. Indeed, many respondents 
reiterated the priority and sense of urgency they specifically gave to news of and related 
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, often linking the changes in their news viewing patterns 
such as constant switching between different television news programmes as well as the 
use of the Internet as an alternative source of news, to this event and others, including the 
September 11 attacks and the increasing violence in the Occupied Territories and Gaza 
Strip in the early months of 200211 as well as the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
11 Veena Das (1995) has referred to such events as critical events in that they can propel people’s lives in 
new directions as well as encourage new kinds of thinking and feeling.
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While taking this temporal conjuncture into consideration, in their making sense of the 
news of the continuous crises, the informants’ news consumption practices took on a 
sense of urgency that was manifested in different ways; many respondents said they had 
become obsessed with news, many said they were eager to find out what was happening
19next in order to make sense of the unfolding drama, while others said they were 
constantly switching channels to assess the different mediations and representations in 
the news. This is how Maha explains this:
I switch channels. I change from Arabic channels to English ones to see what they 
are reporting and what they are saying. In the end though, I turn to the one news 
programme that meets my needs and moves me, or leaves an impact.
Some respondents even suggested that news coverage of the intifada was the catalyst that 
propelled them to install satellite dishes to access Arabic transnational channels, such as 
al-Jazeera and the Lebanese Hezbollah-supported al-Manar, specifically because these 
channels provided them with alternative ideological narratives that countered the 
ideological content of mainstream news media, for example, the BBC and CNN. These 
points are discussed extensively in the previous chapter, but for our purposes here, these 
actions suggest that the informants were involved in making ‘active’ choices about the 
news they could use, active choices that relate to both the what and the how of news, or, 
to content and form. This is reflected in the following short excerpt from a group 
interview with five young asylum seekers in London:
Raed: After the intifada, I installed a satellite dish because all the news you see on 
BBC, etc. is not the same. Now I watch all channels in different languages.
12 In some interviews, respondents would often ask me what was going on, whether I knew, being a 
journalist and a researcher myself, anything they did not know.
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Husain: For me, too, it was the intifada, too. Even now after September 11, that was 
the first and one news event that made me turn to news.
Ali: You cannot separate one event from the other really. The narrative is connected, 
irrespective of its relevance or not
Three implications of such discourses are relevant for understanding the relationship 
between news and processes of identification; the first relates to the fact that the 
informants did not engage with news for its informational values alone. Rather, they used 
news to help them ‘stay alert’ to immediate and distant threats, conflicts and other events 
that were perceived as implicating the informants and their families as well as threatening 
their individual and collective identity. In this context, the regularity and ritual 
characteristics of news programmes can be seen as serving as a form of reassurance in 
times of change and trauma (see Silverstone 1994). The second, as exemplified by 
Maha’s comment: “/« the end, I  turn to news that satisfies my needs”, reflects how the 
respondents choose which news story they can run away with, this is the news narrative 
that provides them with a point or points of reference (the ideological and cultural 
frames) to make sense of events, to manage anxieties, to draw parallels with their own 
lives and to take part in social interaction and action. And the third is that this choice is 
influenced by both media form and content, drawing attention to the ways in which 
mediation processes can play a role in the informants’ engagement with or 
disengagement from symbolic material. In this context, how something is said becomes 
as relevant as what is being said. Both of these are central to the understanding of news as 
cultural discourse proposed in this work.
While there is little doubt that the availability of diverse news sources — these events 
coincided with a proliferation of alternative news sources — provide the respondents
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concerned in this study with different contexts and diverse frames for identity work and 
for engagement in public life, it crucially brings to analytic scrutiny the centrality of this 
access to the tense, contradictory and polarised dynamics surrounding these informants’ 
experiences with and around news. Most of the respondents said they engaged with 
diverse news media, including mainstream Western media, such as English broadsheets 
and terrestrial television channels like the BBC, as well as with Arabic language media, 
particularly Arabic satellite broadcasting channels, pointing to the relevance of the form 
of telling, the how, to their making sense of news. This comes across in the following 
comment by Hussein in the Said household:
I am not only satisfied with just hearing the news as it is. This is not enough. It is 
important to hear the news from different viewpoints and then you decide. There 
is a big difference. When it comes to the Palestinian story, Arabic channels, 
particularly al-Jazeera, show us exactly what happens, even showing us pictures 
of dead Israelis (from suicide bombs). But al-Manar is the best really because it is 
the only Arab station focusing on the Palestinians.
At the same time, however, many of the informants suggested that their consumption 
practices were also dictated by what (my emphasis) was being said — ‘what’ here points 
to the ideological and cultural frames in news, suggesting that the informants’ processes 
of thinking about and reflection on news may be interpreted as struggles for authenticity13 
and recognition, particularly because Palestinians in Britain have for long been media 
invisible or misrepresented14 in the British public sphere. This comes across in two
13 The struggle for authenticity has been a key element in the Palestinian and Israeli versions of events as 
each party claims authentic claims to territory and existence.
14 Like other minorities in Britain, the Palestinians in Britain do not often appear in the mainstream media, 
and when they do, it is often through stereotyped images.
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separate comments in different interviews, the first by Maha, and the second by Omar,
and which illustrate the contrasting of narratives and their importance:
Maha: The Arabic channels have served us by putting the Palestinian story at the 
forefront, after all this is the cause of the Arab world. Most of their news is about 
our homeland, though they also talk of the war in Afghanistan. This is important 
for us.
Omar: The (Western) media are basically indifferent. I would not go as far as to 
say they are positively biased towards Israel. What I would say is that they 
probably leave on purpose large sections of the story. They would tend to say five 
Palestinians were killed today on the West Bank, whereas, if they wanted to, they 
could show graphic pictures of those five people, etc. Very, very powerful images 
that would be very damaging to Israel and they don’t do so. They obviously have 
access to those images, but they show the Israeli images definitely.
These comments, particularly Omar’s, also show that in making sense of news, the 
informants relied on common sense — this is the process by which people find 
themselves repeating assumptions that confirm existing modes of power and domination 
as well as ideology, thus pointing to how even commonsense processes of ‘thinking and 
arguing’ are also influenced by ideology (Billig 1987). Evidence of these processes was 
particularly apparent in the informants’ criticism of Western news media — here, as 
exemplified in the above comment, the criticism of news accounts was made to counter 
hegemonic arguments — and in their often favourable comments on alternative news 
narratives, particularly by Arabic transnational broadcasting channels, suggesting that 
news can act as a symbolic forum for thinking and arguing, while confirming the notion 
of news as a form of cultural discourse adopted in this work. “We find in al-Jazeera a 
way to vent our feelings and emotions. It is the most objective and balanced of all the
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channels,” was one recurrent answer. “As Palestinians, we feel there are people who care 
for you,” was another. This is how Nuha puts this:
I like to watch al-Jazeera and al-Manar. The news is very interesting and [...] you 
feel that they say what is in my heart and express what is in my mind. Most of their 
news and images.. .even when they have intervals or adverts, they put pictures of the 
intifada and music and Arabic songs about Palestine. Al-Manar does not even report 
on south Lebanon as much as it does on Palestine.
What emerges from these and similar comments is the sense that the audience members 
concerned here do not turn to news for information only, but also because it confirms 
their ideological consciousness of nationhood particularly in the ways it represents a 
complex set of themes about ‘us’, ‘our homeland’ and ‘nations’ (ours and theirs) (cf. 
Billing 1995:4), their own frames of reference and their foci of identification.
Though I did not carry out a content analysis of the representations of news on Arabic 
transnational television, the informants’ talk suggests that the ideological consciousness 
of nationhood is reflected in the political stance15 of these channels and their adoption of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as the consensus narrative16 of Arab society, a narrative 
that resonates with the respondents’ own and collaborative readings of news. These 
readings are informed by, and inform, their everyday experiences and are made possible
15 Although al-Jazeera claims to be politically neutral and that its staff are diverse, its coverage of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, its representation of the news and its use of language, point to its critically pro- 
Palestinian stance. For example, al-Jazeera treats the Islamic group Hamas as a legitimate resistance 
movement, and allows its representatives a voice in its coverage of news. Al-Jazeera refers to Israel as an 
occupation force and to the West Bank and Gaza as Israeli-occupied territories, while it has described the 
war in Iraq as an invasion and an illegal occupation compared with the BBC’s choice of the demure “the 
war in Iraq” and Fox’s more partisan ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. Though I did not carry out a study on the 
production policies o f al-Jazeera or al-Manar, there is a general consensus that its stance that supports 
Palestinian nationalism and pan-Arabism is related to the fact that many of its members and employees are 
Palestinians themselves or reflect pan-Arab ideologies. Al-Jazeera rose to prominence following the 
September 11 attacks in the US, attracting criticism from Western governments, but it was popular with 
Arab audiences before that because of its focus on news and current affairs programmes that have given 
voice to people other than government officials or those in power.
16 Even Osama bin Laden, in the early tapes broadcast following the September 11 attacks, linked the fight 
against the United States with the Palestinian struggle for statehood and independence.
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because the subject of the news stories is one they are familiar with, thus giving them 
some form of ‘discursive’ power, while also suggesting that making sense of news is tied 
to some form of ideological resonance (Lewis 1991).
The ideological resonance comes across in the informants’ reflections on why they 
prefer Arabic transnational television channels, which suggest that this preference is 
linked to these channels’ modes of representation, the what, and the language and style 
they use in making these representations, the how. For example, many of the interviewees 
said they preferred to watch al-Jazeera and al-Manar because of their choice of language 
— their news refers to suicide bombers as shuhada (martyrs). Many of the respondents 
reflected on the melodramatic content of news broadcasts and current affairs programmes
17 •on Arab satellite television channels, such as al-Jazeera and al-Manar. The following 
exchange in a group interview in Manchester illustrates this:
Mohammed: The news story.. .well, you have to remember that people are mature 
(sic) and they know when the story reflects certain viewpoints. People know what is 
going on.
Ibrahim: There is really no way to lie. You have studied journalism and you know 
this.. .the format. I can use any sensational way to write or tell a story. But using 
words makes a difference. It is the way the story is told that makes us suffer; it is the 
language. This is sometimes on CNN or the BBC, the way they tell the story hurts 
because we know where the average American and English person comes from. The 
use of the language itself, for instance, when they say that Israel used rockets in 
response to a Palestinian amaliya (operation), they forget to tell the chronological 
events. The story always starts with the assumption that the Palestinians did 
something and Israel responded. This is where the difference (with Arabic channels) 
lies. These are specific issues that hurt us, the place of the story, the format, their use 
of language and the fact that they never explain the reasons why.
Suha: I may convince some English people that we (the Palestinians) have been 
oppressed, but after two weeks, they will forget my words and will follow what the 
big powers will say. How the BBC and CNN tell the story will be followed by the
17 Iskander and el-Nawawy (2004) have described the journalistic imperatives dictating news production 
strategies of al-Jazeera, particularly in the case of the war in Iraq, as contextual objectivity rather than the 
broadly used objectivity.
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people. Look, Hanan Ashrawi (the prominent female Palestinian politician and 
spokesperson) came and gave her opinions. She spoke in their terms, but her words 
are all forgotten and there is no trace of them in the minds of the West.. .you see 
maybe in their minds (CNN and BBC), they think they are giving people equal times. 
But at the end of the day what the broadcaster says at the end of the programme is 
what remains in people’s mind. One sentence can make the difference.
There is little doubt that other salient factors can explain the informants’ preference for 
certain news programmes; these include class and education; politico-religious 
orientations and personal experience of exile and deprivation. Class and education are 
important in that they can explain some informants’ preference for Arabic-language 
media rather than Western media because of language competence. This was evident 
during interviews in lower- to middle-class families where women (mothers and wives) 
normally stay at home, which means their interaction with non-Arabic speaking people 
and the wider society is curtailed to a certain extent. Amani, a 34-year-old mother of four, 
who did not speak English when she arrived here in 1992, says: “Arabic television is 
really important as we can use our own language. They are our link to the homeland.
Now there is news that the children can also watch as we speak Arabic at home. When I 
came here ten years ago, I had no access to news. Now, I am in Palestine, Jordan, Iraq 
and Syria at the same time as here. That is the link.”
Furthermore, politico-religious orientations can explain this preference. For instance, 
some Moslem respondents said they preferred to engage with sl-Manar (allied to the 
Lebanese Islamic and Iranian-backed Hezbollah group) and the Saudi religious channel 
Iqra’ because their news and their presenters and broadcasters, particularly women, 
conformed with and adhered to Islamic values and traditions. Political considerations and
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affiliations18 can also explain why some informants eschewed news programmes that 
were seen as politically dubious. For instance, some said they did not watch MBC 
(Middle East Broadcasting Corp.) because it was supported by the Saudi government.
8.4 Identity Construction as Relational
The second analytical construct that came across in the interview material is the theme of 
boundaries, confirming that discursive processes of boundary-mapping remain key and 
common frames that informants use to construct their identities. Such processes, which 
involve the active maintenance and negotiation with others of guiding frameworks for 
inclusion (Southerton 2002), were reflected in informants’ discourses of othering that 
dominated many interviews, suggesting that in making sense of news, the respondents, 
both as individuals and as members of a ‘real or imagined’ collective group, were 
constructing symbolic boundaries to negotiate notions of inclusion and exclusion.
Across the board, symbolic boundaries were generated and maintained in the 
informants’ talk about which news they watch, emphasising the continuous and shifting 
discourses of ‘self and ‘other’ that draw attention to the tension between notions of 
ordinariness, meaning an acceptance that one is the same as everyone else, and notions of 
difference and uniqueness (Billig 1995), confirming the central theoretical framework in 
this thesis — that the project of identity construction can be better explained as involving 
a continuous process of identification.
18 Most respondents said they did not belong to political organisations, but the pervasiveness of politics in 
Palestinian and Arab lives means that people are normally politically savvy.
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Notions of ordinariness, reflected in remarks such as “we are like everyone else”, but, 
more importantly, of difference and uniqueness, came across in an ‘us and them’ 
dichotomy that was present in many accounts, pointing to how the informants were 
involved in constructing essentialist discourses about themselves and others which served 
to confirm that the process of boundary-mapping is both an ideological and discursive 
construction. However, the analysis of the interview material showed that it was in their 
contrasting of Western media and Arabic transnational broadcasting19 news narratives (of 
the same event) that questions relating to what these respondents perceived as their 
distinctiveness, as members of a particular political and national group, were brought into 
central focus. In other words, it was through their engagement with the sometimes 
polarised accounts of the same narrative that they were forced to adopt ‘defensive’ and 
‘oppositional’ dialogical positions as members of a Palestinian ‘political’ community.
Um Ali puts this plainly: “I consider myself different from other Arabs, politically.”
More often than not, such discourses of othering were made in their making sense of 
mainstream (Western) news narratives, such as CNN’s and the BBC’s, which the 
informants interpreted as exclusionary. In this sense, many respondents expressed a 
dominant or ideological perspective about the news presented on mainstream media, 
adopting an ‘us and them’20 dichotomy position that was essentialising. This emerges in 
the following comment by Omar:
19 Arabic transnational broadcasting channels, such as al-Jazeera, constantly repeated stories that wove 
images from the past into the present and flagged images of Palestinians’ suffering and humiliation. 
Though the national feelings invoked by these practices are not banal, their arousal links with Billig’s 
(1995) argumentation about nationalism in modem nation-states.
20 ‘Them’ was usually a reference to the Other, Israel, or multiple others, including the United States, 
Britain and the Western world in general, while ‘us’ refers to the collective Palestinian nation.
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They (the Western media) basically are indifferent to us. I would not say they are 
positively biased towards Israel. What I would say is that they probably on 
purpose leave out a large section of the news story. They would tend to say five 
Palestinians were killed today on the West Bank and they could, if they wanted to, 
provide graphic images — very, very powerful images that would be damaging to 
Israel.
It is in such contexts that identity construction can be seen as relational, as it is in relation 
to mainstream news discourses and the breakdown of trust in dominant discourse that 
assertions of a ‘communal and political identification’, a hardening of divides and the 
construction of frames of ‘us’ and ‘them’ became more prevalent. This comes across in 
the following comment by Lama:
You see, when we watch the foreign news channels, it makes us really mad. They 
twist the truth sometimes. We have always said that the foreigners (the West) are 
straight and honest people and we looked up to them. They are not, especially when it 
comes to the Palestinian problem.
Indeed, the informants’ different news engagement patterns, yet similar interpretation of 
the news, reflect the ways in which in a highly-mediated21 news environment 
characterised by wall-to-wall news, the presence and availability of mainstream media 
must be seen as crucial in any analysis about what the audience does with news because 
they define empirically, through the experiences and practices of their audience, the 
contexts within which alternative media narrations have to be understood (cf. Silverstone 
2003).
21 It is worth mentioning that different media systems had been available in different countries before the 
advent of satellite television. Some of the older respondents said they had always accessed different media, 
particularly radio broadcasts. Salem, an 80-year old Palestinian who has lived in Britain since the 1940s, 
for instance, recalled in detail how he and his family would gather round the radio in World War II to listen 
to the BBC news service accounts of events.
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In their discussions about the different ways the same news event was presented and re­
presented, the informants displayed a degree of media competence and literacy22 which 
allowed them to construct their mediated world as well as a degree of reflexivity that is 
common to many migrants’ experiences particularly as they become exposed to more and 
more transnational symbolic products. Put the other way round, diverse news may be 
credited for opening up these reflexive processes by offering different and sometimes 
rewarding material for people to exercise reflection and critique of tradition and of 
institutions (cf. Thompson 1995).
The interview material showed how the informants exhibited competence in their talk 
about their news consumption practices — some informants, for instance, suggested that 
their intense focus on Arab satellite television did not mean they had to stop engaging 
with host country symbolic and cultural products. In elaborating on these processes, 
many respondents told of how they constantly flicked between channels to “find out what 
they (my emphasis) are saying about us,” pointing to the argumentative meanings of 
opinion while suggesting that counter discourses arise when the original discourses are 
misunderstood. The following exchange in the group interview conducted in Manchester 
highlights these dilemmas:
Mohammed: If I watch the news, I watch the local (English domestic) news or al- 
Manar and al-Jazeera or CNN. I like al-Manar because it is against Israel. In 
addition, it is a family channel, one that you can leave your children watching
22 Livingstone (2003) makes a crucial distinction between media literacy and competence. She says media 
literacy concerns mediated communication, while the other terms, such as competence, human capital, 
cognitive skill, etc., neglect the textuality and the technology that mediate communication while 
encouraging a universalist perspective that neglects the important that ignores the historical and cultural 
contingency of both the media and the cognitive and social knowledge processes that interpret them.
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without getting worried.
Ibrahim: For me, I like to engage with different news and viewpoints. In my 
opinion, it is not enough for me to get excited about al-Manar or another Arabic 
channel, because I am already excited. I do not need this. When things escalate, I 
try to find what is going on from CNN. Then when things escalate I turn to the 
BBC for analysis. I am keen on Newsnight and their analysis because if the events 
are very important sometimes they are objective depending on the person giving 
the report and depending on whether the person is capable. I want to think how 
others think here. I want to put myself in the place of the English person and think 
how he thinks because we (Palestinians and our media) are perhaps failing in how 
to even address British people because we have always talked amongst ourselves 
without paying attention to the outsider(s).
Comments similar to Ibrahim’s above referring to the importance, sometimes expressed 
as a duty (my emphasis), of engaging with different viewpoints came up again and again 
in the informants’ accounts, pointing to the ways in which the informants were reflexive 
about their choices. That said, this reflexivity often turned into an essentialising ‘us’ and 
‘them’ dichotomy. The following comment by Lutfi points to these contradictions:
I read the Financial Times, out of preference... I also read the Jewish Chronicle 
regularly. I pick it up from the newsagent because I want to see what they write 
and how they report the news. I find it very interesting, but what really grabs my 
attention are the editorials and letters to the editor. I myself occasionally write 
letters to the editors to complain about something. And, of course, I have the 
Arabic satellite channels. Really television is on all the time, al-Jazeera, Sky, 
BBC 24, the terrestrial channels though they concentrate on domestic issues.
8.5 The News Audience: Competent and Emotional?
In talking about the varied and polarised news representations, many informants, 
particularly, though not exclusively, women, became emotional and angry, suggesting
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that their engagement with news is not a passive activity, but rather an expressive23 
activity that had a significant relevance on the ways in which they negotiated processes of 
identification and boundary-mapping. This emerges in Mona’s comment:
I am fed up with the words they (the Western news media) use.. .sometimes even 
on Arabic channels. The other day I heard them referring to a Palestinian attack. I 
am so cross that if I have a chance I will go there and pull the presenter’s hair 
because she said ‘Palestinian attack’ and this totally wrong particularly when you 
have a class of society watching the news with little background about the 
conflict. It gives them the wrong ideas, that we are the attackers.
Referring to the news audience as affective and emotional brings to attention the need to 
think of the news audience as diverse and the need to address the different contexts that 
impinge on the news audience’s level of investment in news -  these notions challenge the 
conventional notions of news as the resource the ‘rational’ citizen uses to address issues 
related to political processes and participation.
Though the study of emotion has often been reduced to its psychological or 
physiological dimensions, it is useful to take account of in socio-cultural perspectives 
because emotional discourse can acquire special meanings as a communicative 
performance in particular contexts. As Abu-Lughoud and Lutz (1990:11) argue, ‘emotion 
and discourse should not be treated as separate variables, the one pertaining to the private
world of individual consciousness and the other to the public social world emotional
talk must be interpreted as in and about social life’ (emphasis in original). Van Zoonen 
(2004) extends a similar argument in relation to emotion, pointing to the similarities 
between participating in a private leisure-based group, such as the fan community, and in
23 This should not be confused with notions of the active audience, discussed in Chapter Three.
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a public group, such as the political environment, while Boltanski (1999) uses a 
philosophical argument in which he argues that the media-staged emotions are close to 
fictional emotion, which people, or audiences, counter by maintaining “an orientation 
towards action, a disposition to act, even if is this only by speaking” (Boltanski 1999: 
153). Indeed, what was interesting was that the informants’ emotional discourses were 
accompanied by a hardening of divides and assertions of difference, suggesting that the 
informants were also aware of the power frameworks of society, their own limitations 
and their “belief that speaking is acting” (ibid: 154) (emphasis in original). The following 
quote from Mansour illustrates how talk reflects the symbolic hardening of divides:
Mansour: September 11 had affected everyone socially and emotionally. We cannot 
deny that.. .1 sympathise (with the victims and with the perpetrators), but not to the 
extent that I become extremist. I was affected personally because I am convinced that 
the West and the US are trying to harm the reputation of Islam and the Palestinians.
There is little doubt that the use of emotional discourse is contextual — what I mean by 
this is that it can be influenced by the particular contexts within which it is produced, 
both spatial and temporal. The spatial context is important as it refers to the fact that 
many respondents’ emotional responses to news were not made in private — they were 
made in households, with friends, in cafes and other public places, confirming how these 
interactive processes reinforce ‘normative and regulative mechanisms’ such as the 
‘shared’ understanding of contextual codes and social practices (cf. Livingstone 1998) 
and also because of pressures of being part of a self-defined group. This shared 
understanding of contextual codes and practices suggests that these codes and practices 
do not need to have been experienced - ‘experience’ here has two meanings, as illustrated
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in the following extracts from different interviews. The first comment is by Um Ali, who 
is obsessed with news:
I live with the story. I am with it, with the event. I imagine myself a lot, running, 
being hit, being killed. I imagine my son (who was shot in Lebanon) all the time, all 
the time. I remember this young girl who was killed. This girl was killed in Ramadan. 
She will never go from my mind and, of course, Mohammed al-Durra.. .we are living 
with him. They always show his picture and in the songs. The songs.. .this girl, I can 
never forget and the mothers. Never, never. I dream about them. I imagine I am the 
mother and that something has happened to my children.. .god forbid.
The following comment by Ruba (19) who does not engage with news on a regular basis, 
shows how news still shapes her understandings and sense of self, her community and her 
surroundings because she consumes it through her family and friends.
The news I grew up with (are) from my father’s stories about his life and exile and 
how he built himself. There is no way to use common sense when you think about 
this because as far as Palestine goes (sic) it (the story) is very emotional. But then the 
Western part of me comes in by thinking why should someone have to give his home 
to someone else? What you hear from the news just.. .just doesn’t fit and anything or 
with common sense.
At the same time, emotional discourses relate to temporal dimensions. Indeed, the 
drawing of boundaries was particularly evident in the informants’ reflections on their 
engagement with news following the second intifada. This is illustrated in the following 
quotes, the first by Fadwa, and the second by Ibrahim, in separate interviews:
When we first came here in 1976, we did not say we were Palestinians. There was no 
awareness of that amongst the host population. After the second intifada, things have 
changed. What makes you wonder is that the average English person is beginning to 
ask you questions about yourself and you start wondering.. .what does it all mean?
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The news has affected our cause and our lives.. .it had a comprehensive effect on all 
fronts.. .from a general level as well as from a personal and collective level, it made 
people change their views about us.
8.6 Loss of Critical Distance
Fadwa’s comments, expressed with anger and emotion, suggest that the process of 
boundary drawing could not be undertaken from a critical distance24, or ideological 
distance, as it forced into the open questions of her Palestinian-ness25, or what it means to 
be Palestinian, which for her and others who had considered themselves integrated with 
British society, had never been a crucial marker of difference. This notion emerges in the 
following comment by Maha:
Now they are saying we (the Palestinians) are terrorists. What we see on 
television (the Arabic channels) actually opens the question of where terrorism is, 
with us or with them (sic). They are our enemies or, as they claim, we are their 
enemies, but they are harming us in a way that we are not harming them. If we 
talk exclusively about Palestine.. .What has made the world feel with Israel or 
show sympathy to it? It’s because they always show that image. We don’t have 
that image. They (Western media) show that Arabs are always the problem. This 
is our problem. Our media is not the same as theirs. Our media has ignored certain 
things. The Europeans, the Americans and the Jews, the media there is stronger 
than ours. This is because they are with Israel. They always tell us the roots of the 
Arabs and also show things that may not apply to us or be within us. For instance, 
now they are saying that we are terrorists. What we see on television raises the 
questions of where terrorism is, with us or with them.
24 This is related to the notion of critical audience (see Lunt and Livingstone 1994; Leibes and Katz 1992). 
Leibes and Katz say the audience critical abilities refer to the ability by audience members to distance 
themselves from the spectacle itself in order to make inferences concerning the media makers’ intentions 
and to impute intentions to the media producers other than those presented by the media programmes.
25 This is based on common attributes of this identity discussed in Chapter Four.
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It is within such contexts that the informants’ thinking about their position in the host 
society can easily become frozen as they resort to rigid templates that subordinate their 
thinking about themselves to a defensive scheme. Importantly, it is during their making 
sense of ‘mediated’ news accounts that the respondents’ normal positions of reflexivity 
and ambivalence about their cultural and social identification in the diasporic space 
become closed down, bringing out rhetoric of dogmatic resolution. This is how Raad (20) 
puts these notions across:
I watch the news and I get very, very sad. I used to discuss it a lot with my 
friends, including Jewish friends. I am actually surprised at myself now, because I 
am touched by the Palestinians and what had happened to them. All their lives, 
the West has been using the word terrorism to describe them and to give Israel the 
excuse it needs, but how can the world continue watching. At the end of the day, it 
is clear that Israel does not want to give in or to change and they just want to go on 
occupying the land. I actually feel with the suicide bombers and support them 
now.
And the following comment by Wael in a group interview with four of his friends in 
London: “It is sad to see all the killings, but if I was there, I would do the same. I would 
not go to the extent of becoming a martyr. But I feel that they have no option.”
These processes of dogmatic thinking can be partially explained by Herzfeld’s26 notion 
of ‘cultural intimacy’ which draws attention to aspects of identity that are considered as
77sources of external embarrassment , but nevertheless provides insiders with an assurance 
of a common sociality. At the same time, they can be explained by the continuous tension
26 Herzfeld has argued that the boundary-making processes that engendered nationalism and prejudice in 
the first place remain a pervasive character of human society.
27 Indeed, Palestinians are often embarrassed by references to them as Islamists or as terrorists, though they 
do not want to admit that in public.
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in the project of construction of collective (national) identity, where struggle for 
recognition and participation is necessary when the self-understanding of a group is not 
reflected in the understanding by others. This lack of understanding of the self by others 
emerges in Hussein’s comment:
I personally believe that people are guided by the information they receive. So, 
you cannot restrict yourself to the stories on British news channels. It is clear, 
when there is a suicide operation and when they (Israel) attack Palestinian homes 
in retaliation, the coverage is totally different. They show you blood and people 
carried away (in the attack), but they definitely do not focus on this when it comes 
to the Palestinian story. Arabic television shows you what happens.
8.7 Between Palestinian-ism and Cosmopolitanism
Crucially, it was in the informants’ contrasting of different news narrations that the 
tension between the personal and the collective or the particular and the cosmopolitan 
was played out in the interviews, and it was within such contexts that comments such as 
“now, I am Palestinian” or “I am becoming more Palestinian” were voiced by various 
informants, irrespective of their age, gender, socio-economic status or religious 
orientations, making it possible to understand them as reflecting defensive, emotional 
reactions to perceptions of exclusion, non-recognition and non-visibility in the British 
public sphere, including in the mainstream media. Judith (28) is clear about this:
The news has affected us, also me personally. If we talk of coverage of the 
intifada, the only thing that is being said is that we are Islamic terrorist and that 
these people (the suicide bombers) are brainwashed and you feel the mainstream
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media does not want to talk about anything else or tell the story. There is not 
enough analysis of us or awareness of the problem.. .This is why I  feel different, 
that we are different. (My emphasis)
And in the comment by Maher, a young adult during an interview with his mother and a 
friend: “The news (on the BBC and CNN) makes me anxious or angry. Sometimes, 
without intending to, I develop anti-Jewish attitudes even though you don’t want to 
really. But when you see something on the news, about Israel, for instance, you cannot 
but become like that.”
These comments suggest that although the process of identification in itself suggests 
fluidity, people’s identifications can “feel essential and natural” at the level of experience 
(cf. Ang 2000) and at the level of emotion. Indeed, as argued in Chapter Two, 
essentialising discourses about identity remain crucial to boundary-making processes as 
they operate to naturalise (rather than problematise) the construction of a politically 
categorised group as being identifiable and characterised by a core essence, whether real 
or imagined, thus resulting in impasse and closure reflected in hegemonic discourses of 
Us and Them, which on the face of it appear to render the differences within and between 
the informants invisible. Bashar (22) says:
I did not feel this way (as a Palestinian) before, but when the intifada happened 
and all the (television) pictures, it became clear to me that it was important to be 
with people you care and to care. I had Jewish friends then, but they don’t care 
about this. Also, the English in general are not interested and the Arab community 
here is divided, lots of division. Frankly, this has made me want to get out of 
there. I feel there is no real community and I feel a stranger. Everybody keeps to 
themselves and I am beginning to feel it does not work.
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The ambivalent relations between the T  and the ‘we’ was a consistent feature of many of 
the interviews, drawing attention to the tension between the two, as well as their co­
existence while pointing to how the rhetorical appeal of the collective or the particular, 
the “self’ is given meaning through its relation to the collective. Indeed, the rhetoric of 
belonging came into clear relief in the informants’ accounts of what it means to be 
Palestinian -  most said this meant an identification with an entity called Palestine 
(irrespective of what and where the borders of this entity are, or what political structure it 
has); that Palestinians in diaspora have the right to return to that homeland, that the 
struggle against Israel is justified and that Western policy and Western media are biased 
towards Israel, repeating rhetorical language of collective dispossession, struggle and 
return which has come to index Palestinian-ness and which has found voice in Palestinian 
political mythologies and nationalist discourses.
Such discourses of ‘Palestinian-ness’ imply that being Palestinian is a taken-for- 
granted attribute, one that people acquire through kinship and family ties, thus pointing to 
essentialist aspects of identification that presume identity as a fixed, given entity. This is 
how a woman in her mid-50s put it: “I am Palestinian. It is something inside me. I feel 
connected. It is in your blood.”
Interestingly, however, while most of those interviewed for this research identified 
themselves as Palestinian, many said that being Palestinian meant being different and/or 
unique, that being Palestinian meant being the underdog or the victim, but also resisting 
and struggling, conforming with public and nationalistic discourses about Palestinian- 
ness. Some even suggested that being Palestinian meant being different from other Arabs,
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pointing to how identification with this core essence is dictated by political rather than by 
ethnic28 considerations. This emerges in the following comment by Wael (28):
I was bom a Palestinian and I have memories. In Palestine, you are with your 
family so what can I tell you. I do not depend on the community or the idea of the 
community. When I see a Palestinian, I feel very happy. To be honest with you, 
there is a problem with the Arabs and the Gulf people. We have our own culture 
and our own dialect even. Even though we were bom outside Palestine and live 
outside it, we still feel Palestinian, Our thoughts are Palestinian, everything, our 
customs our traditions and even our food and the way we bring up our children 
we tell them we are Palestinian.
The following excerpt during a group interview with four 50-plus women in London also 
brings across the notion of distinctiveness:
Fadwa: I am ashamed to say I am an Arab, but not ashamed to say I am Palestinian. 
Mona: It is not a cultural thing, when you are talking about Arab culture, of course 
there is a lot in common, but perhaps not politically.
8.8 Tensions of Belonging
Such particularistic (exclusionary) dimensions of what it means to be Palestinian weave 
through most of the informants’ accounts of ‘belonging and longing’, the third 
interrelated theme that threads through the informants’ narratives. As suggested in 
previous chapters, the concept of belonging remains problematic because it constitutes a 
political and cultural field of global contestation that highlights a range of pertinent issues 
concerning relations between individuals, groups and communities (Hedetoft and Hjort
28 Palestinians share with other Arabs some of the key distinguishing features of ethnic groups (cf. Smith 
1983) — for example, language, culture, religion, geographic territory in the broad sense and customs.
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2002). These contestations become more pertinent when connections between people and 
their homeland are threatened as it is under such conditions that ‘identities’ are thought of 
and constructed as related to space. This is reflected in Mahmoud’s comment in a group 
interview in Manchester:
I was bom in Palestine, but left when I was five. So to talk of memories is perhaps 
not appropriate in my case, and yet there is a feeling of something like nostalgia 
for the street and the homeland. There are no personal memories, but when you 
live in Kuwait and Britain and whether you are rich or poor, you remain a 
Palestinian and a refugee and you remain not accepted in these societies and you 
have to resolve these problems. What do you when you have this feeling of 
longing and this notion that you may ‘never’ go back?
The tensions between longing and be-longing also come across in Jamil’s comment
below:
I feel part of the society here, but I am not here out of my own choice. Perhaps that 
would be different if I have the chance to go back. You can say this is my adopted 
country, but even with adoption, one has a choice. I simply don’t and I feel strongly 
about this because I would like to go back.
However, despite (or along with) these essentialising notions, respondents were reflexive 
about longing and belonging, suggesting that where people feel they belong (the cultural 
or ethnic home) may not match objective ascriptions of membership (to the political or 
civic home) and that belonging separates into its two constituent parts: ‘being’ in one 
place, and ‘longing’ for another (Hedetoft and Hjort 2002: ix). Maha, for instance, says 
that she feels integrated in British society and that is reflected in her ‘social’ interactions, 
but still makes the crucial distinction that her ‘feelings’ are Palestinian: “Psychologically,
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I cannot be but Palestinian.” While Omar, a 35-year-old middle-class businessman, is 
more reflexive in his assessment of belonging and the tensions involved:
London is an extremely cosmopolitan city and it is difficult to define exactly who 
is a traditional British person here. The standard definition of what it means to be 
British is blurred. This country is my home now and I feel integrated in as much 
as I am capable of doing anything in this country that anybody purely British can 
do. At the same time, however, I have my political identifications and attachments 
to Palestine.. .1 guess it is because I also feel comfortable when I go back.
Before bringing up the instances where the contestations inherent in the concept of 
belonging come across in the interview material, it is relevant to outline, albeit briefly, 
the diversity of the respondents in terms of how they place themselves in the diasporic 
space. First, there are those informants who say they are fully integrated into British 
society. These are generally the first generation migrants who arrived in the UK for 
business and trade reasons. Second, there is the category of more recent arrivals into 
Britain, such as the political asylum seekers, who for different reasons remain more 
involved and in touch with what is going on in the homeland. Then there is the category 
of the young adults and children, those mainly bom in Britain, who see themselves as 
British, but whose sense of belonging has been disrupted by the intensity and severity of 
events, making them more aware of the diversity of positions they are invited or able to 
choose to take up, in varying contexts, and prompting questions such as “Who am I?”, 
“Where do I speak from?” and “Who is speaking for me?”
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Many of the informants in this study said they were not members of, or involved in, the 
various Palestinian organisations in Britain,29 noting that these were overtly political and 
factional, or too Moslem-centrist. Most respondents, irrespective of the categorisation 
outlined above, talked of being influenced by a variety of cultures, emphasising that their 
sense of belonging cannot only be related to ethnicity or nationality. Ruba, the 19-year 
old London-born Palestinian, is eloquent in articulating how her beliefs and lived 
experiences all influenced her identification:
It is always difficult being in a place where people don’t really know about you and 
their minds are filled with media and what they see on the news. Then, I know I am 
not really English. I was bom here, yes, I was brought up here, my education was 
here. Some of my friends are English, but the people don’t look at me and say she is 
English. I don’t look it, I’m always going to be different. It’s difficult.. .when you 
were kids you knew that children don’t know much. So if they say something bad 
about me it is because of that. But when you get older and you still hear people saying 
something bad about you, then you start defending yourself. You just start, you know. 
You get into a flap and you probably use the wrong arguments and then you start 
using your mind. You start realizing that there’s gonna be people who don’t like you 
and there’s gonna be others who do and then you just go along with people that like 
you. That’s all right. There are plenty of people in the world.. .it is not a big deal.
Other informants said they were comfortable being in Britain and that their experience of 
living in Britain was positive in many ways — their accounts reflected a sense of 
belonging to the cosmopolitan, or identification with the cosmopolitan aspect of living in 
Britain. This was particularly evident among respondents living in London. Such is the 
case of Mansour, who has been living in London since the late 1960s: “I feel I am 
integrated with the cosmopolitan aspect of Britain, of London. Living in London reminds
29 Many respondents were wary about talking of their political affiliations in the open. This is not surprising 
considering that many felt anxious about their position in the host country as well as about their relations 
with other Arab states and the homeland.
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me of the Palestinian hara (neighbourhood). I have no problems in Britain. Whenever I 
come back to London (after a trip), I feel it is home.” Similar notions of what it means to 
be a cosmopolitan emerge in Reem’s comment:
I am integrated with the cosmopolitan aspect of British society. Probably more 
than I am with the Palestinian society, the diaspora or whatever. I am not 
integrated with it or with the total absolute English side, but the cosmopolitan 
side. I like it here on Portobello road, with the Jamaicans, Spanish and 
Portuguese. We are all foreigners here and even the English are foreigners. This 
place reminds me of the hara (the neighbourhood). A couple of the guys who sell 
the strawberries shout and say ‘look, these are from Palestine.’ They get so 
excited about it and they sold me a box for one pound. I like this. It is home.
Many of the informants said they identified with Western values, saying they were loyal 
to Britain not only for giving them a home and a refuge, but also because of its legal 
systems and respect for human values, identifications that were in stark contrast to the 
emotive and affective identifications and discourses of belonging to the collective. 
Husam, a young political asylum seeker, illustrates this:
We have to remember that Britain has treated us differently. It is not because the 
British like us, but because they have a law and this is good because I feel 
protected. Unfortunately, you do not find this in the Arab countries, where you are 
treated like a second-class citizen.
As does Ahlam in her reflections on what it means for her to be a global ‘citizen’: “It 
(what it means to be Palestinian and what it means to be a cosmopolitan) is a fine line 
really.. .But the chances are that in Britain I feel more protected and I identify with the 
human element of my identity, where I feel an equal citizen of the world.” Beck (2003),
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in his definition of Europe as cosmopolitan, notes tha t.. .’’in the face of growing 
transnational interconnections and obligations, Europe is turning into an open network 
with blurring boundaries, where the outside is already inside” (Beck 2003: 238). In this 
respect, cosmopolitan citizens of Europe can be defined by their capacity to internalise 
the other, as individuals who incorporate otherwise global cultures into their own sense of 
themselves.
The informants’ discourses suggest that they are often comfortably cosmopolitan in the 
exact sense that Beck’s definition of the term implies, while suggesting that they are also 
sensitive to the presence of the other, or as Beck puts it that the outside is already inside. 
This sensitivity to the other was evident in their discourses about the World Trade Centre 
attacks in 2001 and their expressions of sympathy to the victims as well as in some 
informants’ criticism of Palestinian suicide bombings and sympathy to Jewish victims as 
well. Mona, for example, discussed how upset she was about the death of innocent 
people, including Jews, in the attacks, but then went on to say how this was also harmful 
to the Palestinians.
In their reflections on belonging and home, some of the informants said belonging 
meant they socialised with some others, thus pointing to how they construct real 
boundaries along with the symbolic ones they construct through discourse, others said 
there was also a need to integrate with and share the cultural values of the host culture, 
suggesting that the attachment of Palestinian diasporic communities to a particular place 
is shaped through the never-ending dialogue between communities and cultures, through 
the multiplicity of these members’ experiences and the interrelation of the multiple 
identities and their members (cf. Hall 1992; Gillespie 1995; Georgiou 2001). However,
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there was a sense that it was because they felt secure in Britain that some respondents felt 
confident enough to talk about themselves and their concerns in times of crises as well as 
to take part in societal action, which may not have happened in another place, therefore 
attesting to their comfort with be-longing and with being in British society. The following 
exchange in a group interview with four women in London illustrates this:
Ilham: To be honest with you, I am grateful and happy to be living here, to be 
given a chance. This country has given me the freedom of speech which we do not 
have back home. And, this has helped us to see ourselves as equal because we 
know that the law is superior.
Lama: I would like to add another point here. It is true we can acclimatise with 
English people, but we prefer to be with our own people.
Ilham: of course, of course.
Lama: Even Arab Jews30,1 have some friends like that, and I prefer their 
company to the English because I understand them.
Mona: But as women we have developed in a way different than if we were in the 
homeland. This means we have developed as human beings. Of course, at the end 
of the day we like to be together and speak to each other in Arabic and talk and 
laugh at the same time. We suffer together and feel the same pain when we see 
the news. When it comes to women, I consider myself to be the fortunate one. 
Lama: This is not a question about women only. It is more than that. This 
morning, I woke to a phone call from my mother in Jordan telling me off and 
asking me why was I calling for a boycott of Israeli goods on television. My 
mother is worried because she has been taught to be a coward. So I told her that 
there are also Jews and British people with us protesting and that I was not alone, 
but she insisted that I was doing something wrong, simply because I was (filmed) 
on Arabic television and (filmed) speaking in Arabic which everyone can 
understand. She was worried and told me not to get involved, but to stay at home 
with the kids.
Importantly, it was in their reflections on and talk about the diverse news narratives of the 
continuous crises related to the conflict with Israel that modes of identification with the 
collective, what I call a Palestine-centred identification, became prevalent. This was a
30 She was referring to Iraqi Jews.
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discursive identification that gains a double meaning; as excluding others and as 
demanding recognition31 and visibility in the national public sphere32, resulting in the 
respondents’ active engagement in the process of drawing boundaries within which they 
differentiated between who is Palestinian and who is not, who is a member of the in and 
who is not. Fadwa illustrates this clearly in her comment: “Now I am becoming more 
Palestinian”. Such particularistic notions, the interview material showed, were clearly 
linked to the intensive and extensive flows and counter-flows of information and analyses 
of events by diverse news media, which served to disturb the informants’ normal 
‘cultural’ and ‘political’ reference points, contributing to closed and exclusionary 
narrations of their identification. Randa also makes this clear:
In the past when people asked me I used to say I came from Jordan. It was easier, but 
recently I feel the need to say I am Palestinian and to say that I am a Christian 
Palestinian to counter the image that it is an Islamic cause, it is not, we (Christian 
Palestinians) have a big presence. I sometimes wear a big cross to emphasise that. I 
never used to say where I came from, but after the intifada and what is going on, I am 
saying I am Palestinian as I feel very strongly about this issue particularly as people 
and the media stir things up.
These discourses were not exclusive to women, as the following comment by 22-year-old 
Bashar confirms:
I feel Palestinian because my identity is under threat. I do not feel that I can assert 
myself. I am in a state of limbo which is why it is hard for me to stay here. There 
is no way to solidify my identity, nothing. I don’t have a group to turn to. So I am 
practicing my Arabic to go back. I have felt a big change since 2000.
31 These notions of recognition/non-recognition and belonging/non-belonging have been rendered 
problematic by the social changes of modernity and the increasing mediation of everyday lives.
32 It was in this sphere that the US binary logic of ‘you are either with us, or against us’ were hammered 
home incessantly through the mainstream media, bringing into question the possibility of cosmopolitan 
identifications.
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As detailed in Chapters Two and Four, it is not unusual for people such as the 
Palestinians to have multiple identifications. What comes across in the interviews, 
however, is that their discourses of belonging to or identifying with the cosmopolitan 
aspect of everyday life in Britain cannot (my emphasis) be seen as a substitute for or 
alternative to natural assumptions of national rootedness and homeness, but rather as an 
extension or complement to the national (my emphasis). This is how Maha puts it:
I am 90 per cent Palestinian. Psychologically and emotionally, I cannot be but 
Palestinian. But I also feel integrated in this society for the social aspects. Living 
here has rubbed off on me. For instance, I have learned the importance of keeping 
appointments. This is not a Palestinian custom. It is here and in some other 
aspects of living here that I feel British, but not in others. I cannot and never will 
be.
The notions of what it means to be Palestinian outlined above may suggest that the 
informants’ accounts of Palestinian-ness reflect a homogeneous ‘we’ and ‘us’. However, 
the interview material showed that despite projecting themselves within the contours of a 
‘we-centred’ or a ‘Palestine-centred’ identification, informants differed in how they 
conceptualised this identification within the framework of their everyday experiences in 
diaspora, including their engagement with news. Some simply said they were Palestinian, 
some emphasised the Moslem component of their identifications (here, they also 
identified with the Islamic nation as a whole), while others said they were British 
Palestinian or British Arabs.
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Such discourses suggested that they were engaged in creative ambivalence about 
belonging and community as they alternated between rational and emotional talk of what 
it means to be Palestinian (Palestinian-ness) and what it means to feel Palestinian 
(Palestinian-ism), reflecting how negotiating identity is a continuous process of 
identification.
What was clear was that negotiating this creative ambivalence is a complex process as 
it involves continuous movement and tension between self-reflexivity and a group — 
and/or nation-awareness and reflexivity. Indeed, this tension came up in contrastive and 
reflexive discussions and thinking about belonging and community, not only as part of a 
specific group, but also as members of the host society and as citizens of the world, 
reflecting how the construction of a national or collective identity remains a problematic 
concept whose meanings remain contested. This emerges in the following comment by 
Adeeb:
I define myself as Palestinian, but there is no particular reason for that. However, I 
have never felt anything but. I used to say I am Lebanese to people because I don’t 
want to have the whole discussion about Palestinian and Israel.. .It may be because I 
have a lot of common with the Palestinians. I cannot find anything really to relate to 
the English. Not that I have anything against them. Funnily enough, I also have a lot 
in common with Jews in London. There are a lot of them who live around here. But I 
always felt, I don’t know, it is the old cliche, stuck to my own group.
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8.9 News and Memory Work; Past and Present, I and We
The informants’ discourses reflect how the taking up of particular boundaries and 
positionings is not random, but involves reflexive and thinking processes about the self33 
and about the collective that provide the dimensions through which people can 
experience a sense of oneself and the collective as located in a temporally extended 
narrative.34 Drawing on the interview material, this thesis suggests that news, 
particularly television news, is a suitable genre for understanding this location within an 
extended narrative because of its constant mediation of the past in the present and 
between personal and collective memories. The past intrudes in the present by acting as a 
carrier of symbolism and connotative force (see Hoskins 2004). The following comment 
by Hussein Said shows how news mediate these processes by constructing a view of the 
world as a perpetual and pervasive present:
What come to my mind (when watching the news on TV today) are images from the 
past, Sabra and Shatila35 and the exile of the Palestinians. These will never be wiped 
out of my mind. When you see Mohammed al-Durra36, you are reminded of the past 
and you start hating Israel even more. Something like this makes me really angry. 
These stories bring back memories. Of course, they do. But it is not a news story 
itself, it is when you follow a story every day, it becomes a life story, connected to 
your life story. And this happens every day. (My emphasis)
33 Although individualism (the self) remains a central value in the traditional and still prevalent Arab- 
Islamic worldview, unlike its conception in Western culture as a unifying concept that may set a limit to 
group involvement, individualism among Arab people and in Arab cultures is composed of both group and 
individual identifications, thus reflecting the sense that each complements the other (Ayish 2003).
34 See Chapter Four for a discussion on memory and representation.
35 This is a reference to the 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese-based refugee camps of 
Sabra and Shatila.
36 The 12-year-old boy killed by gunfire in the arms of his father.
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Hussein’s comment illustrates how news can provoke memories in different ways, 
confirming that it can serve as a ‘framework’ of memory for its audience through its 
reproduction and repetition of past events and its mediation of the past in the present. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in informants’ discourses about their engagement 
with Arabic transnational channels’ news programmes. The following two excerpts, first 
during an interview with Saws an her husband and son Bashar, at their home in North 
London, and the second with Hussein:
Sawsan: The news on these (Arabic) channels reminds us of what has happened to us 
and to our families. .. .the memories are very clear and do not go with the loss of the 
homeland. Deir Yassin371 always remember.
Bashar: All the recent events also make me think of Palestine. When I switch on the 
TV, there are the 15 year old bombers and the children stone throwers and you know 
the Palestinians are defenceless and this is what we have to do against the military 
might of Israel.
Hussein: News is about memories. Of course, but it is not the story itself because the 
story is there every day and in this way, it becomes a life story. In addition, and this is 
particularly important when talking about Arabic current affairs programmes and 
analyses, the presenter starts with something like ‘On a day like this’, so and so 
happened.. .of course, this brings things back.
In talking about news, the informants often began their stories in the present then worked 
their way back to the past, before going back to the present again. The constant weaving 
of the past into the present and the private into the public (the singular I into the plural 
we) brings into analytical focus the centrality of event time (cf. Giltin 1980), or the
37 This is an important date in the Palestinian national calendar and refers to the killing of hundreds of 
Palestinians in a village.
38 This contrasts with the work of Rosemary Sayigh (1998), who in her study of life histories of Palestinian 
women in the refugee camp of Shatila found that the starting point of narratives was invariably 1948, not 
only among those who have experienced the events of expulsion, but also among the younger generation 
who would have been too young to remember (“Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History,” Journal 
o f Palestine Studies 27, 2.)
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‘experience’ of time in processes of mediation and which draw attention to the ways in 
which news can “operate as a framework of memory39 as it assists in the continuous 
reconstruction of the past by dominating the present” (Hoskins 2004:110). Indeed, the 
informants’ discourses, but particularly those by the older generation, appeared to move 
constantly between different historical registers. At times this would take the form of 
simple comparison, like comparing their life now with how it used to be in the past, and 
at times it would be moving between events that had significance in their lives.
Importantly, it was in this sustained interweaving of present and past that they tended 
to use the plural ‘we’ and ‘us’, reflecting how the personal can become political. This 
comes across in the comment by Husam in a group interview with his friends:
One day I brought a friend to my house and we watched al-Jazeera together and he 
started crying. But this is normal for us, for him he had no idea. For me because of 
living the first intifada (in 1987) in real life, it was normal.. .and the news brings back 
those days a lot, a lot.. .news is me, my life, my past and what I  see now I  used to see 
in real life. When I see the martyrs, the killing, the shooting, the destruction, there is 
no doubt in my mind that it is me.
Comments such as “the news is us” or “the news is me” were repeatedly used by the 
informants. The use of the pronoun ‘us’ is not only indicative of the ‘us and them’ 
dichotomy that evokes notions of segregation and difference, according centrality to ‘our 
story rather than theirs’, but also crucially points to how the experiences of ‘here-and- 
now’ lose their immediate spatio-temporal references as times of distances are ‘plugged 
in’ to the present time system of television news. Lash (2002) has identified these
39 Andrew Hoskins (2004) has argued that the time and speed of mediated events have greater applicability 
and meaning today because the blurring of the public and the private, and the personal and political 
domains become part of the loss of context.
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experiences as shifts in mediated experience, whereby the “mass media and the new 
media are media of not representation, but of presentation.. ..The newer media of 
presentation come to you. They turn up in your house and present themselves.. .in real 
time” (Lash 2002: 71).
This notion of the collapse of the past in the present reflects how informants’ 
narrations can be seen as being ‘mediated’ by news,40 where the meanings of news 
extend beyond the moment of consumption, and where news does not only provide a 
shared agenda for discussion, but also a ‘shared media experience’ (Couldry 2000:35). 
This comes across in the following excerpt during a group interview in London:
Ibrahim: The news, what do you mean.. ..I AM the news. I have been here for 10 
months, but my dreams at night are still of the camps. I see myself running and the 
Jews41 (what he means are Israelis) are running after me. This is my life. The first 
thing I do is to turn on the news in the morning because it is my life. We have been 
moulded this way.
Husam: Before the intifada, it was all the same for me. But the news of the intifada 
was different, because it is part of me, because I was there in the first intifada. The 
news brings this back to me. When I see the martyrs, the killing, the shooting and the 
destruction of homes, it is me, of course, there is no doubt.
And also in the following comment by Maha in a separate interview:
Television news tells you our story. The images clearly show you the agony and the 
sadness. Sometimes, they show you old people wearing the Palestinian headdress and 
it is here that I feel my heart singing. But also the news pulls at my heart and makes 
me cry, particularly when a peasant woman is shown using our dialect and talking 
about how the land was stolen. But as much as I feel sad, I also feel happy because 
this is the story, our story. The old woman and the homeland and the orange groves 
and I can see and imagine how this woman is going through... You start thinking
40 Frith (1996), writing about music consumption, has argued that symbolic products can construct 
mediated experiences that can be made sense of by taking on both subjective and collective positionings.
41 It was interesting that many respondents often referred to Israelis as Jews, reflecting how the political and 
the religious are sometimes intertwined categories.
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about the stories that your mother had told you, the stories o f the past. Really, you 
remember everything from home and you remember even i f  you did not actually live 
there.
8.10 Interpretation and Commuting- Uses of News
The processes that the informants drew on to make sense of the news of the crises and the 
diverse representations were interpretative — informants built on and contrasted the news 
event with their own experiences and the experiences of others known to them, thus 
allowing them to negotiate the most important sources of tensions in their everyday lives, 
including tensions about their status in the host society and about their personal security. 
At the same time, in making sense of news, respondents moved between the news stories 
and their own lives, serving to blur the boundaries between real and mediated experiences 
while also drawing analogies between themselves and the news stories — analogies are 
relevant because they point to shared elements and shared and/or collective memories 
that the informants may use to either prove or disprove the credibility of a news story.
Commuting42 often involves an activation of roles — cultural, professional and 
ideological, whereby the implications of general social issues for particular roles and 
situations can be considered and weighed against experience and knowledge.
Commuting, as Livingstone (1998) notes, takes place at an interpretive level because 
people relate to news through their personal experience or through the experiences of 
others, but also at the narrative level because it is through story-telling that people 
understand and make sense of what is going on around them. Narratives thus emerge as
42 The process of commuting, as Liebes and Katz (1993) see it, refers to the ways in which reception of 
symbolic products involves a continual shift between the story and the viewers’ lives.
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people actively move between the private and the public, the personal and the political, 
the past and the present, as well as between the rational and the emotional.
Commuting took up a lot of narrative space in the interviews, reflecting how the 
informants’ personal and collective memories were continually projected onto the news. 
Mansour, for example, commuted to his visits to his uncle’s house in the West Bank 
village of Aseera to describe how he experiences his identity today:
When you ask me about my identity.. .1 go back to my relatives in the Occupied 
Territories. My identity is my memories of my life with them. It comes from a picture 
hung in the main living room in my uncle’s house. It was a picture of Deir Yassin that 
my uncle had framed. You cannot escape it. It has shaped my vision.. .but it (my 
identity) also comes from the daily reminder in the news. There is no escape. You 
feel it is never ending.43
The respondents’ switch from the past to the present and from one event to another 
suggests that the news these respondents interact with offers them an entry point, or the 
green light, to think and talk about their own narrative, and to locate these narratives in a 
time dimension that extends into the past and future, what Hoskins (2001) calls extended 
present. What was interesting, though, was how some respondents’ narratives appeared to 
be contingent, accentuating a sense of suffering as deriving from chaotic forces and 
without meaning. This is clearly conveyed in the comment by Um Ali:
I watch the news and live with the story. I live with it. I imagine myself there and feel 
as though they (the Israelis) have hit me, killed me. Those children are like my 
children. I am always there (in Palestine). I start to cry. This little girl who was 
martyred and Mohammed al-Durra.. .we live with them, with him. They (Arab 
satellite channels) always show his picture dying in his father’s arms. But these 
children, their images, I cannot forget. I dream of them all the time. You see, I
43 This narrative, as well as others’, come across as disconnected fragments where accounts of the personal 
narrative are often absent from the story.
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imagine myself. I am a mother. God forbid I have a son or daughter and this 
happening to them, but I imagine myself there, with them.
This particular respondents’ narrative reflects an identification that is a psychological 
process whereby the viewer projects herself on to the characters and their dilemmas. It is 
during these processes that we can think of identity as an experience, particularly when 
sense-making is a process of negotiating one’s place in society that is enacted through the 
process of intepellation, or summoning whoever is listening as a secondary witness in 
what Hesford (2004) has called the “rhetorical space of intersubjectivity”.
These processes come into clear relief in the ways in which the informants made use of 
news to narrate their story and to socialise with others - though news is mostly consumed 
in the informants’ homes or in the intimate place, talk about news takes place outside the 
home with friends, over the telephone or during visits, with acquaintances at work or in 
public places, therefore completing the process of communication. In retelling what they 
have watched on television newscasts, what they have heard on the radio or read in the 
papers, the Palestinians interviewed for this research, become storytellers themselves, 
inflecting stories gleaned from their news interaction in ways relevant to their own lives, 
thus moving concerns from the private to the public domain (see Hobson 1989).
This interactivity is a two-way process — people often call their friends to alert them 
about something going on, bringing the home to the community and vice versa. This is 
Um Ali again:
I have a friend who is like me. She also follows the news stories and always calls me 
when something happens. We coordinate sometimes. For instance, she would turn on
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al-Jazeera if I am watching other another and calls me when something happens. 
Sometimes she calls me on my mobile (if I am out) to ask me to go home and turn on 
al-Manar because there is a news flash.
That said, interactivity is not peculiar to the respondents. Indeed, communication, 
particularly in the form of oral expression, has always been a valued practice in Arab 
societies and talk (in families and with friends) is a practice that has roots in embedded 
social and cultural practices. Palestinian social life, like that of many other Arabs, 
depends on endless socialising and visiting. People visit and spend hours in each others’ 
homes and it is not unknown for people to turn up at somebody’s home uninvited, yet to 
expect to partake in that household’s daily practices. As news media saturate the private 
and the public, media and news consumption practices are also influenced by this 
extended sociality, which blurs the boundaries between the private and the public; media 
are communally consumed and news talk becomes an everyday bonding experience, not 
only between family members, but also between friends and work colleagues.
Though telling one’s personal stories always occurs in the present (although their 
content may refer to the past, present or future), what makes narrativised accounts 
interesting for the researcher is the ways in which narrations serve to locate any one event 
in relation to other events, thus making them meaningful. This location of the event in 
relation to others comes into relief when the informants, irrespective of gender, shifted 
the discussion to issues close to their own existence, particularly developments in the 
Palestinian-Israeli narrative, life in Britain, as well as their anxieties and fears, 
conversations that reflect the complexity of their everyday cultural experiences, and the
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ways in which themes of crisis, boundary-making and belonging are interrelated and 
mutually constitutive dynamics in people’s everyday lives.
Most of the informants became more comfortable when diverting from the interview 
questions to discuss politics and personal experiences, which allowed them space to 
personalise and narrativise news stories as they linked them to personal and collective 
experiences. This is an excerpt from the Karim household interview:
Widad: You see, for me, my life is the same as others. When we left Palestine, I was a 
child and my parents suffered. My mother did not have enough milk to feed me and 
the situation was very bad. They left their homes and their lands and slept under trees 
for a while until we arrived at ein el-hilweh camp in Lebanon. I left the camp when I 
got married in 1966, but I did not leave it totally.. .that is why my children feel 
connected.
Crucially for the understanding of news as a mediating framework for the durability of 
collective memory and political mythologies, the informants’ talk suggested that what 
Gitlin (1980) called ‘event times’ are the defining moments that propelled them to think 
about and articulate their identity. Though there is reason to believe that these accounts 
may be articulated differently were the interviews conducted following the 1993 signing 
of the peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians, I argue that the processes that 
media audiences tap into to make sense of the news and define their identities would 
hardly be different.
The interview material shows these processes, commuting, narrativity and story­
telling, are key to making sense of news events, confirming Ricoeur’s (1984) 
theorisation of time and narrative in which he argued that we understand our own lives — 
our own selves and our own places in the world — by interpreting our lives as if they
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were narratives, or, more precisely, through the work of interpreting our lives, we turn 
them into narratives, and life understood as narrative constitutes self-understanding.
Importantly for my argument, what emerges from the interviews is the sense that 
audiences make use of news as ‘ontological narratives’ not only to make sense of their 
lives, but also to act. In this sense, ontological narratives are used to define who we are; 
which, in turn, is a precondition for knowing what to do (Somers and Gibson 1994). This 
‘doing’ will, in turn, produce new narratives and hence new actions, thus underlining the 
ways in which the relationship between narrative and ontology is processual and mutually 
constitutive as both are conditions of the other; neither are a priori. This notion of doing 
(also see previous chapter) comes across in the following comment by Maha:
The news has given me the impetus to discuss it with foreigners.. .1 have a lot of 
English and foreign friends and the news has given me the entry point to show them 
that they have double standards.
Ontological narratives process events into episodes during which processes of 
identification become embedded in spatial and time relations. This comes into clear relief 
in the ways in which respondents’ accounts shifted from discussions of news stories to 
representations of those stories, to the realities of their own lives, thus moving from past to 
present to future and playing a significant role in processes of self and collective 
identification as well as providing a context and a resource for people’s experimentation 
with private and group definitions, or, in other words, drawing boundaries — the subtle, 
shifting and active recognition of the self and the other, and the marking out and 
maintenance of the sense of who belongs and who does not.
303
8.11 News, Events and Identity Work
Chapter Four discussed the centrality of events in the shaping of what it means to be 
Palestinian (Palestinian-ness) and what it means to feel Palestinian (Palestinian-ism).
This chapter has shown that events - in socio-speak, the political and social contexts - are 
central for understanding the ways in which the informants define themselves as 
individuals, as members of a diaspora and as members of a collective.
In summary, two key points need to be made in conjunction with the findings 
presented above: the first suggests that the relationship between news and talk of 
belonging and community can be causal at times of crises, and the second is that news 
can contribute to the creation of a symbolic communicative space.
Through the thematic analysis of the interview material involving a continuous 
movement between the data and theory, this chapter has shown that it is through their 
engagement with the continuous, and, in particular, the televised news stories, of and 
related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, that a sense of an ‘imagined community in 
crisis’ emerges in their talk about news. This consciousness, or what I call a Palestine- 
centred identification, is clearly related to the timing of the research as well as the 
cultural and social positioning of the informants.
At the same time, the interview material shows that it is in their talk about the diverse 
and polarised accounts of the same events that the informants were engaged in creative 
discourses about themselves and the collective, which served to confirm how their talk of 
identity involved movements between closed and essentialising thinking about
304
themselves and their community and open thinking that allowed for the otherness of the 
other, confirming how identity is not a thing, but a continuous discursive process of 
identification.
In making sense of news, the informants used commuting processes that served to 
weave the present in the past and to index particular sites of new trauma44 as trajectories 
of a continuous time, where perceptions of time, post-1948, are forged through dialogical 
imaginations of particular events, al-Nakba, al-Naksa, the first and second intifada, the 
September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, and the war against Iraq, that all served to 
produce narratives of Palestinian-ness as a constantly re-engendered condition of 
suffering, struggle and resistance.
Paradoxically, while the interviews revealed deep-seated ambiguities and 
contradictions regarding the diverse news narratives of the same events, intense emotions 
expressed in the interviews, such as shock, disbelief, anger and mistrust, were tied up 
with a sense of being compelled to engage with news continuously. Though it is difficult 
to draw a line between whether the sense of being compelled to engage with news on a 
regular basis is dictated by the emotional content of news or by the expectations of other 
members of the ‘imagined community’ to participate with such intensity, there is little 
doubt that both of these factors have a profound impact on the ways in which people talk 
of themselves and their community.
The data presented above illustrate the sense of the informants’ ambivalence and 
cognitive dissonance regarding the ways in which events are mediated by news, while 
also pointing to flexible thinking and ‘cosmopolitan’ modes of consciousness that eschew
44 Some talked of the trauma of exile, the trauma of living in Britain and the trauma of the Palestinian 
people as a collective.
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narrow, particularistic patterns of thinking and belonging. That said, there is little doubt 
that the informants’ capacity to be flexible also depends on linguistic, intellectual and 
cultural competences — those able to converse in English, for example, were more 
reflexive in their thinking about themselves and their community — and depends also on 
perceptions of cultural diversity and individuality as assets. What this means is that living 
in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society like Britain can allow people to tap into 
diversity and interaction with different cultures and for ‘alternative’ imaginations that 
stretch our thinking about the national ‘imaginary’ that is so central to the Andersonian 
model.
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusions
The struggles occasioned by identity politics need to be understood not as simply 
between those who claim different identities, but within each subject, as the multiple 
and contending discourses o f our era challenge any or our efforts to attain stable 
self- recognition or coherent subjectivity (Calhoun 1994:19-20).
This thesis has examined the significance and dynamics of news to members of the 
Palestinian diaspora in Britain. I chose news as the media genre for investigation because 
of its assumed centrality for the political, economic and cultural participation of 
individuals at the local, national and global levels and because the news media have 
largely been neglected in the burgeoning literature on migrant and diasporic groups. I 
focused on the Palestinians in Britain as the subjects for this research because their long- 
term media invisibility in the British public space and their assymetrical power position 
vis-a-vis Israel have been crucial to the ways in which they make sense of news and use it 
in their social actions and interactions.
In this study, I have shown that news, particularly television news, emerges as a 
significant (social) resource in the informants’ everyday lives, and a crucial media genre 
around whose consumption the informants’ talk of identity, of belonging and community 
and of citizenship are fraught with tensions between the personal and the political and 
between the collective (particular) and cosmopolitan (universal). These tensions were 
impossible to discount in the analysis of the interview data, highlighting that identity 
politics continues to matter in certain contexts. Yet to say that the informants become
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more Palestinian or that they become more nationalistic and more politically and/or 
socially active because of their engagement with news would be misleading. Indeed, a 
core argument in this thesis is that a proper understanding of the ways in which people 
make sense of and use mediated representations necessitates situating meaning-making 
processes within their broader social, cultural and political contexts that eschew the 
media-centrism prevalent in much media research and that provide a holistic picture of 
how a variety of factors can shape mediation processes.
What emerges from the synthesis of the top-down approach (drawing on various inter­
disciplinary theoretical paradigms) and the bottom-up approach (an audience study of the 
informants’ attitudes to and talk about news) is that news functions (1) as a cultural and 
political forum that provides people and/or members of a particular political or cultural 
community with self-legitimation and (2) as a resource for participation in public life by 
its making people aware of and concerned about a range of issues pertaining to 
themselves and the collective. Though the findings related to this work are specific to the 
informants, I argue that they can contribute to our understanding of contemporary 
mediated cultures, diasporas, the meaning of news and its audience, and the processes 
within which identities are formed and transformed in contemporary cultures.
In this concluding chapter, I bring together the theoretical underpinnings informing this 
research and the empirical data to summarise its contributions. Before doing so, I use the 
next section to summarise each chapter’s key points, then I move on to the key arguments 
and limitations of the thesis. I conclude the chapter by outlining this study’s contribution 
to media and cultural studies, political communication literature, nationalism and 
collective memory and proposing new avenues for future research.
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9.1 The chapters in context
The focus in much of the recent literature on diasporas and their media use in the context 
of globalisation has been on hybridity (Bhabha 1994; Brah 1996), a notion implying an 
arrived-at point between the local and global. By contrast, this research started with a 
rejection of the global and local binary which tends to obscure the interdependence and 
interweaving of these processes. This direction was also adopted in the analysis of the 
informants’ uses and talk of a variety of news media, allowing me to move beyond the 
bipolar models of power versus resistance and active versus passive popular in much 
audience and reception research, and focus on the cognitive and interpretive processes 
the informants use to make sense of news media they engage with on a daily basis.
This approach informed the theoretical frameworks adopted in this study. The first, 
detailed in Chapter Two, sees identity as a continuous discursive process of 
identification, a notion that captures the different and continuous negotiations of 
meanings articulated as people navigate various tensions and points of reference in their 
lives while taking into account the historical, socio-political, economic and discursive 
contextswithinjvhich these processes take shape. The second, proposed in Chapter 
Three, draws on the theoretical framework of mediation to argue for understanding news 
as a form of cultural discourse which allows us to examine through a bottom-up analysis 
how it remains a key media genre for contestations of culture and ideology. The third, 
detailed in Chapter Four, draws on Srebreny’s (2000) notion of looking around to suggest 
that diasporas must be understood as social formations in the process of becoming, which
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means they are responsive to local, global and transnational symbolic and material 
products.
In order to situate the informants in this study, Chapter Four built on a wide range of 
scholarship on Palestinian history, on national identity and communication, collective 
memory and political mythology to provide a historical account of the Palestinian 
diaspora that underscores the centrality of the twin narratives of Palestinian-ness (what it 
means to be Palestinian) and Palestinian-ism (Palestinian national consciousness).
Chapter Five detailed the methodological rationale behind this study, a synthesis of a top- 
down (theoretical) approach and a bottom-up (empirical) analysis, and its drawbacks, 
while Chapter Six provided demographic and descriptive details of the informants and the 
modes of the analysis, which used the tools of thematic analysis to make sense of the data 
as well as a continuous recursive process that facilitated the interpretation by constantly 
moving between the theoretical arguments and the evidence.
In the second part of the thesis, Chapters Seven and Eight, I presented the analysis of 
the empirical work, based on the informants’ attitudes to news, their identity and 
community. Chapter Seven focused on the informants’ social uses of news, its centrality 
in their lives and its potential role in societal action and interaction. The chapter also 
provided a brief review of the different news media, including Arab satellite television 
that the informants engage with ritualistically and obsessively -  their talk showed how 
these news media provide reference points that reinforce their ideological consciousness 
of nationhood and distinctiveness and also enable them to challenge dominant news 
frames as well as participate in public life, confirming that they represent alternative 
communicative spaces where citizenship and community can be practiced and
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experienced. Chapter Eight discussed the informants’ talk about themselves, community 
and belonging while paying particular attention to the processes -  narrativity and 
commuting -  that the informants make use of to take up different positionings. In 
highlighting the contexts within which the informants’ discourses become essentialising, 
the chapter revealed the continuous tensions between the self and the collective and 
between the national and cosmopolitan. To pull these chapters together, I now turn to the 
main findings to address the relationship between news and identity and between news 
and social action.
9.2 The Arguments in Context: Identification, Mobilisation and Participation
I started this thesis by talking of the Palestinians’ intimate or private sphere, a space 
where the Palestinians in Britain, like many other minority or diasporic group, talked and 
argued amongst themselves, i.e. within families and among friends, about their place in 
their community and in the host society. The intention was not to poke into the 
inadequacies of the Habermasian (1989) normative principle of the unitary public sphere - 
these have been eloquently addressed by many others, particularly within feminist 
literature. Rather, the aim was to explore whether and in what ways news can enable 
participation in public life and whether this participation is purely a matter of marking 
boundaries -  these are the common frames that people use to negotiate positions between 
the familiar and unfamiliar and between the local and the global - and of challenging real 
and imagined perceptions of inclusion and exclusion rather than a matter of formal 
citizenship.
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The context of the empirical inquiry was the continuing conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians and other related events mediated by a diverse array of news media, 
including the mainstream (Western media) and transnational (Arabic satellite 
broadcasting) varieties. The period of investigation, November 2001 to June 2003, saw 
the most serious escalation in hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians since the 
beginning of the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) in September 2000. It was also a 
period that can be described as involving intense grassroots political communication, a 
form of transnational connectivity, between the Palestinians in Britain and similar others 
in other diasporic spaces and in the homeland.
Though it goes without saying that the informants’ awareness and use of this 
transnational connectivity had been enhanced by the proliferation of and easy access to 
diverse news media, this thesis has shown that the intensification of conflicts in the 
Middle East and beyond and the uncertainties these create must be understood as having 
exacerbated a deep collective identity crisis centred on what it means to be Palestinian 
(Palestinian-ness) and what it means to feel Palestinian (Palestinian-ism) that has its roots 
in al-Nakba (the catastrophe) of 1948, an event that has been re-narrated, re-imagined 
and re-contextualised in subsequent unplanned ‘media events’.
In analysing the informants’ talk of news, I have shown that the global reach of news 
media, the immediacy of news and the live coverage of events mean that diasporas, such 
as the Palestinians, remain largely focused around nation-specific news dramas. At the 
same time, the analysis has shown that they are involved in negotiations of the 
parameters of citizenship and belonging in the host culture. Indeed, in the interviews 
conducted for this research, the informants’ talk of news and of themselves suggested a
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(continuous negotiation of positionings between what it means to be Palestinian (or the 
particular) and what it means to be cosmopolitan (or the universal) in the diasporic space. 
In  other words, while their conversations claimed distinctiveness and particularlistic 
Imaginations of the collective, they also appealed to universalistic principles of human 
and citizen rights, suggesting that while they are retreating into essentialising positions 
about themselves, their community and the ‘other’, they were reaching out to participate 
In the larger British public sphere.
Crucially, the informants’ talk of news reflected their awareness of the co-existence of 
two competing discourses about themselves (in mainstream and transnational news 
media) and which functioned as interweaving discursive variations rather than as polar 
opposites. This interweaving was reflected in the informants’ talk about and attitudes to 
news, which, this thesis argues, pointed to the co-existence in tension of open and closed 
or essentialising discourses. These closed discourses cannot be simply seen as discursive 
reifications of the distinctiveness of the community, but must also be understood as a 
means to mobilise for action, demand recognition and negotiate parameters of cultural 
and political citizenship in the host country.
This argument is supported by the analysis of the data in Chapter Eight where I 
suggest that the informants’ discourses reflect a consciousness of what I call a Palestine- 
centred identification, a discursive imagination that has a double meaning, as excluding 
others and as demanding recognition and visibility. While these two strands of 
consciousness or imagination are not irreconcilable, there is a sense that what is 
foregrounded in their talk is not collective harmony or a political identification with an
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increasingly metaphoric Palestinian nation, but a longing for self-respect and individual 
possibility and agency in the country of their residence (Britain).
The analysis of the interview material resonates with other findings in reception and 
audience studies, which have demonstrated that media audiences are neither totally 
passive nor totally active, but that they maintain a level of critical interpretation (cf. 
Livingstone and Lunt 1994). However, this thesis has also shown that the critical 
interpretation of news does not necessarily end at the moment of reception in the 
domestic space, but goes on to link everyday micro questions, such as those related to 
personal media preferences, who dictates these preferences or with whom one engages 
with media, to broader ‘macro’ questions of power, inclusion and exclusion in the public.
This interlinking came across clearly in the informants’ active ‘identity work’ through 
dialogic engagement (cf. Billig 1991) as well as through participation. Evidence of this 
active engagement in identity work was apparent throughout, but came into stark relief 
particularly in the informants’ contrasting between diverse mediated news accounts of the 
same event. It was in these contexts that questions relating to what these respondents 
perceived as their distinctiveness, as members of a particular political group, came into 
central focus, drawing attention to the ways in which news can play a role in the coming 
together of the audience members as a distinctive collective.
It was also within such contexts that comments such as “wow, I  am Palestinian” or “/  
am becoming more Palestinian ” were voiced by various informants, irrespective of age, 
gender, socio-economic status or religious orientation, suggesting that their engagement 
with identity politics can be understood as defensive and emotional cognitive reactions to
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perceptions of exclusion in the British public sphere as well as attempts to exercise 
citizenship.
It is commonly accepted that the experiences of migration and settlement themselves 
can require different orientations to the narratives through which identities are claimed 
orientations that are contingent on age, gender and reason for migration, but this thesis 
has shown that there were few generational or gender differences in the uses of news, 
suggesting that what was at stake here were claims to collective identity and community 
rather than claims to individuality. These findings, I argue, must be understood as 
contextual, and also in conjunction with the changes in the news media environment 
brought about by new technologies, 24-hour news and the prevalence of news of 
attachment rather than detachment (human interest as opposed to serious news), which 
have served to blur the boundaries between the private and public and between the 
personal and political.
The analysis of the informants’ uses of news shows how news can facilitate 
communication with others, confirming similar findings in previous media research on 
the socialisation aspect of media use, and how the appropriation of news as ritual 
legitimises its centrality and relevance for the informants. However, I have also shown 
that the centrality of news does not relate to its informational values only, but also to its 
importance as a means of surveillance as it helps them ‘stay alert’ to immediate and 
distant threats.
Importantly, the analysis showed that most of the informants were competent in 
making sense of news and its status as cultural discourse, therefore suggesting they were 
aware of its potential power. The respondents consistently redefined and reinterpreted the
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journalistic and political agendas, making critical comments of news content and media 
practices as well as informed decodings of the largely ahistorical1 mainstream (Western) 
news reports. They were also critical of the cultural (ideological) framing of Arabic news 
media irrespective of the fact that these news media provided them with supportive 
frames of reference (I called this the consensus narrative of Arab societies). That said, the 
analysis showed that the informants’ conception of news as a specific resource for social 
action varies according to the political and other social contexts in which they find 
themselves and in which they put it to use. On the one hand, some of the informants, 
though addicted to news, said they switched off because of their frustration or 
disillusionment with the communication processes, while others made use of news to take 
part in social action and to challenge dominant media frames.
Significantly, the analysis showed that the informants’ access to different mediated 
accounts of the same news event (particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) enabled 
them to argue out, meaning taking their debates about themselves and their community 
outside their intimate and private sphere. However, to say that engagement with diverse 
mediated news accounts on its own provokes societal action and participation would be 
misleading.
Indeed, as suggested by several informants in their accounts of their engagement with 
news, their ability to argue out was made possible because they lived in Britain and 
because they felt secure enough to participate and to achieve a sense of civic individuality 
and agency as understood in the Western perspective and which, according to liberal 
theory, cuts across class, nation, gender and ethnicity. Sharif, the young and articulate 
founder of Arabmediawatch (see Chapter Seven) has achieved this individuality in his
1 These reports were seen as lacking context and background.
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assuming a civic role of responsibility by challenging the dominant media frames. In this 
respect, his assuming this role, fulfils the notion of the “pre or non-political that becomes 
actualised at particular moments when politics arise.. .the key here is to underscore the 
processual and contextual dimension; the political and politics are not simply given, but 
are constructed via word and deed” (Dahlgren 2003: 155).
These arguments notwithstanding, I do not underestimate the limitations of the 
research, which chiefly relate to the particularity of the case study, the Palestinians in 
Britain. The fact that the context of the research was the continuing conflict presupposes 
that the informants were engaged with the news narrative on a continuous basis. 
However, I tried to overcome these limitations and problems by adopting a reflexive 
research methodology that allowed me to constantly move between the empirical data 
and the theoretical framework.
The orientation of the research remains primarily qualitative, but the use of a simple 
quantitative data -  based on the analysis of the interviews -  offered additional material 
for understanding the interactions between the informants. The sample, achieved through 
a snowballing non-probability sampling technique, may not be representative, but the 
quantitative data based on the interviews appeared to offer an adequate representative 
sample of the population under study. To bring this study’s contributions into focus, its 
five main insights are in order:
(a) News as site for contestations over culture. The fact that in making sense of news, 
the informants acted as social agents who had their own critical interpretations of 
news, but who nevertheless gravitated to those cultural texts that catered to their
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ideological and cultural perspectives (worldviews) suggests that news is 
conflictual, not neutral, and that its meanings are the products of contestations and 
inter-relations between cultural worldviews, ideology and relations of power. This 
supports the notion of news as cultural discourse, meaning that although news can 
be interpreted in different ways, it does provide markers for likely patterns for 
doing and thinking, though never directing action and thinking automatically.
This conjecturing corresponds with Schudson’s (1995) notion of how news can 
function like ideology and how it can potentially be a social force.
(b) Diasporas as social formations. The informants’ coalescing or mobilizing as a 
particular collective while at the same time “looking around” and probing 
(Srebreny 2000) suggests we can understand diasporas as social formations in the 
process of becoming. Thinking of diaspora as a social formation in the making 
provides a good analytical basis to discuss when diasporas can be addressed as 
social movements that can challenge dominant media frames and promote their 
own concerns in the media. This notion becomes particularly relevant to address 
in the context of the complex set of linkages that contemporary transnational 
dynamics make possible and sustain and which can provide alternative spaces of 
communication in which the meaning and boundaries of diasporic identity are 
continually constructed, debated and re-imagined.
(c) Essentialism/social constructionism as interweaving, rather than binaries. This 
thesis has shown that informants’ discourses about themselves suggest that 
identity is not a thing, but a short-hand description for ways of talking about the 
self and community, while means it is constructed across diverse and sometimes
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antagonistic discourses, practices and positions. Given that this notion, informed 
by social constructionism, assumes the human being as the agent, then it is worth 
discussing the process of becoming, and addressing how people think of 
themselves as agents and as participants. The question becomes even more 
relevant when discussing the contexts under which claims to collective and 
essentialising identities become prevalent. Though it has not been fashionable to 
talk of identity politics, it is important to acknowledge that claims to basic, 
primordial identities can be invoked particularly when these identities have been 
repressed, de-legitimated or devalued in dominant or public discourse. This 
understanding, this thesis argues, means rejecting the simple binary between 
essentialism and social constructionism and thinking of them as interweaving as 
this allows us to address how social terms we use and take for granted, such as 
identity and community, are the discursive products of ongoing debates and 
political struggles.
(d) The historical context and memory work. This thesis has shown that it is not 
possible to understand the relationship between news, memory and identity 
without considering its historical depth. As shown in the empirical work, in 
talking about news, the informants framed their personal narratives about identity 
and community in a historical context, invoking different historical trajectories to 
make sense of the present-day realities. This suggests that making sense of news 
activates a process where the past and present are used to mutually make sense of 
each other, therefore highlighting the fact that identities are contingent. This came 
across clearly in the ways in which the informants held onto previous cognitive
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and/or interpretive frameworks and unique value systems or worldviews grounded 
in the collective narrative of dispersal starting with al-Nakba (the catastrophe) of 
1948 in their making sense of news.
(e) The audience and mediation. There is little doubt that transnational news media 
have altered the understanding of political dynamics and the notion of the active 
audience. The dynamics of the ubiquity of and people’s dependence on media is 
sometimes taken for granted. However, as this thesis has shown, media use 
requires us to understand the processes of mediation which go beyond discussions 
of media influence or effect to a focus on the social and political context of 
production and consumption and the processes of mediation in which meanings 
are generated by producers and are negotiated by consumers. This has 
implications for addressing the notion of the audience and particularly the active 
audience. This thesis argues that it is no longer credible to discuss the active 
audience as an audience that makes choices or has different media preferences but 
that the active audience must be seen as an audience that understands that 
communication is a symbolic process in which reality is produced, negotiated and 
mediated not only by media producers, but by consumers as well.
9.3 Ways Forward
Though this thesis is situated within the media and cultural studies discipline, the nature 
of the investigation has been inter-disciplinary, drawing on scholarship in nationalism, 
collective memory, social psychology, political science and political communication. In
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this respect, this thesis offers some modest contributions to these various disciplines, 
though its main contribution is to the field of media and cultural studies. Furthermore, 
although this study is about the Palestinians in Britain, its theoretical frameworks can be 
extended to studies of social uses of mediated information, while its findings are relevant 
to other empirical contexts, particularly those dealing with the audiences. Though its 
arguments about inclusion and exclusion and the processes through which informants 
draw boundaries pertain to the news genre, but can be used in discussions of different 
media genres.
The findings resonate with a variety of cognitive theories and empirical studies on 
how audiences may approach media by analogy to perception and cognition of everyday 
phenomena outside the media -  studying the audience is particularly useful as it allows 
for exploring individual uses of news and their interpretations of and responses to media 
frames. That said, the focus on the audience intends to complement, not replace, other 
perspectives to understanding the meaning of news.
By concentrating on the audience uses of news, this thesis has provided a bottom-up 
analysis of the processes of mediation, participation and influence that differs from others 
relying on the traditional and often narrow conception of politics and power. By focusing 
on the audience talk of and around news, this thesis has shown how talk, in households, 
between family members and groups, blurs the boundaries between the personal and 
political because the language of this talk is a ‘public’ language.
Though broadly bom out of media and cultural studies, this thesis makes a modest 
contribution to the political communication literature in proposing a differentiated 
understanding of the meaning of political news and its uses. In addressing the audience’s
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use of news understood as cultural discourse, this thesis raises questions about whether 
more attached, emotional, contextual and engaged journalism may have different 
implications on political life and participation. Furthermore, it raises questions about the 
use of aesthetics and emotion and the relation between them and rational political 
discourse. The key question is whether emotional involvement is important for political 
and social action and in what ways can emotion appeal to the ways in which people may 
act.
This work’s exploration of increasing access to mediated information and diverse 
political news media could be useful in addressing whether more access to mediation 
communication may enable more participation in societal processes, which has 
implications for multi-cultural agendas in democratic societies. And, its exploration of 
the contexts under which the news audience cannot purely be seen as a news audience 
normatively understood to participate in public life as a reasoning public, but as an 
addressee called to coalesce as an engaged and emotional collective means we need to re­
think our understanding of the news audience. Finally, this work’s rejection of a simple 
dichotomy between social constructionism and essentialism serves to focus on how we 
need to re-address how individuals, as social agents, may engage in identity politics and 
how this engagement may relate to mediated accounts of cultural and social exclusion 
and marginalisation.
The local and the global, the personal and political and the intimate and public have 
occupied centre stage in this study of the uses of news among members of the Palestinian 
diasporic community in Britain. In focusing on the audience, my intention was not to
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celebrate audience, but to provide a bottom-up perspective of the news media framing 
processes and to address the question of media influence.
This study can be complemented by studies of news media production that would 
provide important insights on how the social and historical consciousness of collectivities 
are mediated and constructed transnationally and locally, while addressing the various 
organisational and framing strategies in national and transnational news production. 
Furthermore, this inquiry could be complemented by an ethnographic study of 
journalistic practices and strategies, allowing for a differentiated understanding of global 
and transnational news production and output and an understanding of how news 
practitioners maybe ‘cultural intermediaries’ (Featherstone 1992) framing and re­
organising international information for domestic and transnational audiences, therefore 
helping promote cultural/political change and/or re-confirming the status quo.
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